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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction - The New Seven Sisters and their Impact on the Global 
Energy Order
Introduction
Since the turn of the century the global energy order has been witnessing a 
substantial transformation. High oil prices, resurging resource nationalism in 
key producing regions worldwide, growing demand in combination with a 
decline of ‘easy oil’, rising influence of state-owned oil companies, and 
increased awareness of climate change all served to put energy, concerns about 
security of supply and demand, and the geopolitics related to it, high on the 
political agenda. However, while there are clear - and by now well documented 
- signs of a transformation taking place, the precise nature of this transformation 
of the global energy order has not yet been systematically researched.
Two major developments define the shape and direction of the 
transformation of the global energy order. Firstly, there is a geographical 
transformation in the patterns of production and consumption of energy 
(Bradshaw 2009). Recently, the non-OECD world has taken the lead and 
surpassed the OECD world, both in terms of production and of consumption of 
energy; a trend that is projected to continue (IEA 2011).1 This development 
coincides with a more general transformation in the global political economy 
towards what many by now label a more multi-polar world order, with several 
dominant growth poles. The significance of the current historical juncture is that 
these new growth poles are primarily situated outside the OECD area, and that 
their rise coincides with stagnating growth in the OECD world, aggravated by 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis.
Secondly, and partly related to the first development, there is the 
growth and expansion of non-OECD National Oil Companies (NOCs), i.e. 
(partly) state-owned oil companies with a non-OECD origin. Whereas NOCs 
have owned around between 60 and 70 percent of the world oil reserves for 
decades (see e.g. Victor, Hults and Thurber 2012), the novelty is that since the 
mid-90s the NOCs of major net exporters (such as Russia) and major net 
importers (such as China) are increasingly expanding their activities beyond the 
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national borders. As a result, they are directly penetrating markets that used to 
be dominated by Western private oil companies, commonly labelled the 
International Oil Companies (IOCs). The major proponents of these non-OECD 
NOCs have been branded the ‘New Seven Sisters’ (Hoyos 2007a, 2007b), 
referring to the label that was initially given to the cartel of mainly Anglo-
American private oil majors that dominated the global energy order in the first 
half of the 20st century (see Chapter Three). These ‘New Seven Sisters’ have 
become increasingly influential in the global energy sector. They control about 
one third of the world’s oil and gas production and more than one third of its oil 
and gas reserves, and are claimed to be the new ‘rule makers’ by some industry 
experts (Hoyos 2007a).2 Subsequently, concerns have been raised about the 
viability of the (neo)liberal economic model – i.e. whether market forces will be 
sufficient to secure supply - and the future competitiveness and interests of the 
IOCs (e.g. Correljé and Van der Linde 2006, Helm 2005, Hoogeveen and Perlot 
2005, Vivoda 2009).
More recently, a dynamic has emerged that has the potential to have 
great impact on the transformation of the global energy order. This new 
dynamic is related to the so called ‘shale gas revolution’ and the production of 
‘tight oil’, i.e. unconventional oil and gas resources that have become accessible 
through ‘new frontier technology’, such as hydraulic fracturing. These 
technological advances have put the US on a path to becoming self-sufficient in 
terms of energy, and might – as some predict - in due time even make them a 
net-exporter of oil and gas (see IEA 2012a). Although potentially of great 
importance, these new developments are not integrated in the analysis of this 
dissertation. First of all, the actual impact of this particular ‘revolution’ has been 
contested and comes at high costs economically and ecologically (see e.g. 
Stevens 2012). Secondly, the path this development will take is still highly 
unclear. Thirdly, whatever the outcome of these developments, they do not 
diminish the importance of the major two trends that form the point of departure 
of the present study. 
Although recently a rich literature has appeared on NOCs, these studies 
have focussed on the efficiency of NOC’s operations and strategy (e.g. Victor et 
al. 2012, Wolf 2009a, also Eller et al. 2007, Hartley and Medlock 2008, Victor 
2007, Werenfels 2002), their relations to the home government (Hertog 2008, 
Mommer 2002), explanations of the variation between them (Jaffe et al. 2007, 
Marcel 2006, World Bank 2008), and differences with respect to the IOCs 
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(Vivoda 2009). Surprisingly little attention has, however, been directed towards 
how the expansion of non-OECD NOCs has influenced the social organisation 
of power in the energy industry. The impact of the rising non-OECD NOCs on 
the existing power relations and vested interests within the global energy order 
is, however, arguably crucial within an industry that is pivotal to most other 
industries and forms the tissue of modern industrialized societies. Most of the 
products used in everyday life from plastic, electronic devices (e.g. cell-phones) 
and detergents, to medicines, cosmetics and food additives (see list in Appendix 
E), contain some petrochemical product derived from oil or gas. In addition, 
these resources, of course, also form the indispensible fuel for the transport of 
all these products, as well as people, around the globe. Moreover, oil is a 
‘strategic commodity’; it is crucial to the interests of states, has major macro-
economic effects, is intimately related to national security, and serves as the 
backbone of every military apparatus in the world. Additionally, a vast amount 
of capital is amassed in the oil and gas industry and a significant share of this 
capital is concentrated within a top layer consisting of relatively few companies 
and a small number of directors. Over the year 2007, the directors of the world’s 
top ten private oil companies collectively managed almost 1.6 trillion dollars in 
revenues (Energy Intelligence Group, 2008). In comparison there were only 
seven countries in the world with a GDP exceeding that amount in 2008.3
There is also an important ecological dimension to questions 
concerning the current fossil fuel based energy order (see e.g. Bradshaw 2010). 
By now it is no longer contested that burning fossil fuel contributes to a large 
extent to global warming (IPCC 2007), the effects of which are devastating if 
not held in check (e.g. Biermann et al. 2012, IPCC 2007). A recent report has 
highlighted the role of corporations in this respect by putting together the 
simple arithmetic calculation that in order to stay below the threshold of 2 
degrees of global warming (which is a generally agreed upon threshold amongst 
most of the world’s nations, and was the main outcome of the Copenhagen 
Accord on climate change in 2009), only around 565 additional gigatons of 
carbon dioxide can be burned until 2050. To put this into context, global use in 
2011 was 31,6 gigaton (IEA 2012b), which means that the usage rate should be 
drastically reduced. However, the amount of carbon contained in the existing 
proven reserves of conventional hydrocarbons (oil, gas, coal) held by the 
world’s major energy companies (IOCs and NOCs) is estimated at five times 
that number, i.e. 2,795 gigaton (Leaton 2011). In other words, 80 percent of 
those reserves would need to be left untouched in order to hold on to the two 
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degree threshold. If left to the logic of the market and the interests of the 
corporations, however, those carbons will be burned and the amount of CO2
released in the atmosphere will be five times too much (McKibben 2012). 
While these are rough estimations, they provide sobering numbers and 
underscore the importance of understanding who directs the industry, how and 
why.  Systematic empirical study into the configurations of corporate power 
within the oil and gas sector will thus add value to existing studies that focus on 
the economics, efficiency and policy / political implications of the NOCs. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to the current understanding of the ongoing 
transformation of the global energy order by providing an analysis of the impact 
of non-OECD NOCs expansion on the corporate and institutional power 
relations within the global energy order and on the rules of the game – i.e. the 
governance of that order - through the following research question:
How do we explain the nature of non-OECD National Oil Companies growth 
and expansion since the turn of the millennium, and their impact on corporate 
networks and governance of the global energy order?
The Puzzle 
The recent growth and expansion of state-owned oil companies has coincided 
with the resurgence of so called resource nationalism since early 2000s, i.e. a 
significant re-appropriation of the hydrocarbon industry by the state, in major 
producing regions of the world (such as Latin America, Russia and Central 
Asia), and / or renegotiations with foreign oil companies over access and terms 
of contracts (to be elaborated in Chapter Three). Combined, these phenomena 
signal a broader trend of increased state intervention in the energy industry, 
which provides a significant contrast with the preceding ‘80s and ‘90s when 
energy sectors globally were increasingly privatized and liberalized. 
The general re-intensification of state involvement also contains an 
interesting theoretical puzzle, since it highlights the still crucial relevance of 
national borders and manifestations of territorially bounded power. This 
relevance of territorially bounded power contradicts the widely shared notion 
that forces of globalization are progressively de-territorialising and 
transnationalising world politics, ultimately making national borders redundant
(e.g. Scholte 2000, Hardt and Negri 2001). It also contradicts the proposition, 
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often heard in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) that the rise of 
private authority will gradually lead to diffusion - some would even say erosion 
- of state authority (Strange 1996, Cutler et al. 1999). These assumptions, as 
well as the liberal predictions of a gradual process towards a peaceful and 
globally integrated unity of neoliberal market democracies (influential 
proponents of this view were Fukuyama 1992, Ohmae 1999 [1991]), seem to be 
refuted by the current developments, in which the crucial relevance and role of 
state ‘authority’ has made itself apparent not only with respect to energy 
security, but also in the domain of finance (see Van Apeldoorn, De Graaff and 
Overbeek 2012). In fact, these developments have led some authors to predict a 
‘return of state capitalism’ (see e.g. Bremmer 2008, 2009), the demise of the 
private oil majors and the take-over of NOCs (Odell 2006), and the outbreak of 
major resource wars (Klare 2001, 2004). 
In contrast to these state-centric approaches, liberal (institutionalist) 
approaches emphasise the interdependency of the global energy order (e.g. 
Yergin 2006), and the ‘liquid, competitive and truly global market for oil’ 
(Goldthau and Witte 2010:3), which purportedly would make the statist and 
geopolitical dimension less relevant, since market mechanisms and institutions 
are proposed to be primarily decisive in the distribution of supply, demand, and 
surpluses within the energy order.  Indeed, nationalist energy policies are 
considerably constrained by the interdependence created by a globally 
integrated energy market (e.g. Yergin 2006, Nye 2005). Additionally, the latter
crucially involves the power and agency of transnational actors and interests 
interacting on this market, not only corporations but also –as will be shown in 
this study – for instance lawyers, speculators, investors, consultants, and 
diplomats. 
While liberal (institutionalist) approaches rightly criticise the state 
centric approaches for failing to sufficiently consider the central role of markets 
and institutions in the workings of the global energy order (Goldthau and Witte 
2010:3), they - in turn – tend to overlook the crucial role that is played by states 
in order to ensure the functioning of markets and institutions. Subsequently, the 
liberal institutionalist approaches are unable to account for the apparent 
resurgence of state power, whereas the state-centric approaches fail to account 
for what this study will show to be a persistent and growing transnationalisation 
of the global energy order.
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The theoretical puzzle that emerges is how to understand and explain the re-
assertion and expansion of state power taking place within a context of an 
increasingly transnational and interconnected world. 
Critical Political Economy 
The theoretical perspective that will be employed in this study is rooted in 
critical political economy. From this perspective the state is conceptualized as 
inherently related to capital and the process of capital accumulation, the latter 
which includes, but is not limited to market forces. Moreover, it implies a focus 
on the role of agency - albeit interrelated with structure - emphasising social 
relations as a key focal point of analysis. States are hence seen as ‘state-society 
complexes’ (Cox 1981), structured by social relations that are rooted in an 
unequal distribution of economic, social, and political power. 
With the unfolding of global capitalism these social relations might 
transcend the territorial realm of the nation state, but do not make the latter 
irrelevant or redundant. On the contrary, even if the latest phase of global 
capital expansion has been accompanied by an ideology of unrestrained market 
forces and a minimum of state intervention, this does not imply that the state 
has withdrawn, as has been argued (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2001), but rather that 
it had its role redefined. In general, the state has a crucial role in facilitating and 
sustaining capital accumulation (see e.g. Van Apeldoorn, De Graaff, Overbeek, 
2012). In addition, the state has a specific role with regard to hydrocarbon 
production, as will be elaborated in the next chapter(s). While the state, seen in 
this light, has never ‘retreated’ (cf. Strange 1996) in any fundamental way, the 
recent decade is certainly marked by a renewed intensification of state 
involvement with respect to international energy relations. Yet, from the 
perspective adopted in this study, this re-intensification of state involvement 
does not necessarily take place at the expense of the workings of the market and 
corporate interests and drivers. In fact, it is to a large extent with the aim to 
support them, that the role of the state is being re-articulated.  
From this perspective, transnational relations are an important element. 
On a basic level, transnational relations can be defined as ‘regular interactions 
across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does 
not operate on behalf of a national government or of an intergovernmental 
organization’ (Risse-Kappen 1995:3).4 In addition to this actor based 
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conception, the transnational dimension also involves political processes and 
structures that constitute a social space which transcends national borders (Van 
Apeldoorn, Nölke and Overbeek 2007: 6-7). Taking this perspective, 
transnational does not mean de-territorial per se, nor making the state 
redundant. Rather, it offers the building blocks for an integrative theoretical 
explanation that can account for the persisting transnationalisation process 
within a system of capitalist states. The renewed geopolitical focus within 
global politics and the resurgence of state power and state capital in the realm of 
energy - from this perspective - reveals the paradox of capitalist state-society 
complexes: market forces are to prevail in order to secure fundamental 
economic interests, but they need to be backed up and corrected by the state. 
The meta-theoretical point of departure of this thesis is critical realism 
(e.g. Bhaskar 1975, Archer 1995, Sayer 2000) to be elaborated on in Chapter 
Two. From a critical realist perspective follows a conceptualisation of social 
reality as stratified - i.e. containing multiple layers of social structure, some of 
which are directly observable and some of which are not (Buch-Hansen and 
Nielsen 2005) – and constituted through interplay of agency and structure. As 
will be shown in subsequent chapters, (social) structure can be conceptualised 
as social relations at several levels of abstraction. Although, the concepts and 
method of social networks have rarely been applied as such, they are especially 
well suited for an analysis of social structure as rooted in critical realism, 
because social network analysis allows for an analysis of how individual or 
collective agency is embedded in and at the same time constructs social 
structure. Furthermore, it enables a visualisation of the non-material substance 
that social structure is made of. Since the methodology will be discussed in a 
later section, I will now first turn to defining the key concepts of the present 
study. 
Defining Key Concepts
This study examines the impact of non-OECD NOCs growth and expansion on 
the social organisation of power in the global energy order, including the formal 
and informal rules that govern these social relations. Within the broader social 
organisation of power I focus in particular on corporate networks, in which 
corporations and corporate elites (i.e. those people directing the corporations), 
are the central elements. Oil elites are also assumed to be active in shaping the 
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content of governance. The analysis, in sum, will therefore address three aspects 
that are key to the organisation of corporate power in the global energy order:
- corporate networks 
- corporate elite networks 
- governance 
Before turning to a further conceptualisation of these key terms, I want to 
elaborate shortly on what I mean by a ‘global energy order’ and how I will use 
this term in the rest of this thesis. The term global energy order refers broadly to 
the configuration and organisation of the global political economy of energy. 
Beyond oil and gas this of course includes coal, nuclear, electricity, renewables 
and so forth. The interest of this study is however not so much in the specifics 
of these commodities and differences in their industries or the particular 
production chains involved, but in the corporate and social relations of the key 
players that operate at the top of these different industries. The focal point of 
analysis in that respect is major integrated state-owned oil companies and their 
global expansion. The core business of most of these companies is oil, but 
certainly not exclusively (see below). Since they operate at the intersection of 
the corporate world and the political domain and this study takes a global 
perspective rather than an international comparative or regional perspective, 
‘global energy order’ seems an appropriate reference.  
Corporate Networks
The corporations that make up the top of the oil and gas industry can be divided 
into two main types, so called International Oil Companies (IOCs), which are 
listed, private oil companies, and National Oil Companies (NOCs), state-owned 
oil companies. While maintained in this study, it should be noted that both the 
terminology and the distinction between IOCs and NOCs are disputable. These 
designations stem from an era in which resource holders indeed nationalised 
their companies and thus when National Oil Companies were exclusively - or 
predominantly - active within their national borders, whereas International Oil 
Companies were, for a majority of their operations, operating abroad. 
Nowadays the categories are becoming increasingly blurred.5 This is not to say 
that these dimensions have become irrelevant, or do not imply real differences, 
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but to indicate that there is a trend of diffusion going on amongst these former 
rather neat categories. Moreover, lumping together these companies in single 
categories conceals the wide variety within these groups of companies. While 
there are large differences between individual IOCs (for instance between the 
French company Total and the American ExxonMobil), it is emphasised in the 
literature - and was repeatedly highlighted in the interviews undertaken for this 
study - that the NOC group is even more heterogeneous (see Victor et al. 2012,
Marcel 2006).6 Yet, the focus of this research is not so much on a detailed 
comparison of the differences between these companies (excellent studies that 
do provide such in-depth case studies and comparisons are for instance Victor et 
al. 2012, and Marcel 2006, also Jaffe et al. 2007) but rather on the nature of the 
expansion of major non-OECD NOCs and their impact on the corporate and 
social power structures in the industry.  
With respect to the terminology, one of the first things that stand out 
when looking at the major oil companies is their essentially transnational
character. Even a rather isolated company as the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) has subsidiaries abroad, and cooperates with private oil companies both 
inside Iran and abroad. This pertains even more to the ‘new consumers’ such as 
China, with state-owned oil companies that have substantive operations abroad 
and which are thus directly competing with  private IOCs in terms of seeking 
access to reserves. Therefore, nowadays it might be more appropriate, to make a 
distinction between state-owned and private Transnational Oil Companies 
(TOCs) and distinguish them from state-owned and private domestically 
operating firms. It should also be noted, as mentioned above, that, although 
these companies are called National (or International) Oil Company, their core 
business does also include other forms of hydrocarbons such as gas. To 
illustrate, whereas NOCs collectively own 73 percent of the world’s oil reserves 
and cover 61 percent of production, they have a substantial overweight  in gas 
as well, i.e. 68 percent of reserves and 52 percent of production (Victor et al. 
2012:3). 
However, since any categorisation is bound to oversimplify the 
complexity of social reality, the distinction between IOCs and NOCs serves as a 
useful heuristic devise to assess some of the changes that have taken place in the 
corporate and social relations of the global energy order, in spite of limitations 
of the terminology. It is also the common currency within this literature and the 
industry. Moreover, despite the blurring of the (original) distinction, there still 
is a fundamental difference between ‘an’ ExxonMobil or Shell (i.e. a typical  
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IOC from the OECD) and ‘a’ CNPC or Gazprom (i.e. a typical non-OECD 
NOC), which is primarily related to their different ownership structures. Given 
the research question of this analysis it is therefore considered a valid and 
legitimate distinction in spite of increasing heterogeneity and hybridisation. In 
the remainder of this study I will therefore maintain the distinction between 
IOCs and NOCs. In addition, I do however distinguish a third main type, which 
I label ‘Hybrids’, referring to partly state-owned oil companies (both majority 
and minority state-owned).
Corporate Elite Networks
Corporate elites, in this study narrowed down to what I call ‘oil elites’, are 
operationalised as the directors of the world’s major oil companies and taken to 
represent the top tier of the global energy order. The oil elites are however 
considered to be part of a more general corporate elite whose power is 
embedded in: a) corporate networks and b) inter-personal networks such as 
interlocking directorates (e.g. when one director holds multiple board 
memberships simultaneously), or policy planning and socialising networks 
(such as thinks tanks, business coalitions, elite clubs). Since this study analyses 
non-OECD state-owned corporations, it crucially also includes corporate elites 
with a different power base than ‘traditional’ Western corporate elites. This will 
be elaborated in the next chapter.
Points of enquiry will be the extent to which transnationalisation of the 
oil and their corporate networks has taken place elites (cf. Carroll 2010, 
Robinson 2007), how this relates to their national networks and what kind of 
differences we might encounter in this respect between OECD and non-OECD 
oil elites. As such, the aim of the analysis is not so much an examination of the 
distinct elite structures of the non-OECD major powers, but to see to what 
extent and how the expansion and growth of the non-OECD state-owned 
companies has also generated integration between OECD and non-OECD elites. 
Governance
Governance, is broadly understood as involving formal and informal rule 
making and refers to the ‘rules of the game’ (cf. North 1990). Three dimensions 
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of governance will be addressed in this study. First, governance that relates to 
the energy relations of the firms and the (home/host) states. Second, the 
ongoing marketisation and financialisation of energy governance, i.e. increased 
mediation by market-mechanisms in energy relations and growing importance 
of commercial and financial criteria and actors. Third, so called ‘global energy 
governance’, i.e. governance that transcends national borders (including 
regional governance). As will be further defined in later chapters, an important 
dimension that tends to be underexposed in much of the literature on global 
governance of energy is power (see Barnett and Duvall 2005b for a similar 
criticism on global governance in general). Employing the taxonomy set out by 
Barnett and Duvall (2005a) of four different forms of power, the analysis will 
highlight how in particular the ‘diffuse’ forms of power (i.e. ‘institutional’ and 
‘productive’ power) are crucial elements in the global governance of energy and 
its resilience to change (see for an elaboration of these terms, Chapter Two). 
Although the focal point of this research is on the corporate side of the 
industry, the state and inter-state relations do play an implicit role in several 
ways.  First of all, theoretically - as briefly addressed above and will be further 
elaborated in the following chapter - the state is seen as indispensable for the 
organisation of corporate power and market dynamics, i.e. fundamental to the 
process of capital accumulation. The concept of a state-capital nexus is 
employed in order to capture this interrelation. Secondly, the hydrocarbon 
industry has an inherent statist and geopolitical dimension: a) because the 
resources are territorially fixed; b) because the production of hydrocarbons is a 
prerequisite for capitalist production in general, has major macro-economic 
effects and is crucial for any military apparatus, lending it a particular strategic 
character. Moreover, given the focus on the impact of state-owned enterprises, 
the state is inherently part of the analysis, yet, not as a distinct unit of analysis. 
In order to better understand the transforming social organisation of power in 
the global energy order the study will, in sum, focus on oil elites: firstly, by 
mapping and analysing their power bases as embedded in corporate elite 
networks, and secondly, by analysing the ‘rules of the game’ that govern the 
energy order, in the shaping of which oil elites are seen to play an active role.  
A key argument of this thesis is that we are witnessing a hybridisation 
of the global energy order. This hybridisation, which is basically interpreted as a 
dynamic co-existence of distinctive private elements and state elements, is 
analysed along the following dimensions: the rise of hybrid oil companies, the 
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hybridisation of cooperation models, partnerships, and corporate networks, and 
a hybridisation of governance.
Methods and Data
Mapping Social Space
Because a main point of interest is the impact of NOC’s growth and 
transnational expansion on corporate and social relations in the oil and gas 
industry, I will start by mapping out these relations, using social network 
analysis (SNA). In this study I combine SNA with what I have labelled 
‘biographical and organisational mapping’, which basically implies that for each 
individual actor (in this study either persons or companies), all their relevant 
affiliations are mapped. For company directors this includes e.g. corporate 
directorships, political affiliations, academic affiliations, club memberships, 
other civil society affiliations, as well as demographic data. For companies this 
implies a mapping of all corporate affiliations, joint ventures, subsidiaries, 
strategic alliances, and investments. 
The basic premise of SNA is that it looks at the relations between actors 
instead of comparing their individual attributes. As Carroll points out, it 
enables: ‘a cartography of social space that moves beyond the impressionistic 
and anecdotal ... [b]y examining the actual relations that link persons and / or 
organisations into specific configurations of social structure’ (2010:11). While 
allowing for quantitative analysis, SNA is investigative in character and not 
primarily confined to hypothesis testing by means of statistical models (De 
Nooy, 2005). In addition to the visualisation and analysis of social structure, 
SNA also provides some basic measures which are indicators for social power 
and influence (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009). Social network 
analysis hence can provide insight into (changing) patterns of power, through 
relations on the actor level. 7 These insights may hold important answers to 
questions into the nature of the social relations, and the transformations within 
them, that neither traditional statistical analyses, nor purely theoretical 
reasoning can provide. But whereas network analysis helps to visualise and 
reveal patterns in terms of the social relations and networks in which actors are 
embedded - and which forms the context of their agency - a qualitative 
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interpretation of the meaning of these patterned relations is still needed after 
these patterns have become visible.
As Carroll rightly observes: 'Maps ...are static depictions. In tracing 
networks of global corporate power ...  we gain a more systematic 
representation of the actual elite structures that both enable agency and 
channelize it, to some extent, along pre-constituted pathways [...] but we lose 
narrative detail – the contingent flow of human agency through interconnected 
events’ (Carroll 2010:11, see also Pettigrew 1992).  In order to gain a better 
understanding of the meaning, implications, and causes of these changing 
patterns of relations, i.e. ‘narrative detail’ as Carroll (2010:11) calls it, thirty 
two in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted for this research, with 
representatives  from the corporate and political world, as well as a selection of 
experts. Before elaborating on these interviews I will outline the way I have 
approached the network analyses. 
Analysing Corporate Elite Networks
The selection of companies is drawn from the top 50 of the world’s most 
important oil and gas companies, based upon a widely recognised annual 
ranking of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW). This ranking is widely 
recognised and based on operational data from more than 130 firms. The PIW 
ranking uses six individual rankings (oil reserves, oil production, natural gas 
reserves, natural gas output, refinery capacity, and product sales volumes), 
which are then added together to determine a cumulative, overall position of the 
firms. This allows for meaningful comparisons of all types of companies 
(including state owned firms) and thus differs from more financially oriented 
corporate rankings. In fact, the PIW top 50 contains a rather even mix of IOCs 
and NOCs, which together can reasonably be assumed to make up the core of 
the global energy market. Indeed, as illustrated will be illustrated in Chapter 
Three (Table 4), the companies in this ranking account for a majority of the 
world’s oil and gas reserves and production.
Since no empirical studies of this kind predated this current study, an 
original data base of panel data (i.e. multiple dimensions observed over multiple 
time periods for the same firms) had to be constructed, which limited the 
number of cases that could be included. The more in-depth mapping of the 
changing corporate relations of non-OECD NOCs, and the configuration of the 
elite networks of the board members of both NOCs and IOCs, therefore focuses 
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on a selection of the PIW top 50 companies (see Table 1 below and for a more 
elaborate overview including operational measures and financial indicators, see 
Appendix B).
Table 1: Case selection
Firm Home country Type
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100% state-owned
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) Iran 100% state-owned
ExxonMobil USA IOC
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) Venezuela 100% state-owned
China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) / PetroChina
China 100% state-owned
British Petroleum (BP) UK IOC
Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands / UK IOC
Chevron USA IOC
Total France IOC
Gazprom Russia 50,0023 % state-owned
TOTAL N directors 182
TOTAL N IOCs 94
TOTAL N NOCs 88
Priority was given to the largest and most dominant types of OECD 
International Oil Companies and non-OECD National Oil Companies because 
the main focus of interest is on changing power relations at the apex of the 
system. Instead of extending the number of cases I chose to look at several 
dimensions of the changing relations of the main corporate actors, in order to 
get a more comprehensive grasp of transformation and impact. These 
dimensions of analysis are summarised below.
1) A network analysis of the changing corporate networks of a selection of 
the world’s largest state-owned oil companies (NOCs) including their:
x corporate relations (such as joint ventures and equity alliances)
to other oil companies within the global energy market;
x geographical strategies and corporate strategies such as vertical 
integration, diversification, etcetera;
x ownership structures.
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In order to assess whether changes, and if so, what kind of changes have taken 
place in the composition of these networks, these networks will be measured 
over time and compared. The most significant changes are expected to have 
taken place since the turn of the millennium. This is not to imply that the origin 
of those changes can be traced back only as far as the year 2000, but that a 
number of structural shifts that had been ongoing for a long time – as will be 
described in the historicising part of this study - became manifest around the 
turn of the millennium. In order to capture possible shifts I will therefore 
compare the corporate networks on two points of time: in 1997 and in 2007.
2) A network analysis of the directors in charge of the world’s largest 
private and state-owned oil companies mapping all their affiliations in 
2007 in the following domains:  
x corporate affiliations (including financial capital);
x policy planning affiliations;
x state affiliations.
In this case I refrained from a longitudinal comparison of the networks. Since 
the findings from 2007 showed a lack of overlap between the oil elite networks 
connected to the OECD IOCs and non-OECD NOCs respectively, it could 
hardly be expected that these networks would have been more integrated before 
2007. For a different research question and another type of analysis, such a 
comparison could be very useful however. The data base that has been compiled 
for this study might very well contribute to such future research.
The software programmes Ucinet and Netdraw (Borgatti et al. 2002) were used 
to conduct these analyses.
The narratives: Expert and Elite interviews
Expert and elite interviews - as any research strategy - have their particular 
strengths and limitations (see for a discussion Bogner, Littig and Menz 2009, 
also Thomas 1993). For the particular questions asked in this thesis, they 
provided a critical and unique source of ‘inside information’ about the interests, 
ideas, and positions of the actors that make up the social structure of the oil and 
gas industry. The data from these thirty three interviews have been used in 
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addition to the structural patterns revealed by the network analyses. The 
interviews were conducted using a semi-structured set of questions, many of 
them face-to-face, some of them – given the sometimes large geographical 
distance, as well as time and costs constraints – by telephone. In a few cases 
interviewees provided (additional) written answers and / or comments. The 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, analysed, and triangulated with 
document analysis, secondary literature and the findings from the social 
network analyses based on organisational and biographical mapping. 
Interviewees included: corporate officers and advisors from major IOCs and 
NOCs; directors of global governance bodies such as the International Energy 
Agency and the International Energy Forum; diplomats; corporate lawyers; high
level state representatives (e.g. former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Ambassadors, Energy envoys); and a selection of renowned experts from e.g. 
Oxford Energy Institute, Chatham House (London), and the James Baker 
Institute at Rice University, Houston (see Table 2 below and for a full list of 
people and affiliations, see Appendix A).
Table 2: Overview Categories of Interviewees
Category of interviewee Total* Affiliations of interviewees
Global Governance Bodies 4 IEA, IEF, ERT
Corporate officers and
advisors
14 BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Halliburton, 
CNPC, NIOC,  BTC pipeline, GasTerra
Top diplomats 3 Energy Envoys, Ambassadors, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Service
Corporate Lawyers 4 Anonymous
Experts 9 Oxford institute for Energy Studies, 
Chatham House, James Baker Institute, 
Rice University,
* Note that two interviewees only provided written comments, and that some interviewees had 
several types of affiliations, see list in Appendix A.
A note of caution with respect to the interviews: Since the thesis deals with a 
sensitive issue within a strategically important sector, it could be expected that 
especially ‘high level’ interviewees might be reluctant to reveal all they know. 
In particular active corporate members might rather express the corporate 
perspective than their personal views. However, many of the interviewed 
corporate representatives - as well as political representatives – could speak of 
experiences prior to their current position and in that regard were less 
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constrained. Some of the information that they have shared could not be 
disclosed explicitly and some requested to remain anonymous. Non-OECD / 
NOC representatives proved challenging to reach and - at times - felt more 
restrained to talk openly. Nonetheless, a substantial number of non-OECD / 
NOC representatives took part. In addition – as mentioned earlier - a selection 
of renowned experts were interviewed which also helped to fill in some of the 
gaps.
Data
Data on the oil companies were first collected from the companies’ annual 
reports, which were then cross checked and extended with data from the 
companies’ websites. The latter provide an increasingly rich and reliable source 
for energy resource data (see Arnott 2004). Other data came from company data 
bases (like Hoover’s and BusinessWeek); the energy statistical databases of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), US government’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and OPEC; UN World Investment Reports (WIR 2007); 
the Boston Consultancy Group (BCG 2007); and Energy Intelligence Group 
reports (Energy Intelligence Group 1997, 2002, 2008) as well as the Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly (PIW) Annual Ranking (see Chapter Four for elaboration).
Data on the members of the boards were collected first from the 2007 
Annual Reports of the selected oil companies, or from their Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. These biographical data were then cross 
checked and completed with data from financial and corporate databases such 
as Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Business Week, Hoover’s company data base, 
Lexis Nexis company database, and Fortunes profiles. Finally, when there was 
no precise time indication, the annual reports of affiliated companies were 
screened in order to confirm the actual affiliation. This was also done for the 
affiliations with policy planning organisations and for the state affiliations: 
reports, publications, and websites of those affiliations were screened and cross 
checked where possible. 
As the basis for the analyses of Chapter Three, the following data 
(bases) were used: BP Annual Statistical Review (2012), a supplementary 
database of Wolf (2009b), Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) annual 
rankings, and the annual top 50 energy company market capitalization rankings, 
provided by PFC Energy (2012).
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Contribution to the Literature
This study is rooted in critical International Political Economy (IPE) and 
contributes first of all empirically, by providing a systematic study into the 
configurations of corporate power within the petroleum industry – which is 
critical to contemporary setup of global capitalism. Secondly, the study 
contributes to a broader theoretical debate within this literature on the 
geopolitical dimension of global capital accumulation processes and the re-
articulation of state power in the recent decade, as will be elaborated in the next 
chapter. In addition there are three other fields of research to which this study 
has an empirical and theoretical contribution to make: the energy politics 
literature, corporate elite studies, and the global governance literature.  
Energy Politics Literature
With the recently intensified focus on energy security, commonly understood as 
the availability of sufficient supply and demand at affordable prices, increasing 
attention is again paid to the phenomenon of resource nationalism and the 
growing influence of National Oil Companies (NOCs) in academic literature 
(e.g. Victor et al. 2012, Jaffe et al. 2007, Pirog 2007, Stevens 2004, 2008, Van 
der Linde 2000, Marcel 2006, Xu 2007, Wälde 2008, Vivoda 2009). The 
present study makes a contribution to this literature in both empirical and 
theoretical respects. As mentioned, the existing literature tends to look at NOCs 
performance and efficiency as well as at variation amongst them. This current 
study however, shifts the focus towards the impact of NOCs growth and 
expansion on corporate networks and governance of the oil order. Whereas most 
studies on NOCs (and their expansion) take a rather atomistic view of these 
companies, comparing individual properties, this research seeks to adopt a more 
holistic view, focussing on the relations between actors, institutions and their 
ideas and interests. The changing relations between NOCs and IOCs since the 
mid-90s, including their ownership structures and modes of governance, have 
not yet been systematically explored. Existing studies often portray the global 
energy market as a zero-sum game of ‘IOCs vs NOCs’, or ‘net-importers vs net-
exporters’. In other words, one group of actors is pitched against the other, and 
when a shift in power takes place, IOCs are perceived to lose power to the 
NOCs (the resource holders) or vice versa (Jaffe et al. 2007, Stevens 2008, 
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Vivoda 2009, Wälde 2008, Wilson 1987). By focusing primarily on relations 
between these actors, this study instead, will (also) incorporate the shared 
properties and interdependencies between them, which will generate a different 
picture of the power distribution between NOCs and IOCs and the changes that 
have happened in their corporate and social relations  since the mid-90s. 
There is a general lack of theoretical analysis within the rapidly 
growing body of literature on the (geo)politics of energy security and the rise of 
NOCs. Instead it  is rather marked by (often quite anecdotal) empirical analyses 
of ‘geopolitics of oil’ and ‘resource wars’ (Klare 2001, 2004, for criticism see 
Stokes 2005, Bridge and Wood 2010, and, an important exception being Labban 
2008, from an economic geographical perspective). The existing explanations 
tend towards either economic reductionism – explanations exclusively 
focussing on forces of demand and supply or economic efficiency – or state-
centric analyses (neglecting crucial non-state actors and forces). This study, by 
advancing a theoretical framework to explain the contradictory dynamic posed 
by a resilience of state power and an expansion of state capital within a 
simultaneously increasingly interdependent and transnationalising global energy 
order, provides an more integrative perspective on these questions, allowing for 
the co-existence of state and non-state actors and dynamics, as well as the 
interplay between them. 
In sum, this present study aims to contribute to the literature on energy 
politics by:  1) adding empirical mass to existing research on the  the expansion 
and growing influence of non-OECD state-owned oil companies (NOCs) by 
focusing on the under-researched domain of their impact on corporate and elite 
networks in the industry and; 2) providing a theoretical, historically embedded, 
analysis of that process - and the concurrent transforming role of the state -
within an increasingly transnational global energy market.
Corporate Elite Studies
This dissertation builds upon a long tradition of (network) studies on corporate 
and power elites, interlocking directorates, and class formation (e.g. Scott 
1991b, Fennema 1982, Domhoff 1967, 2009, Carrol and Fennema 2002, Carroll 
and Carson 2003, Carroll 2010, Heemskerk 2011, 2013, Van Apeldoorn 2002,
Van der Pijl 1998). In particular Carroll et al. have provided rigorous empirical 
accounts on the basis of social network analysis, with a focus on a global 
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corporate network and the conception of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) 
(see for different approach on TCC, Sklair 2001, also Robinson and Harris 
2000, Robinson 2004). Within this research tradition there is, nonetheless, little 
to no empirical analysis of corporate elite networks in the oil sector, neither has 
this been studied in light of the growing influence of the so called global South 
(non-OECD), which e.g. Carroll and Carson (2003) still identify as the (semi) 
periphery. In fact, non-OECD elites do – as of yet - hardly appear on the radar 
screen of this body of research (see Carroll 2010:224-236). The case selection 
for these studies is often based on the Global 500 companies, which includes 
the firmly established players of the global economy, but which puts emerging 
players and their elites at a disadvantage, since they are still climbing the ladder 
of corporate growth. While this illustrates that in terms of a global corporate 
elite the West is still dominant, the development of the rising non-OECD 
corporate elites is nonetheless a significant phenomenon that needs to be 
researched. Therefore a different point of departure is taken in this dissertation. 
By providing empirical evidence of the nature and configuration of elite 
formation at the apex of the oil sector, and the extent to which integration 
between the OECD and non-OECD elites has taken place within this domain, 
this study thus aims to contribute to: a better understanding of the social 
organisation of power of the world’s leading oil elites and of how that power is 
extended beyond the domain of their corporate boards into civil society and 
politics; and enhance the understanding of the relationships between the non-
OECD oil elites and the OECD elite networks, in order to assess the extent to 
which the non-OECD oil elites form distinctive (and perhaps rival) networks, or 
have become integrated within the Western elite networks and the power 
structures that they constitute.
Global Governance literature
It is only quite recently that a body of research has emerged that approaches the 
debate on energy security and (geo)politics from a global governance 
perspective (Lesage, Van der Graaf and Westphal 2010, Goldthau and Witte 
2010, Florini and Socavool 2009, Florini and Dubash 2011, Goldthau 2011, 
Colgan, Keohane, Van der Graaf 2012). Within this emerging body of research 
it is generally stressed that the key challenges related to energy – such as 
security of supply and demand, transition to a more sustainable energy order, 
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and energy poverty (see e.g. Goldthau 2011, Lesage et al. 2010) – can only be 
governed globally. Yet, both a common set of rules and a capable organisation 
to address these concerns are (still) lacking. To a large extent, this is caused by 
the fact that energy is a ‘strategic good’ intimately related to the sovereignty 
and control of states (as also identified by e.g. Lesage et al. 2010).
Beside states – and not necessarily unrelated - there are however 
significant other vested interests in the oil and gas industry that might form 
obstacles to the development of adequate responses to these energy (security) 
challenges. Most notably of course are the conflicting interests of the major oil
corporations (a significant share of which are state-owned), which are the 
primary focus of this study. In order to assess the potential for obstacles to, and 
the nature of global governance of energy that would be capable of dealing with 
the major challenges that face the global energy order, it is crucial to understand 
which interests are driving the contestation of production and use of 
hydrocarbon resources (see also Newell 2011). 
The existing literature that assesses the nature of and the potential for 
global governance of energy, focuses on global or regional regulatory bodies 
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Lesage et al. 2010, Florini 
2011) and the Organisation Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Goldthau 
and Witte 2011), national governments (Kong 2011, Dubash 2011), 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the G8 (Lesage et al. 2010, Van 
de Graaf and Westphal 2011), financial actors such as developmental banks 
(Nakhooda 2011), export credit agencies (Wright 2011), and financial 
governance of energy (Newell 2011). While the role of companies – in 
particular state-owned oil companies – is referred to at times, or thought to play 
an implicit role (Goldthau 2011, Lesage et al. 2010, Newell 2011), it has not 
been thoroughly researched yet in this context. It is here that this study has an 
important contribution to make, in particular given the crucial role that these 
actors apparently play in the global energy order and its governance. Another –
yet related - contribution of this study is that it includes a power dimension into 
the governance analysis, which most of the global governance literature tends to 
bracket (see Barnett and Duvall 2005b, exceptions are critical governance 
studies such as Overbeek et al. 2012, Rupert 2005, Fuchs 2007, Soederberg 
2010). The latter also applies to the global governance of energy literature (but 
see e.g. Lesage et al. 2010, Newell 2011).
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Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured as follows: The introductory chapter outlined and 
contextualised the main research problem and provided a review of existing 
literature related to the topic, as well as a brief outline of the theoretical and 
methodological approach of the study. This introduction is followed by three 
parts. Part I includes two chapters on the general dynamics at play. In Chapter 
Two a theoretical and conceptual framework will be delineated. This second 
chapter theorises the broader re-articulation of state power within the global 
energy order - signified by the resurgence of resource nationalism and the 
expansion abroad of state-owned non-OECD energy corporations - alongside 
the persistently widening and deepening transnationalisation of the global 
energy order. This is argued to be rooted in the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, in particular its expansive character and the facilitating and 
sustaining role of the state in this regard. Chapter Three places the rise of non-
OECD NOCs in a broader historical context. Firstly, by documenting the ebb 
and flow of resource nationalism and the critical junctures in the development 
of the post-war global energy order. Secondly, by way of an analysis of the 
geographical shift in patterns of production and consumption of energy since 
the mid-60s, based on descriptive data. Thirdly, by assessing the extent to which 
these changes are reflected in changes in the corporate top of the industry 
during the last three decades. In sum, Chapter Three provides a historical 
backdrop to the current transformation and a more systematic but brief
overview of the longer term development of two main characteristics by which 
that transformation is defined: the growing share of non-OECD production and 
consumption of energy and the rise of non-OECD NOCs in relation to the IOCs. 
The second part of the dissertation, Part II Networks of Power, maps the 
process of NOC growth and expansion over the course of the last decade (1997-
2007) and analyses its impact upon the social organisation of power at the core 
of the global energy order. To this purpose, Chapter Four presents longitudinal 
evidence of a contradictory development with on the one hand the growth and 
global expansion of state-owned energy companies, and on the other hand an 
increased integration of the state-owned energy companies with the private oil 
companies and within the core of the global energy sector (hence an increasing 
transnationalisation). Chapter Five shifts the focus to the directors in charge of 
the oil companies. The aim of this particular chapter is to provide more insight 
into the configuration of social power at the commanding heights of the 
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petroleum sector. This is done through the analysis of the social networks that 
the directors of the world’s largest oil companies (i.e. oil elites) create through 
their affiliations with other corporations, transnational policy planning bodies, 
and the state. 
The final part of the dissertation, Part III, focuses on the ‘rules of the 
game’: i.e. it investigates the question to what extent and how the (global) 
governance of energy has been influenced due to the rise of non-OECD NOCs 
and the configuration of the corporate elite networks, as analysed in the former 
two chapters. Chapter Six analyses three dimensions of governance. Firstly, it 
analyses to what extent the rise of non-OECD NOCs and the hybrid alliances 
that they increasingly form, indeed signifies the emergence of a new ‘statism’ in 
energy governance. Secondly, it analyses how corporate lawyers, financial 
speculators and investors, and energy service companies contribute to both the
marketisation and financialisation of global energy governance. As a related 
matter it provides analyses of how the entrance of these relatively ‘new’ types 
of private actors in the global energy governance arena simultaneously 
empowers and conditions the behaviours of NOCs. Thirdly, Chapter Six will 
look at the institutional infrastructure of (global) energy governance. This 
governance and associated rule set are shown to still be largely dominated by 
and biased towards the West. Yet, this configuration is not representative of the 
emerging multi-polarity, understood as the existence of multiple growth poles, 
in which the rising powers and their state-owned corporations gain increasing 
power and influence (i.e. a seat at the table), and are increasingly capable of 
playing by the rules of the game but are not yet part of the process of defining 
them. Nonetheless, while partly internalising these rules, the rising powers also 
remain tied to distinct national state-society complexes with distinctive rule sets 
and a distinctive statist character. This duality, I argue, is characteristic of the 
hybrid nature of the current transformation. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, 
will summarize the main findings of the study, it will discuss the empirical and 
theoretical implications and contributions of the research, and finally it will 
address possible limitations of this study as well as outline possible avenues for 
further research.  
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___________________PART I___________________
General Dynamics
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CHAPTER TWO
Theorising the State-Capital Nexus in the Global Energy Order1
Introduction
The expansion abroad of state-owned non-OECD oil companies and the 
resurgence of resource nationalism, are manifestations of a broader re-
articulation of state power within the global energy order. However, these 
processes take place within a persistent transnationalisation of that order. This 
provides a puzzle to which established approaches do not offer a satisfactory 
solution. As noted in the introduction, state-centric approaches tend to 
emphasise zero-sum conflicts over increasingly scarce resources and prophesise 
the outbreak of major ‘resource wars’ (e.g. Klare, 2001, 2004, Ross 2001, 
2004). These approaches thereby oversimplify the complexity of the global 
energy market and dismiss its increasingly interdependent and interconnected 
character. Liberal institutionalist approaches on the other hand, while 
emphasising the transnationalisation of the global energy order, cannot explain 
the resilience and expansion of state power which is seen to interfere with 
rationally functioning markets. 
In line with the dominant approaches above (i.e. realist state-centric and 
liberal institutionalist), the general approach in the literature on the 
transformation that the energy order is currently undergoing, is to frame it as a 
unidirectional shift between two discrete poles within a dichotomy. For 
instance, as a shift from market to state, (see e.g. Van der Graaf 2008: 30) or 
from IOCs to NOCs (e.g. Vivoda 2009). Similarly, the current juncture has been 
described as an intersection between two scenarios of ‘Regions and Empires’ on 
the one hand, and ‘Markets and Institutions’ on the other (Correljé and Van der 
Linde 2006). The former ‘involves a world broken up in rival political and 
economic blocks, competing for resources and markets via political, economic 
and military power’, whereas the latter ‘exemplifies an economically and 
1 A significant part of this chapter has been adapted from a single authored article 
published in Globalizations (2012), 9 (4): 531-545 (De Graaff 2012b).
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politically integrated, multilateral world with effective institutions and markets’ 
(ibid.:532) and would imply a ‘continuation and intensification of the 
international system based on multilateral relations and a globalization of 
markets’ (ibid.: 533).
While they certainly correspond with a common perception in politics, 
business, and academic circles, these dichotomous representations are both 
empirically and theoretically problematic. Capitalist markets cannot exist (or 
function ‘effectively’) without states (including their political, economic, and 
military power), and within a capitalist order both institutions are internally 
related (see also Van Apeldoorn et al. 2012, Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007). 
The framing of a transformation from market to state – or ‘Institutions and 
Markets’ vs. ‘Regions and Empires’ (Correljé and Van der Linde 2006) - misses 
the point of their co-constitutive relations within the current capitalist order. 
Analysis based on such a dichotomy leads astray because it fails to capture this 
interrelation. Moreover, both state-centric approaches and liberal institutionalist 
approaches tend to neglect or bracket the role of agency, or more specifically, 
the social relations and societal forces that drive, sustain, and transform both 
states and markets. Adopting a critical political economy perspective, this 
chapter will provide a theoretical and conceptual framework with which the 
contradictory tendencies of deepening transnationalisation and re-articulating 
state power can be explained – thereby emphasising the role of agency.
The particular focus of this study is on the agency and power 
concentrated in corporate elite networks – seen as an important nexus between 
the state and the market (or rather: between state and capital, see below) - and 
the role of ideas, norms, and practices in defining the rules of the game (i.e. 
governance). Since the study is about the impact of state-owned entities on 
these corporate networks and governance, corporate elites here not only include 
directors of private capital but also those in charge of state capital, i.e. what will 
be labelled as ‘state-corporate elites’. The chapter is structured as follows: First, 
it will address the meta-theoretical backdrop of this study. Second, the broader 
expansionist dynamics of global capital accumulation will be theorised, with a 
particular focus on the geopolitical dimension and the role of the state, putting 
forward the notion of ‘sovereign social space’ as key to understanding the 
geographical and jurisdictional dimensions embodied by the state that enable 
capital expansion. Third, it will look more specifically at the dynamics within 
the petroleum sector. The final section conceptualises what has been broadly 
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referred to as social organisation of power with a focus on corporate elite power 
given its central role in this study.
Stratified Social Reality – Structure and Agency
The meta-theoretical point of departure of this thesis is critical realism, which 
has as one of its main propositions the stratified nature of social reality. 
Bhaskar, the founding father of critical realism, distinguished between a real 
domain, an actual domain, and an empirical domain (1997 [1975]:13). 
According to his understanding, in addition to actual events and phenomena 
and empirical observations of the actual domain, reality contains a deep or real 
domain, which is not immediately accessible to experience (adapted from Buch-
Hansen and Nielsen 2005). As Sayer explains: ‘[T]he real is whatever exists, be 
it natural or social, regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us, and 
whether we happen to have an adequate understanding of its nature [...] 
Whereas the real in this definition refers to the structures and powers of objects, 
the actual refers to what happens if and when those powers are activated [...] 
The empirical is defined as the domain of experience ... (Sayer 2000:11, 12, 
emphases added). Because events are the result of contingent combinations of 
many underlying structures and mechanisms social reality is conceptualized as 
an ‘open system’.
This meta-theoretical starting point is of particular relevance for my 
study because of its conceptualisation of the role of agency in such a stratified 
social reality. In contrast to the constructivist notion of mutual constitutiveness 
(see Giddens 1984), critical realists see agency as shaping (social) structure, but 
within a context of previously shaped structures. Archer in this respect advances 
a temporal dimension arguing that: ‘these two aspects of social life [i.e. agency 
and structure] however intimately they are intertwined …are nonetheless 
analytically distinct’ (1995:65). By granting agency and structure analytical and 
factual independence, Archer opens up the ‘closed circle’ of structure and 
agency as conceptualised by e.g. Giddens, the latter which actually implies a 
constant and simultaneous reciprocity between agency and structure. 
Although agency is not pre-determined by structure, and thus can shape 
the social structure it is part of, actors inherit a structure that has been shaped by 
previous agency. In other words, this provides them with preconditions that 
have not been entirely of their own making. Structure is thus never deducible to 
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a particular agency or actors: it entails more than the sum of agency, and it has a 
dynamic (development) of its own. Similarly, agency is not fully determined by 
the structure it inherits, since agency has autonomous causal power to shape that 
structure. As Archer frames it: ‘to state that some structures are pre-existent to 
determinate agents and activities has no ontological priority over emphasising 
that the self-same agents are themselves prior to later structural elaboration […] 
it is precisely because such elaboration is co-determined by the autonomous 
causal power of current agents, that society can develop in unpredictable ways’ 
(ibid.:75).
Because this study is interested in the social organisation of power 
(within the oil and gas sector), a central concept, and heuristic devise, is social 
relations. In line with the meta-theoretical points of departure outlined above, 
social relations are seen as shaped by actors (agency), but are at the same time 
understood as a social structure that cannot be reduced to the properties or 
actions of the individual actors. As ‘social structure’ these social relations 
inform part of the identity and interests of actors and both facilitate and 
constrain particular behaviour. Yet these social relations also exist (and have 
potential impact) beyond that. In a similar fashion, agency has freedom of 
manoeuvre or a bandwidth of choice in terms of the social relations that an 
individual is part of.
Thus, this particular understanding of social relations does not propose 
a purely agential voluntaristic approach, nor is it making a case for structural 
determinism. Instead, social relations are seen to exist at different levels of 
abstraction. The most abstract social structure that I will address in this study, is 
the process of capital accumulation and the role of the state within it, to be 
explained in the next section. At an intermediate level of abstraction, one could 
arguably distinguish class relations or other segregating social relations rooted 
in an unequal distribution of material and immaterial power, these will however 
not be focused on specifically in this analysis.8 The most concrete level of 
social relations, that will be studied here, are inter-actor relations, that is: inter-
organisational, interpersonal relations. These, of course, partly originate in, yet 
are not reducible to, the former level of social relations. Social relations at this 
concrete level are conceptualised as social networks. As Dicken, Kelly, Olds 
and Yueng (2001:105) put it: ‘networks are both social structures and ongoing 
processes, which are constituted, transformed and reproduced through 
asymmetrical and evolving power relations by intentional social actors and their 
intermediaries’.
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The different layers of social structure identified here are interrelated, which 
implies that they impact upon each other. As such, a particular concrete 
configuration of social relations (such as a particular corporate network) will be 
more or less likely to emerge due to underlying structures (e.g. the dynamics of 
the capitalist accumulation process). However, these configurations are by no 
means predetermined (i.e. they are open systems, see Sayer 2000). The critical 
realist point of departure fits in very well with the methodology of network 
analysis adopted for this present study. As Hafner-Burton et al. (2009) 
formulate in an assessment of the network approach, structure from such a 
social network perspective is conceptualised as: ‘emergent properties of 
persistent patterns of relations among agents that define, enable and constrain 
those agents’ (p. 570). This implies that a particular position of an actor (or a 
group of actors) within a network provides them with certain opportunities or 
constraints (i.e. properties) that can be, but are not necessarily realised. A 
central position within a network potentially offers influence, since it for 
instance provides an actor with many ties/lines of communication, whereas a 
broker position (i.e. connecting networks that otherwise would be unconnected) 
offers potential leverage even if the actor is not centrally positioned in either of 
the networks that s/he connects.
Ideas are argued to play an important role in how social reality is 
perceived and thus in the way agency simultaneously acts within, and reshapes, 
social reality. Ideas do not emerge or exist in a vacuum, they are always 
produced by someone for some purpose, to paraphrase Cox well-known adage 
(1981:128). Subsequently, I propose that social relations, as conceptualised 
above, are crucial for both content and diffusion of particular ideas. More 
specifically, these social structures:
(a) shape the kind of ideas that emerge and that actors hold, in the sense 
that social position and social belonging to a great extent shapes one’s 
identity, interests, and worldview and defines the limits of what is 
considered possible, desirable, or rational and what is not;
b) to a large extent influence how ideas are transmitted and diffused, i.e. 
why certain ideas become dominant, widely accepted, seen as in the 
general interest, or appear on the agenda, and why others do not.
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It must be stressed here that I do not mean to imply that ideas can be reduced to 
a particular social position. Rather, ideas need to be placed within their social 
context. Hence, while concurring with constructivist approaches on the 
importance of ideas in structuring social reality, I argue that in order to 
understand why certain ideas become dominant and others remain marginal, we 
need to take into account underlying social relations and related power 
differentials.
Now that the meta-theoretical and main conceptual points of departure 
have been outlined, I turn to the dynamics of the state-capital nexus in the 
global energy order. I will start by addressing the most abstract social structure 
that forms part of my theoretical framework: the expansionary dynamics of 
global capital accumulation and its geopolitical dimension and will 
subsequently elaborate on the more specific dynamics of the petroleum industry 
from this perspective.
Dynamics of the State-Capital Nexus in the Global Energy Order
The Geopolitics of Capital
Although subject to continuous debate, the state plays an indispensable role in 
the capital accumulation process in many ways. In fact; within a capitalist order, 
state and capital are inherently related (see for a recent good overview of the 
Marxian debate on the interstate system and capital, Anievas 2010, also e.g. 
Pozo-Martin 2007, Wood 2003). While the state has a plethora of roles and 
functions in relation to capital (see for an elaboration Van Apeldoorn, De Graaff 
and Overbeek 2012), the focus here will be on its function in relation to the 
expansionist dimension of capital accumulation; that is, as the inhabitant of the 
power that erects barriers to the movement (motion) of capital, but that in doing 
so crucially sustains the territorial fragmentation and unevenness on which the 
spatial expansion of capital rests. More precisely then, the focus is on capital 
accumulation within a multiplicity of states; i.e. the geopolitics of capital. The 
state system – it is argued – sustains the anarchy that enables capital to move 
freely (i.e. the power to exit, see Van Apeldoorn 2004). But the state system 
also provides an uneven (differentiated) political and spatial surface, due to its 
constitution of a nearly seamless patchwork of what I call ‘sovereign social 
spaces’ which is crucial for capital expansion. Sovereign social spaces, to be 
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elaborated below, are tied to territory but also have an important non-territorial 
(social/jurisdictional) dimension.  -
Why are sovereign social spaces crucial for capital expansion? As 
David Harvey has highlighted, there is a tendency within capitalism towards 
‘structured coherence to production and consumption within a given space’ 
(Harvey 1985:146). 9 Capital within a given (limited geographical) space will 
however ultimately start to ‘over-accumulate’ (Harvey 2003, 2006). Capital can 
only accumulate when it is in motion (i.e. invested in a capitalist production 
process) and will – while in motion - produce surplus value (source of profit). In 
order to avoid devalorisation, however, surplus value needs to be profitably 
(re)invested. If not, a crisis of over-accumulation is imminent. 10 One way to 
enable continued profitable accumulation is to seek various forms of 
geographical expansion for surpluses of capital. An important dynamic in this 
respect is what Harvey has labelled the ‘spatial fix’, i.e. the geographical 
displacement of surplus capital (and/or labour) in order to avoid over-
accumulation (Harvey 2006: xxiv, Harvey 2003:109; see for useful discussions 
of spatial fix also e.g. Jessop 2006, Brenner 1999, Colas and Pozo 2011).
Another type of ‘fix’ that Harvey identifies is the ‘temporal fix’, 
referring to temporal displacement of surplus capital (and/or labour) through 
investment in long-term capital projects, such as infrastructural projects, or 
social expenditures. Such temporal fixes lead to situations in which: ‘…part of 
the circulation of capital slows down in order to promote accelerating turnover 
times for the remainder’ (Harvey 1985:136). The temporal fix can also be used 
in combination with the spatial fix, i.e. the spatio-temporal fix. How the 
problem of over-accumulation is ‘fixed’ is thus a (political) choice with rather 
different distributional, socio-economic, and political outcomes. When the 
problem of over-accumulation is not ‘fixed’,  surpluses must be devalued or 
destroyed, which can take many forms, from financial crises to – at their most 
extreme and violent end - war (see Harvey 1985). Note that the spatial fix is 
also of a temporary nature, in the sense that it does not resolve the inner 
contradictions of capital accumulation and thus, in due time, will again lead to 
over-accumulation and the need for a new ‘fix’ (either spatial, temporal, or 
combined).
A contradictory outcome of the expansion of capital is what I label the 
‘boomerang effect’, i.e. it potentially creates rival centres of accumulation 
which ultimately will seek ‘external’ space for their own over-accumulated 
capital and eventually become competitors of the original ‘centre’ of over-
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accumulation. This ‘boomerang effect’ poses a catch-22 situation to the home 
base; as Harvey describes:
The unconstrained development of capitalism in new regions caused by capital 
exports brings devaluation at home through international competition. Constrained 
development abroad limits international competition but blocks off opportunities 
for further capital export and so sparks internally generated devaluations (2006: 
435-6). 
This illustrates how the expansion of capital (through for instance spatial fixes) 
also results in spreading ‘the contradiction of capitalism over ever wider 
spheres’ (ibid.). Either way, this dynamic makes clear that, in contrast to the 
neoclassical economic mantras of market equilibrium and increased wealth 
through growth and global market mechanisms, the system is marked by uneven 
geographical development and instability (cf. the notion of ‘uneven and 
combined development’, e.g. Allinson and Anievas 2010).
For capital expansion, geographical differentiation and unevenness are 
crucial, because they provide an ‘external’ space to invest capital surpluses and 
keep on profitably accumulating. While geographical differentiation can take 
many forms - importantly of course, there is a naturally given, geographical 
unevenness - the politically created and constituted geographical differentiation, 
embodied by the state system, provides capital accumulation with a stable 
foundation, because it carves up the globe into exclusive spheres of sovereignty 
tied to a particular territory. This, first of all, creates an ‘internal’ and an 
‘external’ space for capital, the latter of which, provides capital with a basis to 
expand (for instance in order to avoid devalorisation, i.e. the spatial fix).
Secondly, because these exclusive spheres develop differently, their differences 
can be exploited, i.e. they provide a basis for inter-capitalist competition.
The general point is that capital accumulation harbours a contradictory 
dynamic of, on the one hand, a continuous strive to transcend boundaries, while 
on the other hand requiring such boundaries because they constitute the uneven 
surface that capital needs to expand and keep on accumulating. These 
boundaries can be geographical (i.e. spatial) but also institutional 
(jurisdictional). The state, as the political and institutional embodiment of a 
sovereign social space, harbours both. While sovereign space is tied to a 
geographically bounded territory, the institutional boundaries of sovereign 
space transcend territory. An example of the latter is seen with so-called 
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offshore banking. This type of banking provides opportunities for accumulation, 
not primarily because of the particular territorial assets of the Cayman Islands, 
but rather, because it is a sovereign jurisdiction with a different taxation level 
(see Palan 1998, 2002, for a study on tax havens along similar lines). The 
current European debt-crisis is another illuminating example of how financial 
capital, seemingly unrestricted by territorial boundaries, crucially needs and 
uses sovereign national boundaries as a source of accumulation and profit. 
Indeed, national differences and speculation on expectations of differential 
national performances are the source of (potential) profit.11 This underlines the 
crucial function of the state system for the ‘survival’ of capital (see for a recent 
debate on the relation between capitalism and the inter-state system Anievas 
2010, Pozo-Martin 2007). 
However, more importantly for the purpose of this study and the 
research problem it engages with, is that the forgoing shows that the 
deterritorialising forces associated with globalization of capital (e.g. 
financialisation, transnationalisation) (see Scholte 2000, Robinson 2004, Hardt 
and Negri 2001), are inextricably linked to territorial dynamics, a contradiction 
that is embodied by the state-capital nexus. As Neil Brenner (1998, 1999) has 
eloquently argued, global capital accumulation is characterised by a continuous 
process of de-territorialisation and reterritorialisation in which the state plays a 
key role ‘at once as a site, medium, and agent of globalization’ (Brenner 
1999:41, see also Sassen 2000). I interpret this dialectical process as an ever 
widening and deepening of transnational (social) space, which – it should be 
stressed - is not to imply the demise of the state, but, on the contrary, is argued 
to be necessarily grounded in the continued existence of social spaces of 
territorially bounded sovereignty. While the general trend in most IPE and 
globalization studies is to focus on the growth of the transnational dimension, 
most often understood as occurring at the expense of the national state, I argue 
that  it is their co-existence and dialectical relation that needs to be stressed (see 
also Van Apeldoorn 2004).
With the global expansion of capital, this contradiction is not 
transcended but continuously re-articulated. This subsequently explains the 
dynamic between a widening and deepening transnational dimension and a 
resilient (inter)state dimension that constitutes the central theoretical puzzle 
underpinning this study, i.e. the persistence of the state system and of 
territoriality, in spite of intensifying transnationalisation of the global political 
economy and its social relations. In addition, I want to emphasise the 
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importance of a social dimension and agency inherent in these processes. 
Whereas most of the contributions discussed above conceive of territoriality as 
a social process rather than a static given (see also Colas and Pozo 2011), these 
social dynamics - and the concrete agency underpinning them - tend to remain  
underexplored  (an exception is Van der Pijl 2007).
Following from these abstract dynamics, varying and changing 
articulations (and re-articulations) of the state-capital nexus can emerge. As 
identified elsewhere (Van Apeldoorn, De Graaff and Overbeek 2012: 473-6), 
the state can have different roles with respect to the capitalist accumulation 
process: a market creating, a market correcting, and a market directing role, as 
well as the role of external representation (i.e. to represent the external interests 
of ‘domestic’ capital). Under certain circumstances and conditions, a more 
directing role of the state might, for instance, come to the fore. Such is the case 
in the current re-articulation of state power in both production and finance (i.e. 
the resurgence of resource nationalism, nationalisation of banks, sovereign 
wealth funds, and growing presence and power of state-owned non-OECD 
firms).  How precisely such a directing role becomes manifest is contingent 
upon e.g. historical, cultural, ideological, political, and economical 
circumstances, and is thus, ultimately, an empirical question. In the present 
study this empirical question is analysed with a particular focus on the energy 
sector. Yet, the theoretical argument holds that the question can be explained by 
the broader dynamics, as outlined above.
Now that the broader underlying puzzle of the study - the contradiction 
of a re-articulation of state power and a simultaneous deepening of 
transnationalising forces - has been theorised, I will discuss some of the more 
particular features of the oil sector from this perspective. 
The ‘Organisation of Scarcity’
Whereas the former section highlighted a structural geopolitical dimension of 
capital accumulation, the oil industry has an additional territorial dimension 
because of the geographically fixed nature of these resources. In particular
pertaining to the upstream part of the industry.12 This, firstly, introduces the 
aspect of (ground)rent, i.e. that part of the surplus (profit) that resource 
holders/producers can appropriate because of their entitlement to a certain part 
of land (see below). Secondly, the territorial fixity of the resources holds the 
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potential for geopolitical conflicts over access. Yet, this physically anchored, 
crude territorial aspect is not sufficient to explain the particular dynamics 
playing out in the oil industry. First of all, landlocked resources only obtain 
value with the application of capital (i.e. investment, technology, labour) and 
the latter, which is not territorially fixed in a similar way, thus introduces non-
territorial dynamics and interests into the contestations of production of energy. 
Secondly, the existence of a global oil market introduces dynamics, actors, and 
interests of its own (such as financialisation and speculation), which to some 
extent circumvents the geopolitical aspect of territorial fixedness. As such, non-
state actors and dynamics interplay with, and at times exceed, the control of 
states and the bargaining power that their physical endowments provide.
Nonetheless, there is yet another geopolitical dimension to the global 
oil market a) because it is underpinned by a multilateral web of treaties, 
agreements, and institutions in which the US and other major Western countries 
are (still) dominant, and b) because of the military dominance of the US and its 
substantial control over the global transportation infrastructure, both maritime 
and land based. In other words, the territorial and geopolitical dimension applies 
in particular to hydrocarbons because of their geographical fixedness, but not 
exclusively because of that, i.e. there are other geopolitical and territorial factors 
to take into account. Yet, on the other hand, the presence of a geopolitical 
dimension does not exclude the influence of other dynamics in the hydrocarbon 
sector, in particular those related to the financialisation of the oil market.
The centrality of hydrocarbons such as oil to the machinery of the 
current global political economy and the whole fabric of society can hardly be 
overstated; oil is a core commodity of which about 89 million barrels are moved 
and consumed around the globe every day. Moreover, it is (still) the main fuel 
used in transportation: virtually all movement of products and people depends 
upon it in some way (even bicycle tires and shoes have petroleum products in 
them), as well as – importantly - any military apparatus. Of each barrel of oil 
more than half its content is turned into around a hundred petrochemical 
products that are estimated to be used in more than six thousands commercial 
products (see list in Appendix E). On a more fundamental level, land and the 
resources it contains are a prerequisite for the production process. The 
extraction of raw materials forms a necessary link within capital accumulation 
as a whole, between nature (the ‘objective’ conditions of production) on the one
hand,  and different branches of industry on the other hand (Labban 2008:6).Oil 
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thus plays a crucial role within general production processes and is of 
fundamental importance to the overall process of capital accumulation. 
With the process of capital accumulation, however, demand for raw 
material will increase, which in turn leads to an increase in prices of raw 
material.13 While this benefits the extractive industry, the profitability will 
attract an increasing mass of capital and eventually lead to overproduction, 
which subsequently results in falling prices. High oil prices, moreover, will lead 
to the migration of capital into new reserves, which will also result in increased 
production and expansion of the stock of producing reserves, and thus in the 
end to decreasing prices. This results in the paradoxical situation, described by 
Labban, that ‘as reserves grow and oil becomes more abundant, it must be made 
scarce in order to produce and realize the surplus profits of the oil industry’ 
(2008:4), and thus follows the incentive to induce artificial scarcity (ibid:26). 
Undersupply, however, will similarly lead to high prices that in the end generate 
the same dynamics as sketched above. 
The ‘organisation of scarcity’ thus demands a precarious balancing of
oversupply and undersupply and the main challenge for oil producers is to 
balance the flow of capital going into production (ibid.:2008). While oil 
producers, through their control of the flow of capital into production, can to 
some extent ‘organise’ scarcity (i.e. create conditions of over- or undersupply), 
this is, as Labban points out, only the power of negation, because the resource 
holder (landowner) needs productive capital in order to make the land (i.e. its 
minerals) economically valuable in the first place. Without productive capital 
(including of course the application of human labour to work the land and 
extract the resources), land will remain nature and the resources will remain 
underground. 
While both resource holders and resource seekers have a shared interest 
in the organisation of scarcity, there is a conflict of interest between them about 
the share of ground rent, i.e. that part of the surplus (profit) that is appropriated 
by the resource holder due to his/her entitlement to the land.14 Ground rent is 
obtained when the owner of the land provides access to the land and its 
resource(s) to a producer. The latter also constitutes a careful balancing act, 
because the land owner will try to extract as big as possible a share of the 
surplus (profit) by restricting access to land (thus withholding it from 
production and thereby limiting overproduction and oversupply); however if 
limitations are imposed too strictly, the stimulus for investment will disappear 
(Harvey 2006:364). Yet another aspect, in which the organisation of scarcity 
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impacts differently upon resource holders and resource seekers, is that whereas 
the former have the right to exclusion and thus potentially have greater control 
over the organisation of scarcity, resource seekers have the relative freedom to 
divert investments in case of overproduction.
These interdependencies and limitations to ‘organisation,’ illustrate that 
the notion of ‘organising scarcity’ does not imply absolute control over 
production and prices. Instead, these are influenced by a host of other factors, 
some of which are, and others that are not, controllable.15 The importance of the 
notion of organising scarcity is that it highlights the role of agency within the 
structural conditions that are given by the dynamics of capital accumulation 
(energy production in this case), and emphasises interdependency between 
resource holders and resource seekers, which enables us to see more clearly 
where their interests coincide and where they collide. As such, this particular 
constellation highlights the need to unravel the configurations of social power 
and agency that interact with these structural dynamics; which is the main 
empirical focus of this study and will be conceptualised below.
Social Organisation of Power
In this final section I will try to demarcate how the social organisation of power 
in the global energy order will be studied in this research; starting with a 
conceptualisation of how corporate elite power is embedded in (social) 
networks and concluding with a description of how power is interpreted in this 
study.
Corporate Elites
As introduced in the previous chapter, the focus of this study is on what I label 
‘oil elites’ in both OECD and non-OECD countries. These oil elites are part of 
broader corporate elites, recently defined by Scott as: ‘an inter-organizational 
group of people who hold positions of dominance in business organizations’ 
(2008:37). Carroll (2010:6) provides a more specific definition, in which 
corporate elites include: ‘...not only functioning capitalists (directors who are 
executives or major shareholders) but [also] directors who are advisers to 
business owners and top management, and who often sit on multiple boards’. 
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Corporate elites thus can be seen as part of a broader (capitalist) class. On the 
one hand these elites will include powerful actors that are not necessarily 
owners of the means of production (i.e. capitalists in the strict sense), but who 
do hold strongly aligned interests and worldviews. On the other hand this 
conceptualisation excludes ‘many capitalists who are not active on boards of the 
largest firms’ (ibid.). 
Although often used interchangeably there is an important distinction between 
concepts of ‘class’ and ‘elite’. While both start from the observation that most 
modern societies are governed by a minority (Bottomore 1993), the most 
essential difference between an elite perspective and a class perspective is that 
the concept of class is based on a theory that assumes a fundamentally 
conflicting relation between capital and labour rooted in (private) property 
relations. This, first of all, provides the ‘ruling minority’ with a clearly defined 
power base (i.e. its power is ultimately rooted in ownership of production) and, 
secondly, implies a fundamentally antagonistic and exploitative relation 
between the ruling minority and the ruled majority. Elite theory, on the other 
hand, as Bottomore aptly puts it: ‘avoids...the difficulty of showing that a 
particular class, defined in terms of its economic position, does in fact dominate 
all the spheres of social life; but it does so only at the cost of abandoning any 
attempt to explain the phenomena to which it refers’ (1993:21-22). Elite 
theorists tend to define, for instance, a ‘power elite’ (Mills 2000 [1956]) as 
those that occupy the recognised position of political power in a society, but fail 
to theorise how particular individuals come to occupy these positions of power 
(Bottomore 1993:22, see for a similar critique from a different perspective 
Winters and Page 2009). Nor do they provide a consistent and systematic 
explanation of change within governing elites. For instance C.W. Mills, who 
conducted a seminal study on what he called the ‘power elite’ (1956), analysed 
three major American elites: corporate leaders, political leaders and military 
chiefs. Yet, as Bottomore points out, while stating that most of the three elite 
groupings are drawn from an upper class, he never elaborated this any further. 
Nonetheless he claimed the unity of the power elite and assumed a homogeneity 
in its social origins which he only defined to the point of saying that it entails 
‘the often uneasy coincidence of economic, military and political power’ 
(Bottomore 1993:23).
The present study, analyses not only Western corporate elites, but also 
non-Western corporate elites, that are predominantly directing state-owned 
corporations. These corporate elites do not primarily base their power in private 
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ownership of property, but rather in state-owned capital and are argued to have 
a more explicit (party) political and/or bureaucratic power base.16 While not 
precluding a class analysis, the particular focus of this study is thus on the one 
hand more narrow, in the sense that it focuses only on the top tiers within a 
broader capitalist class (see Carroll 2010:6) and is limited to a particular sector 
(oil and gas), yet on the other hand it is more comprehensive, in the sense that it 
also includes corporate elites with power bases that are not primarily capitalist, 
i.e. not purely based on private ownership of property, which I have labelled 
state-corporate elites.
Acting in the shadow of corporate elites are heterogeneous groups of 
e.g. consultants, lawyers, and advisors. These groups first of all are crucially 
important in providing knowhow, service, ideas, and technology to those at 
governing positions, and as such often are positioned at critical junctures when 
powerful decisions are made. Secondly, they are also – partly facilitated by their 
largely invisible and highly specialised roles - influential in shaping the 
particular content of the rules of the game, i.e. governance, as will be illustrated 
in Chapter Six. As Carroll points out: ‘[t]he service of lawyers, consultants, 
academics, retired politicians and the like is integral to corporate business 
today. In the structure of economic power such advisers are subordinate to 
functioning capitalists, yet in the political and cultural fields they often lead the 
way in representing corporate interests or in mediating between those interests 
and others’ (2010:6).17 While these actors generally play a facilitating role in 
the advancement and consolidation of corporate elite interests, they also retain a 
relative autonomy and can, in that respect, at times have a contradictory impact 
on the interests of the corporate elites – as will be shown in later chapters.
To summarise, the focus of this study is on the managers of private capital and 
managers of state capital in the oil sector, and their consultants; these are 
labelled 'oil elites' and include both corporate elites and state-corporate elites. 
Their powerbase is rooted in corporate capital, both private capital and state 
capital, and is embedded in corporate elite networks which will be mapped and 
analysed in Chapters Four and Five. In the following subsection of this chapter I 
will, however, first conceptualise these corporate elite networks and define the 
different forms of power that will be employed in this study.
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Networks of Power
Corporate elite power is, first of all, embedded in corporate networks 
established by interlocking directorates (e.g. Kentor and Jang 2004) which ‘link 
the key centres of command within the corporate economy’ (Carroll 2010:7). 
These corporate board interlocks, as Carroll points out: ‘serve as channels of 
communication among directors, facilitating a common worldview’ (ibid.:9). 
Another such key channel are corporate elite interlocks with policy planning 
bodies such as think tanks, research institutes, regulatory bodies, business 
coalitions, and non-profit organisations (e.g. Domhoff 2009, 1967, Useem 
1984). The latter provide elite formation with an institutional and societal 
architecture, through which they can formulate and extend their interests and 
preferred governance beyond the realm of the corporate boardrooms and into 
civil and political society (Carroll 2010:9). At the transnational and global level, 
such bodies have a crucial role in forging consensus and coalescing interests -
amalgamating into a global rule set, generally labelled ‘global governance’ (see 
Overbeek 2012). In spite of their multilateral character, these bodies are highly 
concentrated platforms of power from which a still pre-dominantly Western 
elite, promotes and aims to secure the interests of the more transnational 
oriented sectors of capital (such as financial capital and large transnational 
corporations) (e.g. Peet 2007, Van Apeldoorn 2002, Van der Pijl 1998, Gill 
1990).
Corporate elites also form an important nexus in the interrelation 
between the state and the capital accumulation process (see for similar argument 
Van der Pijl 2007). This obviously applies to the state-corporate elites from 
more authoritarian states, but it applies to Western corporate elites as well. In 
case of these Western elites, there is substantial interaction and coordination 
between the corporate elites and political decision makers, as well as a 
persistent revolving door mechanism (particularly in the US, this is a deep-
rooted and extensive feature of the foreign policy establishment, see Van 
Apeldoorn and De Graaff 2012). Jessop, in his theorisation of the state and the 
social relations in which states are embedded, in this is regard identifies the 
‘structural relations between the state and its encompassing political system [...] 
the strategic ties among politicians and state officials and other political forces, 
and [...] the complex web of interdependencies and strategic networks that link 
the state system to its broader social environment’ (2007:6). Whereas there is 
often a direct relation and overlap with the state apparatus in the case of the 
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state-corporate elites, the relation is more indirect in the case of the corporate 
elites.
Following Barnett and Duval, I adopt a broad definition of power as: 
‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the 
capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate’ (2005a:42). 
Whereas power is essentially a relational concept even in its most basic dyadic 
definition - i.e.: A has power over B when it gets B to do what it would 
otherwise have not done (Dahl 1957:202-3) - employed in this study, 
‘relational’ is stressed to mean an embeddedness of agency in broader social 
structures: both networks of social relations and deeper underlying social 
structures, such as the dynamics of capital accumulation. These social structures 
are partly shaped by agents, but at the same time form the pre-conditions in 
which their agency - and thus power relation - takes place (see previous 
discussion of critical realism).
In the taxonomy of power that Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 2005b) 
identify, the two forms of ‘diffuse’ power are of particular relevance given the 
approach of this study: institutional power and productive power. The direct 
forms that Barnett and Duvall identify are compulsory power, which refers to 
the most common conceptualisation of power similar to Dahls definition 
mentioned above, and structural power, which in their conceptualisation is 
rooted in fundamentally antagonistic relations such as capital and labour, slave 
and master (2005a, 2005b). Institutional power however refers to an actor’s 
indirect control over socially distant others. Power is no longer a matter of A’s 
direct effect on B, but works ‘through socially extended, institutionally diffuse 
relations… because A stands in a particular relation to the relevant institutional 
arrangements, its actions exercise power over B [...] Temporally, institutions 
established at one point in time can have ongoing and unintended effects at a
later point. Longstanding institutions represent frozen configurations of 
privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future choices of actors’ 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005:52). Productive power, concerns ‘discourse, the social 
processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, 
fixed, lived, experienced and transformed. Discourse refers not to dialogues but 
to ‘how “microfields” or the quotidian “define the (im)possible, the 
(im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a problem’ (ibid.:55). In 
other words, it refers to the power to define the boundaries of what is normal, 
acceptable, desirable, right and wrong; the power to formulate the framework 
through which interests are perceived, knowledge is obtained and behaviour is 
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guided. 18 Within this particular study, both institutional and productive power 
are seen as essential in defining the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), i.e. the 
formal and informal rules that constrain and/or facilitate the behaviour of 
particular communities or collectives (cf. Van Apeldoorn, Nölke and Overbeek 
2007:5). 
Summarising, in this thesis oil elites are perceived as structuring a top 
layer of the global energy order, whose power base will be analysed by way of 
focusing on the corporate elite networks in which they are embedded (the latter 
which in this case are partly linked to the state). Yet, I also see them as a source 
of agency that is (re)shaping the ‘rules of the game’ that govern the global 
energy order.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the theoretical and conceptual framework of the 
dissertation. It has first positioned the research within a critical realist ontology, 
which stresses the ‘stratified’ and ‘open’ nature of social reality and the 
interplay between social structure and agency. Secondly, it has theorised the 
broader key puzzle of how to explain the resilience and resurgence of state 
power and state capital in spite of the de-territorialising forces of globalization 
and the interdependence created by transnationalisation of production and 
global financial markets, introducing the notion of sovereign social spaces. 
Thirdly, it has outlined the more particular dynamics in the oil industry and 
lastly, it has conceptualised the approach to studying power within the global 
political economy, for which the focus on corporate elite networks - as a nexus 
between the state and the capital accumulation process - is argued to be a 
relevant point of departure.
The broader theoretical point and contribution of this study is to explain 
how the resurgence of the state is both driven and conditioned by globalization 
(i.e. globalizing capital), that is; to show how the state is integral to the 
globalizing of capital, which implies - simultaneously - the constant drive to 
transcend the boundaries of state power, and their reinforcement. This 
dialectical process is argued to result in an ever widening and deepening of 
transnational social space, which is however necessarily grounded in the 
continued existence of sovereign social space, containing both a territorial and a 
jurisdictional dimension. As capital expands, this contradictory dynamic 
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between a widening and deepening transnational dimension and the resilient 
statist dimension will lead to a continuous re-articulation of the role and relative 
power of the state vis-a-vis capital. At a more concrete level (i.e. the domain of 
the ‘actual’ and the empirical, see Bhaskar 1975) the resurgence of resource 
nationalism and the growth and expansion of state-owned oil companies from 
outside the Western capitalist ‘core’ are manifestations of such re-articulations 
within the global energy order.
In the following chapters of the dissertation it will be empirically shown 
how these contradictory tendencies play out. First, by way of a more general 
descriptive chapter (Chapter Three) that assesses the nature of the current 
transformation; placing it in the historical context of the evolution of the post-
Second World War global energy order. Second, in the chapters that constitute 
the empirical heart and contribution of this dissertation, by focusing on a global 
corporate elite network; delineate how this has been transformed since about the 
mid 90s (Chapter Four); and assess what the effects of this transformation are in 
terms of a reconfiguration of the oil elite’s power relations (Chapter Five) and 
(global) governance of energy (Chapter Six).
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CHAPTER THREE
The Rise of non-OECD National Oil Companies in Historical Perspective
Introduction
This chapter provides a historical context for the recent transformation of the 
energy order. It will focus on three aspects of the history of the post-war 
petroleum order. The first aspect is the evolution of non-OECD state oil 
companies and the waves of resource nationalism that accompanied this. The 
second aspect refers to a shift that took place in the global energy production 
and consumption patterns, gradually shifting the centre of gravity of the energy 
order towards the non-OECD world. The third aspect concerns the shifting 
balance of forces between private oil companies and state-owned oil companies 
in the global energy order. I will argue that these three particular developments 
are key to an understanding of the recent transformation of the global energy 
order and the balance of forces within it, and thus of relevance for an 
explanation of the nature of the growth and expansion of the non-OECD NOCs 
since the turn of the millennium.
There is nothing new to oil being used as a ‘strategic commodity’. Nor 
is resource nationalism a novelty. In fact, the history of the global energy order 
is characterised by the ebb and flow of resource nationalism and the cyclical 
nature of this aspect is observed by most authors on the topic (Wilson 1987, 
Stevens 2003, 2008, Bremmer and Johnston 2009, Joffe et al. 2009). Resource 
nationalism is, however, in itself a charged and contested term. The definition 
and interpretations of resource nationalism diverge widely (Stevens 2008:5-6) 
and as it is often used in a pejorative way, many resource holders perceive the 
term as rather insulting.19 Following Stevens (2008:5), this study adopts an 
interpretation of resource nationalism that identifies two main elements: one is 
the capturing of a greater share of the revenues (rent) on the part of the resource 
holding state; the other is the assertion of greater state control over natural 
resource development, including the establishment of a National Oil Company 
(NOC). These two components may, but do not necessarily, coincide. One may 
add to this the concept of ‘resource protectionism’, which is more prevalent in 
the Western world and entails protection of domestic industry enforced by the 
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state through import quotas, tariffs, regulations, etcetera. Bremmer and Johnston 
(2009), who identify four types of resource nationalism, label this ‘soft resource 
nationalism’.
Closely related to the history of resource nationalism is a shift in the 
respective roles and standing within the global energy order of private 
International Oil Companies (most often coming from OECD countries) and 
state-owned National Oil Companies (primarily originating in non-OECD 
countries). Basically, this particular shift stretches from the era of the so called 
‘Seven Sisters’, a cartel of mainly Anglo-American private oil companies that 
built the industry and in the first half of the 20th century controlled the global 
energy order, towards the current era of, what has recently been labelled, the 
‘New Seven Sisters’ (Hoyos 2007a, 2007b), see below.
The third major development is a global shift in the geography of
demand and supply, in which the non-OECD countries have gradually 
surpassed the OECD members in terms of both production and consumption of 
energy. As recently as 2008, a tipping point has been reached, with the non-
OECD world since then consuming more energy than its OECD counterpart. 
This signals an important change, as it implies that the ‘new’ consumers from 
the non-OECD world now lead both the demand and supply sides of the 
petroleum industry. This introduces new forms of competition into the energy 
market as well as new forms of potentially conflicting interests: whereas 
previously most of the contestation was structured between producers and 
consumers, a new dynamic might now evolve between OECD and non-OECD 
consumers. This trend coincides with a more general transformation in the 
global political economy, in which the new ‘growth poles’, in particular in Asia, 
but also in the Middle East, Russia, and Latin America, are seen to pave the way 
to an increasingly multi-polar economic and political order.
In this chapter these three shifts will be documented and described 
subsequently, in order to provide a backdrop to the analysis of the impact of the 
more recent expansion of non-OECD NOCs on the existing corporate and 
institutional relations within the global energy order and on the rules of the 
game. The chapter will be structured as follows: The first section will provide a 
historical narrative of the waves of resource nationalism that have occurred 
between the mid 1950s to the 2000s, based on secondary sources (e.g. Yergin 
1991, Stevens 2008, Fattouh 2007, Stokes and Raphael 2010, Layne 2006).  
Although this historical section makes up a substantive share of this chapter, it 
is only a concise summary of the fascinating and multi-facetted evolution of the 
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petroleum order aimed at providing a backdrop to the empirical core of this 
study (Chapter Four to Six).20 The post-war history of the petroleum-order is in 
this chapter divided into five periods: 1) the shaping of the post-war petroleum 
order (1940-1950),  2) the first wave of resource nationalism (1950-1960), 3) 
the oil crises and resource sovereignty (1970s), 4) the neoliberal era (1980-90) 
and 5) the 2000s – a new wave of resource nationalism.21
The second main section of the chapter will document a long term shift 
in production and consumption of energy in the OECD and non-OECD world 
since 1965. The latter is illustrated by empirical analyses on the basis of 
aggregate descriptive statistics that are (primarily) derived from data provided 
in BP’s workbook of the Annual Statistical Review 2012. BP’s Annual 
Statistical Review is a highly recognised and authoritative source of data in 
studies on energy economics and is widely used as a reference in academia, 
business and governments (see e.g. CIEP 2012). 
The third section will outline a longitudinal shift since the beginning of 
the 1980s, in production and consumption shares of the different types of oil 
companies (i.e. IOCs, NOCs, and Hybrids, see Chapter One). These descriptive 
empirical analyses are based on panel-data from the annual ranking of the 
world’s top oil companies published by the Energy Intelligence Group 
(Petroleum Intelligence Weekly) as compiled in a supplementary data set 
provided by Wolf (2009b), added with data collection of my own, partly on the 
basis of the same sources (i.e. the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, annual 
rankings) and partly derived from PFC Energy (2012, see Section Three). The 
final section of this chapter will reflect upon these historical developments and 
provide a prelude to the next and primary part of the thesis which provides a 
more in-depth mapping of the changing power structures at the apex of the oil 
sector and the process of NOC growth and expansion, during a recent decade 
(1997-2007).
The Ebb and Flow of Resource Nationalism
The Shaping of the Post-war Petroleum Order (1940-1950)
In the first half of the twentieth century the global oil industry was dominated 
by a cartel of major Anglo-American oil companies referred to as the ‘Seven 
Sisters’.22 These oil companies had carved up the world oil market between 
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them, an arrangement that was formalised (though kept secret)23 in 1928 with 
what is known as the ‘As Is Agreement’ or ‘Achnacarry Agreement’. The latter 
derives its name from the Castle in Scotland, in which the heads of the major oil 
companies of the cartel came together over a weekend of grouse shooting, while
at the same time setting forth a set of principles aimed at maintaining their 
absolute cartel status and their control over oil prices in response to the price 
wars that were at the moment raging worldwide (Bina 2006:9, Sampson 1975).
In the pre-war period and during World War II, the US was the major 
oil producing region in the world, and the main supplier to the Allied forces. Oil 
was critical to the Allied forces’ victory in WW II but this victory heavily 
drained the US resources. US orientation towards the Middle East was first of 
all instigated by the regions’ potential oil wealth and worries about their 
dwindling domestic supplies due to World War II. Yet, oil was also part of a 
broader post-war so called ‘Open Door’ strategy (see Layne 2006, also Van
Apeldoorn and De Graaff 2012). As an 1944 intelligence report from the Office 
of Strategic Services concluded, the US had three vital national interests in the 
Middle East: ‘Oil, Airbases and Future Markets’ (quoted in Layne 2006:48). In 
addition, during the Cold War, America’s strategic interests in the region were 
also guided by fears of Soviet influence and penetration, leading the US to 
establish a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, oil 
constituted a critical US interest in the Middle East. As Layne describes, it was 
already during the war that ‘key US officials recognized that control of oil 
would be an important post-war strategic interest’ (ibid.:46). The American 
‘discovery’ of the region’s potential oil wealth, however, led to fierce tensions 
with their British war allies, who had of course ‘discovered’ the area much 
earlier and saw ‘their assets’ in the Middle East threatened by US competitors 
(see also ibid.:47). Yet, in the end, the British had little choice but to cooperate 
with the US, and subsequently the Middle East and the corollary concessions 
were divided between the two foreign powers, in the Anglo-American 
Petroleum Agreement of 1944 (Anderson 1981).
Several major oil deals in the region put in place the corporate
infrastructure under Anglo-American control to facilitate the increase in 
production of Middle Eastern oil for the purpose of supplying Western markets. 
The most important of these was the establishment of Aramco (Arabian 
American Oil Company), which, by the end of 1948 – after a long process of 
negotiations and anti-trust litigations – came to comprise a consortium of four 
American oil majors, owning and operating what was to become the most 
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valuable concession in the world for a long time ahead (Anderson 1981).24 In 
addition, the US cemented its special relation with Saudi Arabia, which oil 
riches were recognised as a ‘stupendous source of strategic power and one of 
the greatest material prizes in human history’ (head of the US State 
Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs Gordon Merriam, quoted in 
Stokes and Raphael 2010:87). This special US-Saudi relation implied the 
agreement to export oil cheaply to international markets in return for military 
protection (see ibid.).25
The post-war period, marked by shortages of coal, would decisively set 
the Western world on the path to an oil based society.26 Although the US would 
no longer be the epicentre of the world’s oil supply (becoming a net-importer in 
1948), it had ensured its dominance over the new centre of gravity in the post-
war petroleum order, the Middle East. At the expense of the former imperial 
power Britain, American companies almost completely controlled the oil 
production in the Middle East, with British and Dutch companies participating 
but to a much lesser extent. 
First wave of Resource Nationalism – 1950-1960
The first instance of full resource nationalisation took place in Mexico in 1938, 
with a complete expropriation of the foreign oil companies and the creation of 
state-owned Pemex. The broad wave of resource nationalism that would 
eventually spread throughout the Middle East, however, was ignited in 1943 in 
Venezuela. Here, nationalisation led to a renegotiation of the rent split between 
the oil companies and the government that became known as the ‘50/50’ deal; 
i.e., an increase in royalties and taxes that would be about equal to the oil 
companies’ net profits in Venezuela (Yergin 1991:435).27 Once Venezuela had 
set the example, other major producers followed suit.28
Another key development in the rising tide of resource nationalism was 
the election of Mossadegh in Iran, 1951. He replaced the then very young Shah 
(Mohammed Pahlavi) and completely nationalised the (British) Anglo-Iranian 
consortium and its resources. At this time, Iran produced 40 percent of total 
Middle Eastern oil and its supplies gained an additional strategic importance 
with the onset of the Korean War. It was, however, not only the loss of oil due 
to these nationalisations that made the US responsive to a suggestion by the 
British government to oust Mossadegh. They were driven by fear of Mossadegh 
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turning to the Soviet Union and of ensuing communist influence throughout the 
rest of the Middle East. But even more so, by worries that if left unchecked, 
Mossadegh would set a precedent that might inspire others producers in the 
broader region to do the same (Stokes and Raphael 2012:88-9). The CIA-
orchestrated coup that took place in August 1953 put the pro-Western Shah 
back in power and the newly nationalised Iranian oil company (National Iranian 
Oil Company) back in the hands of the private oil companies (see e.g. Bamberg 
1994, Kinzer 2003).
Although this provided a discouraging example for other producers 
with ambitions to take control over their resources, two significant shifts had 
taken place in the structure of the oil industry of Iran, the then second largest 
producer in the Middle East. First of all, the industry was no longer purely 
British, but instead was owned and operated by a consortium in which 
American companies took a prominent place. While the Anglo-Iranian, the 
British major that had been the sole beneficiary of the Iranians resources, 
retained 40 percent of the industry, 14 percent went to Shell, 6 percent to the 
French state-owned CFP, and the remaining 40 percent was to be owned by 
American companies (see e.g. Bamberg 1994). Secondly, an important remnant 
of the short-lived experiment of resource nationalism was that the resources 
themselves remained in the ownership of the state. Iran thus became the first
country in the Middle East to actively pursue ‘permanent sovereignty’ over 
national resources (see Stevens 2008:10), even though in practice it had no 
control whatsoever over the consortium at the time.
Moreover, the events marked a key moment in the transition from 
British to American hegemony. This  dominance was now build on the ‘twin 
pillars’ of Saudi Arabia and Iran, were US friendly regimes were in place, 
cemented with political, military, and economic support and guaranteeing the 
US control over flows of oil from the Persian Gulf (Stokes and Raphael 
2012:89-90). While the developments to some extent empowered the exporting 
countries, boosting their position as well as their capture of the rents, they also 
anchored the position of the US in the Middle East and made it the dominant 
foreign power in the region. The coup in Iran had made clear to all involved, 
that if this power was to be threatened, the US would intervene decisively.
The Suez crisis in 1956 provided another historical juncture which 
furthered Arab nationalism and emancipation, as well as American dominance 
in the region. On the one hand, it showed the increased power of the Arab 
producers, since Nasser – the Egyptian president and widely influential 
69
revolutionary proponent of pan-Arabic nationalism – succeeded in nationalising 
the Suez Canal and driving out the former colonialist power Britain (and its 
allies France and Israel). On the other hand, it was clear to all, that it was 
primarily due to the opposition and lack of support from the US to the latter’s 
military invasion of the Canal Zone that they were forced to retreat.
While the events implied a victory for Nasser and his ‘Arab socialism’, 
the Suez crisis had also made unequivocally clear that new hegemonic power in 
the Middle East - and the world - was no longer Britain but the US. The latter’s 
strategic interests in the region – instigated not only by the aim to control its oil 
flows but also by fear of a marriage between radical nationalism and 
communism – crystallised in the ‘Eisenhower doctrine’, formulated early 1957, 
which stated that a country could request American economic assistance and/or 
protection by U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed 
aggression from another state [i.e. the Soviet Union] (see U.S. Department of 
State 2012, also Layne 2006:51-93).
Nasser had meanwhile become a driving force of the nationalist and 
emancipatory movement building up momentum in the Middle East. Several 
other dynamics added to the growing discontent of producing states, fuelled by 
Nasser, which were all related to increasing competition on the world oil 
market. The increased competition led to downward pressures on spot market 
oil prices and strained the price agreements between IOCs and resource holding 
states. First of all, the increase of competition was due to the arrival of 
‘independents’. A host of smaller American and non-American oil companies 
had started to enter the global oil market and competed with the major IOCs. A 
second crucial factor was the arrival (or rather re-entrance) on the world oil 
market of the Soviet Union, which had started to export oil to the West in 1955.  
From 1958 onward the Soviet Union became a major factor of influence on the 
world oil market, by adding substantively to the already existing surpluses and 
further accelerating the price fall. A third factor which added to the growing 
competition in global oil markets, was the instalment of import quotas on 
foreign oil, imposed by the Eisenhower Administration in 1959 who yielded to 
a forceful domestic lobby (see Yergin 1991: 535-540).29 Not only did the quotas 
imply that more non-US oil had to be sold on the global market - thus adding to 
the competition and causing even deeper price falls (except within the US) - it 
also added to the discontent of the petroleum exporters, fuelling their 
nationalism, and predisposing them towards action. The quotas enraged 
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Venezuela in particular, which was extremely affected by them, since the US 
was the destination of 40 percent of its total exports (ibid.:513).
The necessary spark for the producers to join forces was, however, the 
unilateral decision by the IOCs to cut the posted price. This ´fatal move´, as a 
Shell executive had called it, was made in August 1960 in response to 
plummeting market prices, in an attempt to enforce a share of the ‘losses’ onto 
the producers (Yergin 1991:521). Under the leadership of Venezuela and Saudi 
Arabia the producers finally acted on plans that had been discussed throughout 
the 1950s to create a joint organisation that would allow them to gain control 
over prices, production, and output, and that would counterbalance the power of 
the IOCs. This became the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), founded in September 1960 with the following members: Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait.30 OPEC demanded a return of the oil 
price to its pre-cut level and insisted on a guarantee that producing countries 
would be consulted with on future price matters, i.e. no further unilateral 
decisions on the part of the IOCs.
Yet, in spite of all the commotion surrounding the founding of OPEC, it 
initially did not have much clout. The oil companies in fact, as Yergin 
documents: ‘“attached little importance to it” [….] they pretended that “OPEC 
did not exist”’ (1991:523). Nor did Western governments seem particularly 
alarmed; in a secret 43 page report on “Middle East Oil” produced in November 
of 1960, the CIA devoted no more than four lines to OPEC (ibid.). There were 
three main reasons behind OPEC’s initial lack of power. First of all, the 
concessions were still in place (except for Iran and Mexico). Secondly, the 
producers depended on IOCs for access to markets and technology. Thirdly – as
described above - there was a huge oil surplus on the market. Not even the 
disruptions of oil supplies after the Six Day War, due to the embargo that the 
main exporters had placed on Israel-supporting countries, were effective in 
terms of a so called ‘oil weapon’, and actually simply implied a loss in terms of 
revenues for the exporters (ibid.:556). In addition, OPEC was hampered by 
internal political and geopolitical differences (see e.g. Stevens 2008). 
For all these reasons OPEC was somewhat of a ‘side show’ throughout 
the 1960s, as one executive had called it; the reality of the oil world at the time 
being ‘US import quotas, Russian oil exports and competition’ (Yergin 
1991:525). Nonetheless, OPEC’s establishment did signify a growing 
emancipation and organisation on the part of the major exporters and had made 
clear that any unilateral action (i.e. cuts in the posted price) on the part of the 
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international oil majors would potentially yield major repercussions. Also, it 
had put in place the foundations for a much more fundamental transition of 
power towards the petroleum exporting countries, to occur once market 
conditions and the geopolitical balance of forces had changed.
Several other important changes of the international energy order and 
its supply- and demand patterns had taken place in these two decades. Firstly, 
there was a global shift from coal to oil based societies. Whereas in 1949 coal 
had provided two thirds of world energy, by 1971, two-thirds of world energy 
came from oil (along with natural gas) (ibid.: 546). Secondly, total world energy 
consumption between 1949 and 1972 had more than tripled (in particular in the 
US, Western Europe, and Japan). Thirdly, the production of oil now came from 
a much wider geographical range in which the Middle East had taken the most 
prominent place. By 1971 the Middle Eastern Region produced 32 percent of 
total world oil, compared to 25 percent in North America, and 17 percent in 
Europe and Eurasia (including Soviet Union). South- and Central America 
produced 10 percent, Africa 11, and the Asia Pacific region 5 percent (BP 
2012).
Although by the end of these two decades the Seven Sisters still had 
considerable power and influence, and held the majority of the oil concessions 
in the world’s most productive regions, they were no longer ‘reigning alone’ . 
There had been a proliferation of new players: between 1953 and 1972 more 
than 350 companies either entered the foreign (that is, non-US) oil industry or 
significantly expanded their participation (Yergin 1991:532). Altogether the 
new entrants now owned 112 billion barrels of proven reserves – a quarter of 
the non-communist world total (ibid.). In contrast, and in spite of the rising tide 
of resource nationalism and the establishment of OPEC, still only a few new 
non-Western NOCs were established in this period. In addition to the already 
existing (mainly Western) NOCs of Austria (1908), Argentina (1922), France 
(1924), and Italy (1926) these were: Pemex in Mexico (1938), National Iranian 
Oil Company (Iran) in 1951, Brazil’s Petrobras (1953), India’s Oil and Natural 
Gas Corporation (ONGC) in 1956, and Sonatrach in (Algeria) in 1963 (Victor et 
al. 2012). These NOCs were, however, not yet a challenging counterforce to the 
IOCs; combined they had access to barely 1 percent of the world’s oil reserves, 
compared to access of the IOCs to about 85 percent of the oil reserves (Diwan 
2007, in Victor et al. 2012:6). However, this state of affairs was about to 
drastically change in the ensuing tumultuous and transformative 1970s.
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The 1970s – Oil Crises and Resource Sovereignty
The 1970s saw a dramatic shift in the supply-demand balance of world oil, as 
demand was rapidly catching up with available supply. The preceding two 
decades of surplus and falling prices were in the past, new supplies needed to be 
developed, and spare capacity was diminishing. The new decade was also a 
watershed for US domestic oil industry, which by 1970 had reached peak 
production. Correspondingly, US imports as share of total production rose from 
19 percent in 1967 to 36 percent 1973 (Yergin 1991:567). 
The process that would eventually lead to full nationalisation of the 
resources and the high tide of OPEC, shifted through several stages. The so 
called Tehran agreements (February 1971) between OPEC and the international 
oil companies, were a first major turning point in the producer-consumer 
relations. These agreements shifted the initiative from the companies to the 
exporting countries by establishing 55 percent as the minimum government 
take, and agreeing on a thirty-five cents increase in the price of a barrel of oil 
(Yergin 1991:582). Meanwhile, global demand for oil kept rising at a fast pace. 
Most of the increase in demand was met by OPEC countries, enhancing their 
power relative to the multinational oil companies (Fattouh 2007:3). The share of 
OPEC oil production in world total production increased from 50 percent in 
1965, to 60 percent in 1975 (based on data BP 2012).
In addition to further battles over the posted price, the time was slowly 
ripening to settle the issue of ownership. The concession system – which 
granted foreign oil companies the contractual ownership rights to freely explore 
and produce oil within a given area - was increasingly seen as a relic of the past, 
belonging to the era of colonialism and imperialism from which the developing 
world was ‘freeing’ itself. It was thus not only the capturing of a larger share of 
the rents, but also the question of sovereignty over resources, that became the 
focal point of contestation (see also Stevens 2008:10). Still, most of the Middle 
Eastern producers - in the early 1970s – thought it too disruptive to their 
relations with the IOCs (and their home governments) to opt for full 
nationalisation. Instead, Zaki Yamani, Saudi oil minister and key figure in these 
historical events, proposed the concept of (equity) ‘Participation’ – i.e. joint 
ownership with the major companies, rather than their ejection (Fattouh 2007). 
However, the producer countries were much supported by global market 
conditions.  Between 1970 and 1973 the market price for crude oil doubled and 
in fact exceeded the official posted prices, and by September 1973 even the 
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conservative Yamani was convinced that the Tehran Agreements should be 
overhauled. 
It was around this time that the Arab Oil Embargo, imposed in retaliation 
for military and economic support to Israel in the Yom Kippur War (waged by 
Egypt and Syria), caused the first severe oil crisis in the West. Although net loss 
of production was, in fact, not alarmingly large (about 9 percent), it was the 
ensuing panic that turned the embargo into a full blown oil crisis (i.e. frantic 
buying on oil markets and a spiralling price). What caused the panic was that 
the embargo came as a complete surprise; nobody expected that the exporters 
would voluntarily cut off their own stream of revenues (Yergin 1991:60).
In the midst of this turmoil, on October 16, 1973, OPEC unilaterally 
announced a 70 percent rise in the posted price of oil, in order to bring it back in 
line with the panicking markets. This signified a drastic change in the pricing 
system, since OPEC previously only had the power to prevent oil companies 
from reducing the price (Fattouh 2007:4). Moreover, these developments led to 
a rift in the Western alliance, since individual countries were trying to secure 
their own supplies (as well as trying to, formally, distance themselves from the 
‘contaminated’ US). While the US initially had not been opposed to price 
increases, because it would boost their flagging domestic oil industry, damage 
the export competitiveness of their European and Japanese competitors, and 
because a manageable increase in revenues to the Middle Eastern regimes was 
considered a stabilising and pacifying force and counterforce to communism 
and radicalism, this political turn and the loss of control that it implied, greatly 
alarmed them.
In response to these escalating developments the US put in place two 
mechanisms, with the underlying aim to ensure a central American role in the 
global energy order. One was a rather invisible and highly secret agreement 
with Saudi Arabia (and OPEC) called the ‘petrodollar recycling system’. This 
system consisted of two pillars (see for a well-researched account Spiro 1999): 
1) a tacit commitment of Saudi Arabia to denominate oil in dollars in return for 
military protection and 2) the “add-on arrangement” which basically boiled 
down to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) agreeing to ‘buy US 
government obligations without competitive bidding against a marginally 
cheaper rate than the average price paid by private firms’ (ibid.:109). The latter 
gave the government access to a huge pool of foreign capital and, moreover, it 
could in this way ‘control inflows of Saudi capital … on a central bank to 
central bank basis’ (ibid:110). As long as OPEC oil was priced in U.S. dollars 
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and OPEC invested these dollars in the US government, the latter enjoyed a 
double loan, as Spiro argues; first of all, the US could simply print dollars to 
buy oil, second, since all other countries had to pay with dollars without being 
able to print them, they would have to produce their goods and services for 
dollars to pay for oil (1999:121-122). Indeed this arrangement can be 
interpreted as an alternative for the gold-dollar standard and the Bretton Woods 
system that had just broken down, i.e. an alternative way of ensuring the status 
of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
The second mechanism was the founding of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) in 1974, with the aim to act as watchdog for the so called energy 
‘consuming’ OECD countries. Primarily, the IEA aimed to develop and 
coordinate an emergency oil-sharing system amongst its original 17 OECD 
members, to be deployed in case of a new supply disruption (see Van der Graaf 
and Lesage 2009, Florini 2011).31 Cementing the interests of the OECD 
consumers under auspices of the US (holding a majority block of voting rights), 
was a way to bind together centrifugal forces within the global energy order. In 
fact, these foundations are still in place, as will be shown in Chapter Six.
Meanwhile, a nationalisation wave was building up that would 
fundamentally change the structure and power relations within the oil industry. 
The onset of this build-up predated the oil embargo and continued well after it 
had ended on March 18, 1974. During this process both Iraq (in 1972) and 
Kuwait (in 1974) fully expropriated the foreign oil companies and Venezuela 
took irreversible steps towards nationalisation. Saudi Arabia, again opted for a 
more cooperative solution, taking over ownership and rights within the country 
in 1976, while Aramco (still run by American oil companies) would continue to 
be the operator and provide services to Saudi Arabia (Yergin 1991: 651-2).
These nationalisations took place within a broader global context of re-
evaluation and reformulation of the North-South relations. This took a concrete 
form in the adoption by the UN of the proposal for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (see Krasner 1985, Cox 1979). The NIEO 
consisted of a large number of policy proposals put forward by the G77 (an 
assembly of non-OECD developing countries). These proposals aimed to 
improve the trade positions of the global South in relation to the North, with at 
its core the claim to state sovereignty. This included the right to regulate and 
control activities of foreign multinational corporations (MNC) within their 
territories as well as the right to nationalise their assets. According to Krasner, it 
represented the ‘clearest manifestation of Third World efforts to restructure 
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market-oriented international regimes’ and ‘fundamentally challenged the 
extant liberal order’ (Krasner 1985:6). In spite of its initial success however, the 
NIEO movement, reaching its peak in the mid-1970s, was gradually disarmed 
by a combination of forces and developments, in particular – as elaborated by 
Van der Pijl - the agency of multinational corporations from core OECD 
countries (1993:54).
Nonetheless, by the mid-70s the exporters owned their domestic oil 
reserves and, as a corollary, this period saw the birth of a new group of major 
(mainly non-Western) National Oil Companies (Victor et al. 2012, World Bank 
2008, Bentham and Smith 1987, Wolf 2009a): Libyan LNOC in 1970, 
Pertamina of Indonesia in 1971, full nationalisation of Iraq National Oil 
Company (INOC) in 1972, PDVSA (Venezuela) in 1975, Kuwait Oil Company 
in 1975, QGPC in Qatar 1974, Petronas (Malaysia) in 1974, PetroVietnam in 
1975, Sonangol (Angola) in 1976, Nigerian National Petroleum corporation 
(NNPC) in 1977, and finally Saudi Aramco in 1980.32 However, not only non-
Western producers created NOCs at the time: Norwegian Statoil was established 
in 1972, the British National Oil Company was formed in 1975, and Canadian 
Petro-Canada in 1975.
The rise of these National Oil Companies implied a drastic reversal in 
the ownership relations of the oil industry. By 1980 the NOCs could access 
about 59 percent of the world’s oil reserves (compared to less than 1 percent a 
decade earlier), whereas the IOCs only had full access to 12 percent (instead of 
the 85 percent they had been used to) (Victor et al. 2012:6). This heralded a 
‘Golden Age’ (1974-1978) for OPEC and the exporting countries in general. 
However, nationalisation of the oil resources and the creation of NOCs, while 
implying an assertion of state power and the full realisation of sovereignty on 
the part of the resource holders, at the same time – paradoxically - generated a 
set of tendencies that would contribute to a deepening transnationalisation of the 
petroleum order and would in due course significantly influence the price of oil 
and the power of OPEC and its members in that respect. In effect, the 
nationalisations had three major (interrelated) consequences that will be 
described below.
Arguably, the most fundamental consequence was that the 
nationalisations laid the foundation for an integrated global oil market 
(Goldthau and Witte 2010, Fattouh 2007, Bina 2006). Nationalisation and 
expropriation namely also implied a significant break-up of the vertical 
integration of the industry, increasingly depriving IOCs from access to reserves 
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and NOCs of access to refining and retail outlets, thus inducing the need and 
rationale for exchange at a global oil market with spot prices. Hence, with 
nationalisation the seeds were planted for the ongoing integration and 
interconnectedness of the global oil market, a process that has since then 
evolved alongside nationalist energy policies.
A second, related, consequence was that IOCs started to redirect their 
corporate strategy towards trading. BP, which lost about 40 percent of its 
upstream assets, led the way in this ‘revolution’, establishing a large trading 
unit to deal with spot markets and eventually becoming more and more 
decentralised (World Bank 2008).33 The other IOCs soon followed BPs lead. 
While the oil companies were initially still linked to the producers by supply 
contracts, those connections would weaken over time, due to diversification 
policies (see below) and because of opportunities and alternative ties that 
existed in the market. As a result, the spot market gained significance. Its 
importance became even greater following the outbreak of the second oil crisis 
in December 1978 with the upheavals in Iran and the rise to power by 
Khomeini, since the result of that crisis was that buyers who lost Iranian 
supplies turned to spot markets to replace them. As Yergin describes, the spot 
market, which had been ‘the fringe’, comprising about 8 percent of total 
supplies, now ‘became the center’ (1991: 688). In turn, spot prices in February 
1979 became double the official price, which instigated exporters to not only 
add premiums to their official price, but also to shift their supplies from long-
term contracts to the spot markets, since these were much more profitable, 
thereby further adding to the expansion of the spot markets (ibid.:689). All of 
this sent prices spiralling out of control and would lead to a price collapse, only 
a few years further along.
A third consequence of the nationalisations was a redirection of 
investment flows away from the non-OECD areas towards the OECD countries. 
In addition a whole gamut of diversification policies on the part of oil 
companies and Western governments was undertaken to reduce dependence 
upon OPEC oil (see e.g. Fattouh 2007). The latter meant that considerable effort 
and investment was put into bringing new sources on the market. Alaska, 
Mexico and the North Sea proved particular important sources in this respect, as 
their discovery led to a considerable diversification of global oil supply and 
gradual decline of reliance on OPEC supply, after a period of time. As Figure 1 
illustrates, OPEC production dropped markedly from the end of the 1970s to the 
mid 1980s. During this period non-OPEC production took over and continued 
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to steadily increase over the course of the following decades. It was only after 
1986 that OPEC production started to rise again, but still the production level 
remained considerably below non-OPEC production. Interestingly, however, 
since 2004-2005 OPEC production again has surpassed non-OPEC production, 
a development that marks the current transformation and will be elaborated in 
the next section of this chapter
Figure 1: Oil production OPEC and non-OPEC 1965-2011
£ Non-OPEC excludes former Soviet Union                             
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
The paradoxical developments that sprung from the nationalisation of the 
resources, as described above, illustrate how the expansion of capital generates 
parallel interrelated developments, rather than one-dimensional or uni-
directional trends towards either transnationalisation or nationalisation. A 
dialectic that was theorised in Chapter Two as rooted in the expansionary drive 
of capital accumulation and the crucial role of the state in sustaining continued 
accumulation. It also illustrates how the global expansion of capital projects 
these contradictions on an ever wider scale. The 1970s had seen a significant 
shift in the balance of forces between producers and consumers, marking the 
heydays of a broader emancipatory movement from the global South, claiming 
sovereignty and control over their own resources and more equal terms and 
conditions of international trade. But although these developments had 
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fundamentally redrawn the boundaries of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
operations of international oil companies (i.e. transnational capital) and between 
the global North and South, they also contained the seeds of the further 
transnationalisation of the global energy order. More broadly, it comprised a 
countermovement in which capital accumulation and profits on the part of 
Western-originated transnational capital were restored through the development 
of a neoliberal growth model that came to fruition in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
will be described below.
The 1970s had, however, two more ‘geopolitical shocks’ in store, the Iranian 
Hostage Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. It 
was to the latter that president Carter responded with the by now well-known 
Carter doctrine illustrating US vital geopolitical and energy interests in the 
region: ‘Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military forces’ (Carter, 1980). 
1980s and ‘90s – the Neoliberal Era
Overall, this era was dominated by neoliberal thinking in which privatisation, 
liberalisation, open markets, competitiveness, and maximal retreat of the state 
were hailed as the panacea for economic development and growth. The 
neoliberal growth model was globally promoted and enforced under leadership 
of the US and supported by formally multilateral bodies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the so called 
‘Washington consensus’). The end of the Cold War added a sense of ‘victory’ to 
the Western neo-liberal mode of governing the socio-economic order. Many 
believed that the future would be marked by a gradual conversion towards this 
model with largely beneficial outcomes in terms of economic growth, welfare, 
and peace (e.g. Fukuyama 1992).
The neoliberal growth model contained a mix of liberal pro-market and 
supply-side discourses (laissez-faire, privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, 
competitiveness) and of monetarist orthodoxy (price stability, balanced budgets, 
austerity) (Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn 2012:5). Overbeek and Van 
Apeldoorn characterise this model as a ‘money capital perspective […] pursuing 
short-term profit and the abolition of capital controls and other state-imposed 
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limitations on the free circulation of capital’ (ibid.). However, this model is not 
limited to the financial sector, since, in the guise of ‘shareholder value’, it also 
dominated the so called ‘real economy’ (ibid.). Moreover, it implied a shift in 
production from the West to the newly industrialising countries (particularly 
East Asia). Initially these ‘spatial fixes’ primarily benefitted Western 
transnational capital. However, once in place they also generated the growth of 
rival centres of accumulation that ultimately came to compete with the original 
(Western) centres of capital expansion. In addition, it should be stressed, that 
while the ideological and political (policy) dimension of neoliberalism - with at 
its core the aim for expansion and opening up of markets, and the for freedom 
of manoeuvre of capital - emphasised a minimum of state intervention, these 
measures could only be implemented and sustained through state intervention, 
backed up by coercion, if necessary.
In the global energy order, the neoliberal growth model became 
manifest through a gradual financialisation of global oil market, comprising: a 
shift from long-term contracts to short-term maximisation of profit making in
the rapidly expanding spot markets, the development of futures markets and 
speculation, the restructuring of IOCs corporate strategies towards trading and 
later financial investment (speculation), and a shift towards a corporate 
governance model dominated by ‘shareholder value’, or so called ‘value based 
management’ (see Stevens 2008). These developments coincided with yet 
another shift in the supply and demand balance in the global oil market. As had 
happened in the 1920s and 1940s (see e.g. Sampson 1975), the shortage that had 
characterised the 1970s oil market, had by now turned into surplus. As outlined 
in Chapter Two, this dynamic illustrates the precarious balancing between over-
and undersupply, and the complexity of ‘organising scarcity’. Additionally, by 
this time important changes in the patterns of demand had taken place. High 
prices and concerns about supply security had led to a shift in consumption 
from oil to other energy sources and to a conservation policy that had 
significant effect in major consuming countries in terms of energy efficiency 
(Yergin 1991: 718). Thus, when in 1980 the Iran-Iraq war broke out, the 
considerable loss of supply due to this conflict (about 15 percent of total OPEC 
output and 8 percent of the non-communist world demand), could be offset by 
other production and the inventories that had been accumulated during the 
‘panic years’ of the second oil crisis (ibid.:743). The war did, however, 
contribute to further development of the spot oil markets, falling oil prices, and 
an erosion of power of the oil producers. Non-OPEC producers, in order to 
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increase their market share, were cutting their official prices. Subsequently, 
demand for OPEC oil fell and prices were falling along. In 1980 non-OPEC 
production (excluding the former Soviet Union) overtook OPEC (see also 
Figure 1 above), and – importantly - most of that oil was sold on spot markets. 
In order to counteract these developments, OPEC imposed production quotas in 
March 1982, in combination with a 15 percent price cut. All in all, this meant a 
complete reversal of the 1970s, as Yergin summarises: ‘producers now had to 
worry about access to markets’, rather than vice versa (1991:721). As a sign of 
the times, the four Aramco partners – Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron – in 
1984 severed their historic ties with Saudi Arabia, because their price was too 
high (ibid.:723-4).
As addressed above, these developments were partly a contradictory 
outcome of the nationalisations of the 1970s, which led the IOCs to reinvent 
themselves and to shift their focus from long-term contracts to spot markets. As 
described in a World Bank report: ‘A more competitive and unstable business 
environment, coupled with declining profitability and the pressure to improve 
shareholders’ returns, was gradually changing the corporate culture of 
international oil majors […] traders and commercial people were gradually 
replacing the supply planners of the 1970s in international oil majors’ (World 
Bank 2008:2). These developments indeed neatly illustrate how the ongoing 
transnationalisation of the global energy order, partly originated from, and co-
developed with, the nationalisation wave of the previous decades.
This contradiction became even more apparent with the financialisation 
of the global oil market, which heralded a new crucial phase in its further 
transnationalisation. In particular the introduction of oil futures, on March 30 
1983 at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), would decisively 
undermine OPEC’s – as well as anyone else’s - price-setting powers. While the 
NYMEX was initially met with scepticism and hostility from the industry, 
within a few years most of the major oil companies, some of the exporting 
countries, as well as many other players (e.g. institutional investors, 
speculators) were participating in crude futures on the Exchange (Yergin 
1991:725). Since then, the futures market has grown and it is now placed at the 
heart of the current oil-pricing regime (Fattouh 2006:68-9). A recent estimate 
observed that: ‘the daily volumes of trades in energy futures is now a staggering 
25 times higher than daily global demand for energy. Speculators rule the 
markets....’ (Sharma 2012). These dynamics will be further elaborated on in 
Chapter Six. For now, we can conclude that these developments illuminate how 
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the rules of the game have transformed from a system of administered oil 
pricing governed by the IOCs, to an OPEC-governed order, and finally, to a 
futures market in which the epicentre of pricing power has shifted to the realm 
of financial and speculative capital.
Another dimension of the neoliberal restructuring of the energy order 
applying to the IOCs was the emphasis on so called ‘shareholder value’, i.e. 
prioritising financial capital and shareholder interests. Simply put, this implied 
that if the company could not do better than the market in terms of its rate of 
return, it must return the money to the shareholders (Stevens 2008:22). The 
results of this ‘strategy’ were a stream of mergers and acquisitions of the IOCs, 
the outsourcing of technical services to so called energy service companies, 
massive lay-offs, and a decrease of investment (Stevens 2008). The 
restructuring thus implied a redistribution of wealth to the shareholders at the 
expense of the employees and exploration expenditures. As Yergin sums up; 
‘All the activity – the major mergers and acquisitions, the recapitalisations, and 
the stock buy-backs – propelled well over $ 100 billion into the pockets of 
institutional and individual investors, pension funds, arbitrageurs and the rest’
(1991:742).
Yet, the neoliberal energy order, as described here, while hailing the 
free workings of market forces and advocating state intervention to be kept at a 
minimum, was in fact underpinned by the ‘invisible hand’ of OPEC, or rather 
Saudi Arabia’s role within it. How much so, became apparent when Saudi 
Arabia in 1985 changed their strategy. Up to that point they had acted as a 
swing producer, which in reality meant they had steadily cut production in order 
to keep up prices, at their own ‘expense’ up to a point where costs were 
disproportionally high. Since other producers failed to do the same, a point was 
reached were Saudi production fell below the North Sea production level, which 
in fact meant that Saudi Arabia was running a deficit in order to enable the 
British under Margaret Thatcher, a forceful proponent of neoliberalism to 
produce more. The new Saudi strategy was to defend volume instead of price, 
i.e. to sell as much oil as the market ‘wanted’ within a quasi competitive system 
of so called ‘netback pricing’ (Yergin 1991:748-9, see on netback pricing also 
Mabro 1987, Fattouh 2007). Subsequently, a third ‘oil shock’ broke out, with 
prices not rising, but tumbling, to less than $10 per barrel in mid-1986. As
Yergin describes: ‘…it was not merely that prices were collapsing: they were 
also out of control [...] What was unleashed that year, in the words of the acting 
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Secretary General of OPEC Fadhil al-Chalabi, was nothing less than “absolute 
competition”’ (1991:755).
The results of the price crash were however not only felt by the OPEC 
producers (including of course Saudi Arabia itself), but also severely affected 
the American domestic oil industry, which saw its revenues dry up, stalled 
investment in exploration and production, and with the subsequent drop in 
production feared a rise in imports as well as economic depression in the oil 
producing Southwest (ibid.). The many subsequent calls for the imposition of a 
tariff were turned a deaf ear by the neoliberal minded Reagan administration. 
Instead, the US would try to ‘jawbone OPEC into getting its act together’ 
(ibid.:756). Vice-President George Bush (an oil man himself) went to Riyadh to 
persuade OPEC to return to a system of administered pricing with a higher oil 
price. He succeeded: OPEC decided on a price of 17-19 barrel and a new quota 
system, non-OPEC producers hesitantly cooperated (ibid.:758).34 This 
disciplining of OPEC, illustrates the rebalancing of forces in the global energy 
order that had taken place in the 1980s and testifies to the hegemonic power of 
the US. While exporters had their own reasons to want price stability, the US 
clearly had the leverage (not only due to their political and economic 
overweight, but also significantly due to their military ties with the Middle East, 
see e.g. Stokes and Raphael 2010:82-94), to force OPEC into making the 
desired adjustments.
The decline of the producers’ power and influence, however, also 
reflected the changed market conditions. What mattered during the 1980-90s 
was secure access to markets: i.e. security of demand, rather than security of 
supply. An important indication of this is that the oil market was not much 
affected, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, followed by the American 
retaliation and embargo imposed on Iraq. The embargo removed 4 million 
barrels from the oil market, i.e. the same scale as in the crises of 1973 and 1979, 
but by December 1990 the lost production had been completely compensated 
for. At the same time demand was weakening since the US and other countries 
headed into economic recession (Yergin 1991:774-5). The US air war and 
subsequent ground war, for all the devastation that it brought to Iraq and 
Kuwait, did not significantly affect oil prices, which initially spiked from $30 to 
$40 but then plunged to $ 29 per barrel (ibid.).
Producers hence needed to make sure that they were reliable suppliers of a 
secure commodity. In response to falling prices and revenues – and in line with 
the reigning neoliberal mode - exporters started to attract IOCs and foreign 
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direct investments (FDI) again (Victor et al. 2012, Stevens 2008). This process 
was reinforced by the fact that the debt crisis in the 1980s gave the IMF and the 
World Bank under leadership of the US, considerable leverage to ‘persuade’ 
countries of the need to open their oil sector to private players, the so called 
‘Washington consensus’ (Stevens 2008:21).
The rate of new NOC formation also slowed down considerably during 
the 1980s (Victor et al. 2012:6). Germany, an oil-importing state, established a 
NOC with the aim to promote security of supply and several of the (post-)
Soviet Union states founded NOCs, a prominent example being Gazprom in 
1989. Some NOCs started to integrate downstream, some even privatized. 
PDVSA (Venezuela) built up a large refining and marketing system in the US, 
as did Kuwait (Q8). Saudi Arabia, together with Texaco, established a joint 
venture in which Saudi Arabia acquired a 50 percent interest in Texaco’s 
refineries and gasoline stations in the US. And Margaret Thatcher, a ferocious 
advocate of privatisation, ‘free’ markets, and minimal state intervention, sold 
off the UK government’s 51 percent stake in BP in 1987.
This trend of privatisation deepened during the 1990s, in particular in 
Latin America, Russia, and Asia (yet, less so in the Middle East). Argentina 
privatised YPF in 1992, and both the Mexican NOC (Pemex) and PDVSA 
pressured their government for more private sector involvement. Some Chinese 
and Indian NOCs allowed minority shares for private investors, and Russia 
undertook a large scale privatisation of its hydrocarbon sector, which however 
remained closely linked to the political establishment (Victor et al. 2012:7). On 
the part of the IOCs, growing competition amongst them led to greater emphasis 
on so called ‘value-based management’ (maximising shareholder value) (see 
Stevens 2008: 22). This engendered another round of mega mergers, triggered 
in 1998 by BP’s takeover of Amoco (the American Oil Company) and 
culminating in a drastic reduction of the number of IOCs and in a substantial 
reduction of investments (ibid.).
In sum, the 1980s and ‘90s had shifted the balance of forces in favour 
of the International Oil Companies and the consuming countries, although on a 
much frailer basis than was the case in the pre-nationalisation era, because their 
relative edge was no longer grounded in ownership of the reserves. While the 
IOCs in this period gained renewed access to the reserves under more 
favourable terms, this improvement, to a large extent, was due to global market 
conditions of excess supply and falling prices. These conditions could easily 
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change again, at which point the tide could once more turn ‘against’ them; 
which – as will be illustrated shortly - it did.
Ownership of the oil reserves, nonetheless, still predominantly resided 
with the OPEC countries (see Table 3 below), of which the majority (55 
percent) was still located in the Middle East. Production had however become 
more diversified, as new important production regions had been disclosed. In 
particular, there had been a large build up of production in Mexico, Alaska, and 
the North Sea. Moreover, the US industry had surged and Egypt and a range of 
other minor players (such as Malaysia, Angola, China) had started to become 
significant exporters, adding significantly to diversification of supply. In 
addition, major innovations had improved exploration, production, and 
transportation technologies, largely benefitting the IOCs of the West.
Table 3: Distribution Oil Reserves in 1980-1999
1980 1999
OPEC 62% 67%
Non-OPEC 28% 27%
Soviet Union 10% 6%
1980 1999
Middle East 53% 55%
Rest of the world 47% 45%
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
2000s – A New Wave of Resource Nationalism
Towards the end of the 20th century, the limits and contradictions inherent in the 
neoliberal growth model and the Washington consensus had become manifested 
on a global scale. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the economic 
collapse of Russia in 1998 were apparent examples of the failure of the 
Washington Consensus, since these countries had followed the IMF/World 
Bank recipes but collapsed, not only in spite of them (Stevens 2008:8), but also 
partly as a consequence. Global discontent was growing with US enforced, 
neoliberal globalization and the inequalities it produced. The 9/11 attacks were 
perhaps the most visible indicator of this shift towards erosion of US hegemony, 
not only because they revealed the vulnerability of the military ‘superpower’, 
but also because these attacks came from forces within what had been 
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considered America’s most important (energy) ally in the Middle East (Saudi 
Arabia). While the ensuing US response, known as the global ‘war on terror’, 
gathered support from a largely Western and Western-friendly ‘coalition of the 
willing’, it simultaneously intensified the rift between the West and ‘the rest’, 
and led to a heightened sense of insecurity. Not in the least, of course, in 
Muslim populated parts of the world (in the Middle East but also North Africa,
Central Asia, and for instance Indonesia), which also happen to be hydrocarbon 
rich areas. The US-led invasion of Afghanistan and - even more so - the war on 
Iraq aimed at installing a Western/US friendly regime in a strategically located 
area in the Middle Eastern region, which so happened to contain the fifth largest 
proven oil reserves in the world (IEA 2011), resulted in a quagmire. While 
aiming to counter anti-US/Western forces and sentiments in the region, these 
wars further undermined US legitimacy as a hegemonic power, and also 
substantially drained the already fragile economy of the US (De Graaff and Van 
Apeldoorn 2011). These developments were further aggravated by the ensuing 
global financial crisis, emanating in 2008 from Wall Street, the very heart of the 
US promoted neoliberal model.
Another ‘boomerang effect’ of the global capital expansion that had 
taken place in the high tide of neoliberal globalization, was the emergence of 
new centres of accumulation in the non-OECD part of the world, in particular 
China. As described in the previous chapter these new growth centres ultimately 
also needed an ‘external’ space for their over-accumulated capital and thus 
became competitors to the original ‘centre’ of over-accumulation. A crucial 
corollary of their growth has been an exponential increase in demand for energy 
that could not be met with sufficient increases in supply, leading to a tight 
market and correspondingly, rising prices. Growing awareness and 
politicisation of climate change added to this mix. As a result, energy security 
returned to the forefront of the political agenda and – more broadly – the state 
started to make a ‘comeback’ in terms of its role in energy policies and politics.
Rising oil prices (from an average of $12.28 in 1998 to $ 54.52 per 
barrel in 2005, see for historical trend of the oil price, Figure 17, in Appendix 
C) and growing discontent with the Western imposed order and ideology, also 
led resource holders to re-evaluate the terms offered in the 1990s. As a result, 
several major producers embarked on a path of renegotiating these terms and, in 
some cases, of re-nationalisation of the industry. In other words, a resurgence of 
resource nationalism had made its entrance in the global energy order, spreading 
from Latin America to North Africa, Russia, and Central Asia.
86
A case in point is Hugo Chavez, who in 2001 enacted a new 
Hydrocarbons Law in Venezuela. This law enforced significantly higher 
royalties from foreign oil companies and guaranteed PDVSA a majority share 
of any new projects. Similary, in Kazakhstan, new restrictions on Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSAs) with foreign oil companies were introduced in 2005, 
as well as new tax structures, guaranteeing state-owned Kazmunaygaz at least 
50 percent in any PSA, and raising government’s oil income to 65 – 85 percent. 
In Russia, Putin took a more assertive and state-directed approach towards the 
energy industry.35 OECD countries were not immune to the tide of resurging 
resource nationalism either. Canada and Australia in particular, have displayed 
resource nationalist behaviour (see e.g. Bremmer and Johnston)36 and, for 
instance, the UK in 2011 increased taxes on North Sea oil from 20 to 32 percent 
(Harvey 2011). Moreover, ‘resource protectionist’ measures have been taken on 
behalf of some major consumers: the US congress’ blocking of the takeover of 
American oil major Unocal by the Chinese state-owned CNOOC, for instance, 
and a general tightening of oversight on ‘strategic sectors’ by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
Nonetheless, this new wave of resource nationalism is not simply a 
rerun of the 1970s. As John Mitchell –energy expert at the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs in London, and former BP executive and advisor to the 
managing directors – described it, it is more of a revision than a revolution.37
Although in some cases, in particular in Latin America, ‘revolutionary’ projects 
and rhetoric are accompanying the resurgence of resource nationalism, it is 
generally of a more pragmatic and commercially oriented nature. It also takes 
place within a fundamentally different context. First of all, it no longer involves 
large scale contestations and shifts in ownership of resources. Secondly, there 
is, instead, a significant shift outwards, i.e. NOCs are moving outside their 
national borders, directly penetrating markets that were previously IOC 
dominated. Thirdly, and related, this wave has yielded a new breed of NOCs,
the non-OECD resource seeking NOCs, typically, but not exclusively, from the
Asian countries. The Chinese expansion in particular has been much 
commented upon (see Chapter Six). Fourthly, this time resource nationalism 
takes place alongside the existence of a much more globalised and integrated oil 
market, in which there are significantly higher levels of interdependency and 
short term profit seeking behaviours rooted in more flexible and ad-hoc market 
exchange relations. In addition, the financialisation of the oil market has put 
trading activities and speculation at the heart of the pricing dynamics of global 
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energy order, adding an –as of yet - uncontrolled and unregulated dynamic to 
the price formation of oil and as such, greatly contributing to the latter’s 
volatility (see Chapter Six and e.g. Mabro 2000, 2005, Labban 2010, Stevens 
2008, Masters 2008). Finally, the recent wave of resource nationalism coincides 
with a broader shift in the global political economy in which the non-OECD 
world is gaining increased economic and political clout. In the following section 
we will turn to this fundamental transformation and the effects it has had on the 
energy and production patterns.
A Shifting Centre of Gravity in Energy Production and Consumption
We are currently witnessing a major shift in power in the global political 
economy, due to the emerging economies of the global South - with in 
particular China constituting a new economic growth pole. The emergence of 
these non-OECD growth poles has led some to describe the global political 
economy as increasingly multi-polar, which in this study is interpreted as the 
existence of multiple dominant centres of accumulation (growth poles) within 
the global political economy.38 What distinguishes the current multi-polarity 
from earlier situations - for instance the three dominant growth poles of the US, 
Europe, and Japan in the 1980s - is that this time the growth takes place 
primarily outside the OECD. Additionally, it coincides with declining or 
stagnant growth within the OECD area, which since 2008 is further hampered 
by the global financial crisis and, lately, by the sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, it 
can be debated to what extent the major OECD powers (i.e. the US and the EU) 
can still be considered growth poles.
A recent report by the World Bank observes: ‘By 2025, global 
economic growth will predominantly be generated in emerging economies’ 
(2011:2). The report projects that global wealth and asset holdings will ‘shift 
further toward emerging economies with surpluses’, such as China and major 
oil exporters in the Middle East: ‘International reserves held by emerging 
economies topped $7.4 trillion in 2010 (approximately three times the $2.1 
trillion in reserves held by advanced economies), and the share of cross-border 
mergers and acquisition (M&A) by firms based in emerging economies in 2010
was 29 percent ($470 billion) of the global total’ (idem.:4).
This section of Chapter Three documents this broader shift by focusing on 
energy production and consumption, which are intimately related to economic 
88
growth in general. The analyses presented here are (primarily) based on data 
provided in BP’s annual statistical review, which is a widely recognised and 
used source both inside the industry and beyond. It should be noted here that 
although I employ the distinction between the OECD and non-OECD,  wide 
variation exists within these aggregate categories and in both cases there are 
actually only a few ‘powerhouses’ with major IOCs or NOCs. Yet, these 
categories are used here to provide a general indication of the trends, moreover 
this is a common way in which this kind of data are used in the literature and 
industry / policy studies on this topic. When considered necessary or 
appropriate I will also provide some disaggregated examples. 
Figures 2 and 3 make clear that there has indeed been a long term shift 
in the respective share of the OECD and the non-OECD world in terms of both 
primary energy production and consumption of hydrocarbon’s (oil, gas, and 
coal). The most striking feature of this shift is that the share of consumption of 
energy in the non-OECD world has not only been steadily increasing over the 
past decades, but also in fact has surpassed the OECD world in its growth in 
2008 (see Figure 3).
Figure 2: Oil ,Gas and Coal Production 1981-2011 (OECD and non-OECD)
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
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Figure 3: Primary Energy Consumption 1965-2011 (OECD and non-OECD) 
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
In terms of hydrocarbon production (Figure 2) the developments since 1981 
reveal a widening gap between the OECD and the non-OECD members, caused 
primarily by the fact that the non-OECD members have significantly increased 
their production of oil, gas, and coal, respectively from 3,5 billion tonnes of oil 
equivalent in 1981, to 8 billion in 2011. The OECD countries, on the other 
hand, hardly increased their production during this period. Although the data 
presented here are aggregate, this trend is more or less similar for oil, gas, and
coal separately (see Figures 18, 19, 20 in Appendix C for the disaggregate data).
In terms of primary energy consumption (Figure 3) an interesting 
tipping point has been reached quite recently (in 2008), with the non-OECD 
part of the world currently consuming more energy than the OECD part. 
Whereas the OECD members consumed more than double the amount of energy 
(i.e. more than 1.5 billion tonnes of oil equivalent) compared to the non-OECD 
countries in 1965, the non-OECD world currently consumes 1 billion tonnes of 
oil equivalence more on a yearly basis than its OECD counterpart. Moreover, 
according to the IEA, it is estimated that in the next 25 years, 90 percent of the 
projected growth in global energy use will come from the non-OECD 
economies (IEA 2011). 
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At a more disaggregate level (country and regional), it can be seen that the
increase is primarily taking place in the Asia Pacific region (see Figure 4 
below), in particular due to China’s spectacular growth since the turn of the 
millennium. In 2006, China surpassed the European Union and in 2009 also 
North America.
Figure 4: Primary Energy Consumption 1965-2011 (Selected Country/Region 
Comparison)
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
A widening gap between OECD and non-OECD countries can also be observed 
in terms of (proved conventional) oil and gas reserves (Figures 5a and 5b 
below), largely due to an increase on the part of the non-OECD members.39
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Figure 5a and 5b: Proven Oil and Gas Reserves 1980-2011 (OECD and non-
OECD)
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
A remarkable new development is that, since 2010, the non-OECD part of the 
world has surpassed the OECD countries in terms of their refining capacity (see 
Figure 6a below). This means that the former - in addition to their dominance in 
the upstream part of the hydrocarbon sector, which, as we have seen, was 
established in the ‘70s - are now also increasingly expanding into the 
downstream sector.
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Figure 6a: Refining Capacity 1965-2011 (OECD and non-OECD)
Figure 6b: Refining Capacity 1965-2011 (Selected Country and Regions 
Comparison)
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
Refining capacity has remained somewhat stable in the OECD area since the 
2000s, which in particular, seems due to decreasing capacities in the European 
Union (see Figure 6b above). This more disaggregate overview of a selection of 
major countries and regions shows that while the former Soviet Union (which 
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includes Russia and Central Asia) has seen a decline in refining capacity, the 
Middle East has seen a steady increase (in fact reaching the same level as the 
former Soviet Union by 2011), and that China has increased its refining 
capacities quite spectacularly since 1965, in particular over the last decade.
The prevalence of ownership of reserves, gives resource rich non-
OECD countries influence and control over access to reserves, and is often seen 
as a major advantage for the National Oil Companies from such resource 
holding countries. However, as has been outlined in the theoretical chapter, this 
power is at the same time circumscribed by the need for investment, technology, 
and markets. To the extent that non-OECD NOCs cannot provide these 
themselves, they remain dependent upon the IOCs for input of financial capital, 
and technological and managerial knowhow, in order to reap the wealth that 
their subsurface holds. In addition, as the historical narrative has illuminated, 
producers’ capabilities and power of access to and control of reserves are 
greatly influenced by price- and market conditions.
The fact that the non-OECD members are increasing their refining 
capacity however, is a significant indication of their emancipation, and seems 
indicative of their increasing influence. Extending refining capacity, as 
Steinhubl and de Sá in a recent corporate report point out: ‘adds value (and 
margin) to the crude oil produced [in the country and] promotes integration 
downstream into lubricants and petrochemicals [which] limits imports, 
generates jobs, increases labor qualification and grows exports’ (2012:2). For 
non-OECD resource seekers it is also described as a strategy to solidify 
relationships with major producers. In particular China’s investments and joint 
ventures with major producers around the world – most notably with Saudi 
Arabia – are seen by some commentators as supporting ‘a long-term strategy of 
developing world-class refining facilities in partnership with OPEC suppliers. 
Such relationships mean economic leverage that could soon make China 
OPEC's premier purchaser and subordinate U.S. relations with the same 
countries’ (Yinan 2012).
The first section of this chapter addressed the shifts and turning points 
in the respective power of private and state-owned oil majors, IOCs and NOCs, 
embedded in a narrative of the post-war evolution of the global energy order. 
The following section will add to that a systematic and more aggregate analysis, 
of changes in patterns of production and consumption since the end of the ‘80s 
by IOCs and NOCs at the commanding heights of the industry.
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Transformations at the Top: towards NOCs Dominance?
As a proxy for the top of the energy industry I have taken the rankings of the 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW, see Chapter Four for a more elaborate 
description of this ranking). The analyses below make use of a database 
composed by Wolf (2009b) who compiled a comprehensive panel data set from 
the PIW annual rankings (see Wolf 2009a for an explanation of his dataset and 
methodology, pp. 2645-8). In addition, I used supplementary data that I 
collected from the PIW rankings (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1988, 2008). 
The PIW rankings, which are a widely used reference within the industry, are 
usually published at the end of the year and based on disclosed company data of 
the previous year. They list operational data such as reserves, production output, 
refining capacity and (in more limited form) financial data such as revenues, 
they also provide information on the origin of the firms and percentage of state-
ownership (see also Wolf 2009a). These data are here used for a descriptive 
aggregate comparison of the developments in the configuration of the top of the 
petroleum industry. For additional financial indicators, I used data from PFC 
Energy (2012) a global oil and gas consulting firm which since 1999 provides 
the PFC 50, a ranking of the world’s largest listed energy companies on the 
basis of market capitalization. Although this ranking excludes fully state-owned 
energy companies (NOCs) it does include partly state-owned energy companies 
(Hybrids) and is considered a useful indicator for the longitudinal developments 
at the top of the industry in terms of financial weight and influence.
In order to show how the companies in the PIW ranking relate to the 
sector in general, Table 4 shows the total share of PIW ranked companies 
compared to world totals, in terms of proven reserves, production, and refining 
capacity, for 1987 and 2006 respectively. The overview clearly shows that, in 
terms of oil reserves, the share of PIW ranked companies has been predominant 
and rather constant (between 82-85 percent since at least 1987) in relation to the 
world total, and that their share has grown considerably in terms of gas reserves 
(from 45 to 63 percent), oil and gas production (59 to 80, percent and 36 to 69 
percent respectively), and refining capacity (from 53 to 60 percent). In all these 
categories the 50 companies included in this ranking – in 2006 – represented a 
majority share of the world’s total. Next, we will see how this ranking is 
composed in terms of state-owned and private oil companies.
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Table 4: Total Share PIW top 50 companies of World total
1987 2006
Total Proven oil 
Reserves 
PIW*/World** 
82% 85%
Total Proven Gas 
Reserves 
PIW*/World** 
45% 63%
Total Oil Production 
PIW*/World**
59% 80%
Total Gas Production 
PIW*/World**
36% 69%
Refining Capacity 
PIW*/World**
53% 60%
* PIW top 50 total                ** based on BP estimate (BP 2006).
Source: Wolf 2009b
Composition of the PIW Ranking
Figure 7 below displays the changing composition of the PIW top 50 ranking 
between 1987 and 2008, making a distinction between private / publicly listed 
firms (IOCs), fully state-owned firms (NOCs), and partly state-owned firms 
(Hybrids). This figure illustrates - in aggregate terms – that the most significant 
change in this ranking of the top of the energy industry, since the late 1980s, has 
come from an increase in the presence of Hybrid Oil Companies, in particular 
since 1994, from less than 10 percent to more than 20 percent, whereas the 
share of fully state-owned oil companies (NOCs) has in fact decreased from 
more than 50 percent to a bit less than 40 percent, and the share of IOCs has 
overall remained rather stable over time (around 60 percent) in spite of some 
fluctuations. 
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Figure 7: Share of IOCs, NOCs, Hybrids in PIW top 50 ranking 1987-2007
Source: Wolf 2009b, supplemented with data collection author (PIW 2008)
A comparison of the companies’ relative share, in terms of operational measures 
such as oil and gas reserves, oil and gas production, refining and oil sales 
products, reveals similar trends (see Figures 21a to 21f in Appendix C, for 
additional graphs). It shows little change in terms of oil reserves, of which 
NOCs of the PIW top 50 have held between 85 and 95 percent of the reserves 
over these last three decades.40 It does, however, show a significant increase in 
the share of proven gas reserves and gas production on the part of the Hybrids, 
mostly at the expense of NOCs, which has everything to do with the entrance of 
Gazprom into the PIW top 50 in 1993. Furthermore, it shows a gradual decrease 
in terms of refining capacity on the part of IOCs, although these IOCs still 
account for 50 percent of total refining capacity of the PIW top 50. Similarly, 
there is a clear dominance in terms of oil product sales on the part of IOCs (i.e. 
60 percent), in spite of a slight decrease since 1987.
If we compare geographical origins of the companies in this ranking, 
we find a development in line with the former section. Whereas the share of 
companies with an OECD origin in 1987 was slightly greater than the share of 
companies from the non-OECD countries in 2007, the share of non-OECD 
companies has increased and makes up two thirds of the ranking.41
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Table 5: Origin of the PIW top 35 companies 1987-2007
1987 2007
OECD 55% 33%
non-
OECD 45% 67%
Source: PIW 1988, 2008, data collection by author
When divided in regions, the overview provided in Figure 8, shows that 
particularly American and European firms have seen a decline in the PIW top 
35, whereas there has been in increase in companies from most of the non-
OECD regions, in particular from Asia and Russia. Although nearly all of the 
decrease on the part of American and European companies is due to the wave of 
IOC mergers, as was addressed in the first part of this chapter,42 the fact that 
non-OECD companies fill the vacancies is still significant; it might just as well 
have been other American or European IOCs moving up the ranks.
Figure 8: Regional Distribution PIW top 35 Companies 1987-2007
Source: PIW 1988, 2008, data collection by author
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To sum up, as far as this composite ranking is indicative of the configuration of 
the apex of the global energy order, it is not the case that state-ownership in 
general has increased since the mid-1980s, rather it has remained unchanged; 
combined NOCs and Hybrids have made up 60 percent of the top 50 over these 
two decades. The transformation that has taken place, however, is one of 
hybridisation: within this 60 percent, the share that is partly state-owned 
(hybrid) has doubled. Moreover, it is worth noting that since the early 2000s the 
composition of the ranking has been remarkably stable in these aggregate terms, 
it has thus not been affected by the often highlighted resurgence of resource-
nationalism, nor by expansion of non-OECD National Oil Companies. These 
results do however not preclude that change has taken place at a different level, 
which will be elaborated in the ensuing chapter. Lastly, these findings make 
clear that the transformation that has taken place is in effect a gradual shift 
towards the non-OECD world.
Financial Indicators
A comparison of financial indicators of the companies is harder to obtain, since 
the disclosure of financial data is rather incomplete, in particular on the part of 
the NOCs, i.e. those that are fully state-owned. On the basis of the PIW data 
from 1987 provided by Wolf (2009b) only revenue data for 1988, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 are nearly complete for all companies in the sample, which gives the 
following trend (see Figure 9 below).
Unsurprisingly, a steep increase in the mean value of annual revenues 
(converted to US$) has taken place since the late ’80s, for all four types of 
companies;43 a trend that is fed by high oil prices. Interestingly, in spite of the 
fact that NOCs outweigh the IOCs in terms of reserves and production, the 
IOCs still harvest a dominant share of the revenues. The IOCs mean revenue 
was more than $90 billion in 2006 (the maximum revenue in this year, it should 
be noted, was almost $345 billion, for ExxonMobil, and the minimum was 
about $2 billion) (see Wolf 2009b). The mean revenue of the NOCs was about 
$57 billion (the maximum being $109 billion for Saudi Aramco, and the 
minimum $8 billion) (ibid.).
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Figure 9: Distribution Revenues (mean value) of PIW top 50 Companies 1988-
2006
Source: Wolf 2009b
A financial indicator that is widely used to assess the ‘net-worth’ of a company 
is market capitalisation, i.e. the total (dollar) market ‘value’ of a company’s 
outstanding assets. Since 1999, PFC Energy has composed an annual ranking of 
energy corporations on the basis of their market capitalisation. Changes in the 
composition of this ranking over time give an indication of the financial weight 
of the oil companies in terms of how they are valued by the investment 
community (i.e. the importance that is attached to these kinds of signifiers). It 
should be noted that these rankings per definition exclude wholly state-owned 
oil companies (NOCs), since their assets are not publicly traded. However, 
partly state-owned companies (Hybrids) can be included, as well as subsidiaries 
of state-owned oil companies with controlling stakes in these corporations. 44
The figure below (Figure 10) provides an overview of the relative share 
of different company types (i.e. IOCs, subsidiaries of NOCs, Hybrids, energy 
service companies, et cetera) that make up this ranking, It can be seen that IOCs 
have become increasingly dominant / powerful in terms of market capitalisation 
over time (from 26 percent in 1999 to 42 percent in 2011), whereas the category 
‘other’ (which includes electricity corporations, gas utility companies, et cetera) 
has decreased substantially since 1999 (down from 62 percent in 1999 to 28 
percent in 2011).
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More interestingly, however, is that the shares of both Hybrid companies and 
NOC-subsidiaries in this ranking have increased in the past decade. While not a 
single NOC-subsidiary was present in this top 50 in 1999, by 2011 several have 
taken a high position in this ranking (see also Table 6 below) and Hybrid 
companies are growing even more substantially in terms of market 
capitalisation (from 8 percent in 1999, to 20 percent in 2011).
Figure 10: Distribution Company Types in PFC Energy top 50 Market 
Capitalisation Ranking1999-2011
Source: PFC Energy (2012), data collection by author
In spite of the bias in these rankings towards listed firms, i.e. excluding fully 
state-owned firms, this is a significant illustration of how partly state-owned 
energy companies become increasingly important players in domains that were 
previously almost exclusively populated by private firms. A question that 
remains is the extent to which these state-owned players are also non-OECD 
originated.
A comprehensive overview of the geographical origins of these 
companies and shifts that have taken place over time cannot easily be presented 
in an orderly way. However, an aggregate indicator can be provided by 
comparing the shares of respectively OECD and non-OECD originated 
companies in this market capitalisation ranking over time. As Table 6 shows, 
two thirds of the energy companies in this ranking still originate in the OECD 
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region. Nonetheless, the share of companies from non-OECD countries has 
been rising steadily since 1999; a change that becomes even more pronounced 
when focusing on the top 15 of this ranking. Table 6 clearly shows that in 1999, 
only 7 percent of the top 15 energy corporations by market capitalisation 
originated in the non-OECD area, whereas this share has grown to 40 percent 
during the last decade. This is a tremendous shift towards non-OECD capital 
and firms, which clearly indicates that they are becoming more influential 
players on global markets, as well as potential competitors to the Western 
companies and capital interests.
Table 6: Distribution OECD and non-OECD energy firms in Market 
Capitalisation top 50 and top 15 (1999 and 2011)
                   TOP 50 TOP 15
1999 2011 1999 2011
OECD 82% 66% 93% 60%
Non-OECD 18% 34% 7% 40%
Source: PCF Energy (2012), data collection by author
A more detailed overview of the individual energy companies and shifts in the 
composition of the top 15 by market capitalisation is provided in Table 7 below 
(displaying the years 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011). Whereas the ranking had 
both OECD and non-OECD hybrid oil companies in its top in 1999, the most 
significant change that can be observed is the entrance of first Chinese NOCs 
(PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC) and later of Russian Hybrid oil companies 
(Gazprom, Rosneft) in the top of this financial ranking.  PetroChina in 2007 
even trumped ExxonMobil, the latter which had until that moment held the 
number one position in terms of market capitalisation.
To summarise, these financial indicators show us that over the past 
decades - in particular since the 2000s – non-OECD NOC-subsidiaries and 
hybrid companies have been gaining weight and influence in terms of their 
financial scope and impact. In particular hybrid oil companies from the non-
OECD are becoming major players in the domains that had previously been 
dominated by private energy companies, which mainly originated in the OECD.
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Conclusion
This chapter has charted three major developments behind the current 
transformation of the global energy order.
Firstly, it described the historical ebb and flow of resource nationalism 
in which the rise of state-owned oil companies is embedded. This historical 
narrative has shown how the global energy order was transformed. It changed 
from being dominated by a cartel of private Anglo-American oil majors, to an 
order in which exchange at the global oil market - and in particular also at the 
oil futures market - to a large extent determines price setting and trade. It has 
also shown how the transition of ownership of reserves to the resource holding 
countries of the global South has changed the power balance between the latter 
and the resource seekers, in particular the Western IOCs. The nationalisation 
wave that peaked in the 1970s generated an energy order that was by and large 
divided between IOCs and NOCs and between OPEC and the IEA. However, 
paradoxically, the nationalisations also contributed to the expansion of the 
global oil market and later to its financialisation, thus illustrating the parallel 
trends of ongoing transnationalisation of the oil market and recurring 
nationalistic and statist responses, and testifying to the crucial role played by the 
state in the globalization of capital. The more recent re-pronunciation of state 
power as manifest in a new wave of resource nationalism, has however been 
argued to be qualitatively different from the earlier wave. Whereas the latter 
was marked by a battle over prices, rent-capture, and ownership - i.e. more 
defensive and emancipatory - the current wave has a more expansionist and 
increasingly competitive nature, with NOCs taking upon themselves the roles of 
the IOCs, expanding beyond their borders and intervening in domains that were 
previously dominated by the IOCs.
Second, a broader underlying trend has been documented, showing a 
gradual shift in the geography of production and consumption of energy, in 
which non-OECD countries account for an increasingly greater share of 
production and consumption, in particular due to the exponential rise of the new 
economic growth poles in Asia (foremost China). On the consumption and 
demand side, the aggregate data presented in this chapter have shown a 
longterm rise of the non-OECD region in terms of their share of world wide 
consumption of primary energy, with in particular the Asia Pacific region 
displaying an explosive increase since the early 2000s, so much so that they 
have recently surpassed the OECD world, a trend that is predicted to continue in 
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the foreseeable future (IEA 2011, BP 2012). With respect to the production / 
supply side of the industry, these longitudinal data tell us that the non-OECD 
countries are leading in terms of ownership and control over oil and gas 
reserves since a long time, and that this gap is steadily widening. Non-OECD 
countries are increasingly leaving behind the OECD countries in terms of 
production of oil, gas, and coal. And moreover, the non-OECD countries, as a 
combined category, have recently not only caught up with, but even surpassed, 
the OECD countries in terms of refining capacity.
Third, I charted how these developments have been reflected in the 
configuration of the corporate top of the global energy sector, for which the top 
50 Ranking of the world’s largest oil companies, annually composed by 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, was taken as a proxy. Based on descriptive 
analyses of (panel)data, this section has shown that in terms of a composition of 
the top level of the industry the recent decades in fact reveal remarkable 
stability. In spite of the recent alarm about re-nationalisations and an alleged 
‘takeover’ by NOCs (Odell 2006, Hoyos 2007a), NOCs have seen little change 
in terms of their ownership of proven reserves since the end of the 1980s. In 
fact, the only change that can be observed in this respect is one of a relative 
decrease, rather than an increase. Neither was there a significant change in 
terms of oil production. The picture for gas is slightly different, with a 
significant increase in both reserves and production on the part of the Hybrids at 
the expense of NOCs. In the downstream sector, IOCs saw a gradual decrease in 
terms of refining capacity; yet, they still hold a dominant share in terms of oil 
sales.
The most significant changes that can be distilled from the presented 
aggregate trends however, firstly, are an increase in the presence of hybrid oil 
companies, and secondly, a geographical shift towards more inclusion of the 
non-OECD members. In other words, during the most recent decades the apex 
of the oil industry has hybridised and become less ’OECD-exclusive’. This, 
however, still leaves us with the question whether and if so, how, non-OECD 
NOCs growth and expansion have taken place during recent times, as well as 
what the impact of such growth might have been on the corporate and social 
relations within the energy sector, something that we cannot deduce from these 
broader aggregate trends. This suggests that a whole dimension of change goes 
unnoticed here, because the social and corporate relations of, and between, the 
actors that make up these rankings remain implicit. However, the expectation is 
that it is precisely in the realm of these inter-actor relations that the most 
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significant changes have taken place. The next part of this dissertation will 
therefore focus on these social and corporate relations: first on the relations 
between corporations (i.e. corporate networks) and second on the relations of 
their directors (i.e. oil elite networks).
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___________________PART II___________________
Networks of Power
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CHAPTER FOUR
Expansion and Integration of Non-OECD National Oil Companies2
Introduction
Peter Voser, former CEO at Shell, recently highlighted at the 20th World 
Petroleum Congress: ‘In the past, the relationship [between Shell and national 
oil companies] typically was straightforward: We gained access to resources in 
return for technology, capital, or access to big consumer markets. But the world 
is changing. NOCs increasingly have strong technical capabilities. They have 
strong cash flow and less need for outside capital. And they are moving beyond 
their borders, accessing resources around the globe’ (Shell 2012). This 
statement captures the current phase of IOC-NOC relations and the growth-
phase the latter are in, particularly the new characteristic of their expansion 
beyond national borders. As briefly introduced in the former chapter this is what 
distinguishes the current phase of non-OECD NOC-growth from their earlier 
emancipatory phase that peaked in the 1970s. While it is in first instance 
resource seeking NOCs that expand abroad, this trend is by no means confined 
to them. Even major producers may be active abroad. Indeed, even Saudi 
Aramco the world’s largest producer has increased its foreign operations in 
which it cooperates with major IOCs as well as NOCs, particularly in 
downstream business. This expansion is a relatively new phenomenon and not 
likely to be reversed. As Jonathan Stern, Director Natural Gas Research 
Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, commented: 
...if you look back ...probably back to the mid-90s, maybe ten years, as an 
international energy community we just had no model for the Sinopecs, the
Gazproms, the Lukoils, becoming international players. We regarded them as 
national players and sort of the natural order of things was the IOCs operated 
internationally and that was it. These companies have now become 
international players, and their role is likely to expand rather than contract.45
2 This chapter is based on a single authored article published in Global Networks
(2011), 11 (2):262-283, (De Graaff 2011).
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Some recent numbers on their international acquisition activities highlight the 
significant scope of the NOCs global expansion, Wood Mackenzy estimates that 
55 percent of total value of M&A production and exploration deals in 2012 will 
be made by NOCs, this is a steep increase compared to the already considerable 
19 percent in 2010 and only 4 percent in 2005 (Pfeifer 2012).
The recent growth and expansion of NOCs has also instigated a surge in 
academic literature on the role of National Oil Companies (see for an overview 
of the literature Stevens 2004), after two decades of relative dearth. These 
include in-depth case studies (Jaffe et. al 2007; Marcel 2006; Xu 2007), 
assessments of NOC performance and efficiency (Victor et al. 2012; Wolf 
2009), policy and governance analyses (Hoogeveen and Perlot 2005; van der 
Linde 2000, 2005), and general overviews of their rising influence (BCG 2007; 
Paik et al. 2007; WIR 2007). In popular press and think tank circuits the rise of 
NOCs has been linked to the growth of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and 
state-owned enterprises in general and described as a more general ‘return of 
state capitalism’ (see Bremmer 2009). In general this development has been 
seen as detrimental to the workings of the free-market and threatening to the 
interests of the net-importing countries and the IOCs. Yet, how the rise of non-
OECD national oil companies since the mid-1990s has been taking place and 
what the impact of their growth and expansion has been on the power structures 
in the global energy market has not been systematically researched yet. This 
chapter shall show that alongside the global expansion of the NOCs, and the 
concurrent dimension of re-nationalisation that is frequently highlighted in 
academia and politics, the period 1997–2007 also saw an increased cooperation
between state-owned and private energy companies in terms of corporate 
relations. This implies both a closer integration between Western and non-
Western actors and a deepening of the transnational dimension.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next 
section, I will outline the particular approach to study NOCs expansion taken in 
this research; in the section after that, I analyse how the rise of non-OECD 
NOCs took place in terms of changing corporate relations between 1997 and 
2007. To do this I employ a longitudinal social network analysis focused on a 
selection of the major non-OECD NOCs. The analysis looks at various aspects 
of NOCs expansion, including the geographical configuration, vertical 
integration, and changes in ownership structures. The concluding section will 
synthesise the main findings and reflect upon what remains unanswered.
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A Network Approach – why and how?
Most of the existing studies, as well as the vast amount of commercial energy 
literature, focuses on economic performance and economic power of the firm, 
and assesses the power balance between NOCs and IOCs by comparing the 
properties and aggregate measures of individual companies. In this study, while 
not discarding the notion of economic power, I start from the idea that actors (in 
this instance firms and those directing those firms) can derive power and 
influence from particular relations and positions that they have within a network 
of social relations, in addition to the distribution of material capabilities (see 
also Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). This approach is in line 
with the earlier outlined definition of power as given by Barnett and Duvall 
(2005a:42) which emphasises how power is exercised in and through social 
relations, thereby producing the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate. This empirical study will show that how the position of 
firms in corporate networks (the connectedness or lack thereof, for instance) 
generates a different view on the distribution of power between them, from a 
comparison of the total amount of production or number of reserves of 
individual firms. Taking relations between actors, rather than the properties of 
individual companies, as the ‘unit of analysis’, will allow for an analysis of 
shared properties and interdependencies between these actors. This approach 
will generate a different picture of the power distribution between NOCs and
IOCs and the changes that happened in this respect during the period between 
1997 and 2007 than is generally portrayed in the literature on NOCs. Moreover, 
and crucially, it will reveal more about the transnationalisation trend.
With its particular social network approach this study builds further 
upon a tradition of network studies of (corporate) power and influence within an 
increasingly transnational global economy (for example Carroll 2009, Carroll 
and Fennema 2002, Carroll and Carson 2003, Fennema 1982). While these 
scholars have provided thorough empirical accounts of a global corporate 
network and the concept of a transnational capitalist class vis-à-vis national 
capitalist classes, no one has yet applied network analysis to the energy sector. 
In addition, the existing network studies have not incorporated the rise of the 
major economies of the global South and their TNCs.
To position the changing relations of the non-OECD NOCs within the 
global energy market, I first need to identify the key players of that market. The 
top 50 of the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) annual ranking (Energy 
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Intelligence Group 2008) was taken as the point of departure, as has already 
been introduced (see Chapter One and Three). As shown in the previous chapter 
(Chapter Three), if one takes the PIW top 50 as representative of the top of the 
global oil and gas sector, the past decades have not witnessed a drastic change 
in the share and positions of the NOCs vis-a-vis the IOCs. The most important 
changes in aggregate terms are the entrance of Hybrids and the growing share of 
non-OECD originated firms. Of course, some more changes would become 
apparent if the longitudinal changes in the PIW top 50 would be analysed in a 
more disaggregate manner, but also in that case, there is a remarkable stability 
in terms of the composition of individual firms within this ranking, especially in 
the very top of the PIW ranking (see De Graaff 2011:267-268).   
My proposition in this chapter, however, is that a whole dimension of 
change remains hidden by just comparing the properties and performance 
measures of the individual companies. Examples of these include changes in the 
kind of relations that might exist between companies (for example with whom 
they work together), changes in the kind of investments along the value chain 
(for example downstream, upstream or service-related), changes in the 
geographical distribution of those investments and changes in ownership 
structures. All this might imply changes in the power relations between, and 
strategies of, key actors in the global energy sector that stretch beyond changes 
in the properties of individual companies.
Below I will therefore provide an in-depth mapping of the corporate 
relations of five top non-OECD NOCs from the most important regions in terms 
of hydrocarbon resources and geopolitical impact.46 These five ‘New Sisters’ 
(see Hoyos 2007a) are Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia, 100 per cent state owned), 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) (Iran, 100 per cent state owned), 
Gazprom (Russia, 50,0023 per cent state owned), China National Petroleum 
Company (China, 100 per cent state owned) and PDVSA (Venezuela, 100 per 
cent state owned). In 2007 all these companies were ranked in the top 10 of the 
PIW, apart from Gazprom, which was ranked thirteenth (Energy Intelligence 
2008). Gazprom, it should be noted, is also a somewhat special case in this 
selection since it is the only Hybrid company (i.e. majority state-owned) and 
because it is primarily a gas company. Yet, although indeed gas is the core 
business of Gazprom it is involved in oil production as well and owns more oil 
reserves than several of the major IOCs. Vice versa, some of the other oil 
companies (such as NIOC) are also large holders and producers of gas. The 
focus and interest of this study is on how the expansion of the largest of these 
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non-OECD players takes place and how it has impacted upon the configuration 
of social and corporate relations in the oil and gas industry. Since Gazprom is 
often singled out as a key player in this respect, with a high geopolitical impact, 
it seemed pertinent to include this company in the selection.  
I mapped all the ‘ego networks’ of Saudi Aramco, NIOC, PDVSA, 
CNPC and Gazprom, which in this case means that I charted all these 
companies’ external corporate relations. These were joint ventures (domestic 
and abroad), wholly owned subsidiaries (abroad), consortia (domestic and 
abroad), equity interests/alliances (domestic and abroad), different forms of 
operating and service contract agreements, and other relations such as lease 
contracts and memoranda of understandings.47 When applicable, the ownership 
structures of these relations were included, in terms of the percentage of the 
different participating actors’ stake in the relation.
When mapping the relations of the top five non-OECD NOCs, a 
distinction was made between relations involving an affiliation with a company 
belonging to the PIW 50 core of the global energy market, and relations 
involving an affiliation with companies outside the PIW 50 core. Furthermore, 
apart from the distinction between fully state-owned companies (NOCs) and 
fully private companies (IOCs), a third category is distinguished – the ‘hybrid’ 
companies. These are partly state-owned companies and they range from 
minority to majority owned. In sum, this gives five different main types of 
actors – NOCs, IOCs, Hybrids, state outsiders and private outsiders. To capture 
the rise of these NOCs since the turn of the millennium, the networks are 
compared at two moments in time, 1997 and 2007.
Social network analysis (SNA) was employed to conduct the analyses. 
As explicated earlier SNAs distinctive feature is that instead of focusing on the 
units of the system and comparing their attributes, it focuses on the (social) 
relations among those units. In that manner – as has been outlined in the 
introductory chapter - it provides a way to analyse how individual or collective
agency is embedded in and at the same time constructs social structure (for an 
extensive recent guide to SNA, see Scott and Carrington 2011; classic works on 
SNA are Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 1991a). I used the UCINET 
software programme (Borgatti et al. 2002) to perform the analyses.
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Mapping the non-OECD NOCs network: Expansion and Integration
The first step of the analysis is to examine the aggregated numbers of all the 
different forms of corporate relations of the five top non-OECD NOCs together, 
and compare the networks this generated in 1997 and 2007 respectively. The 
absolute increase in terms of corporate relations, on the part of the five top non-
OECD NOCs, is shown in Figure 11 below.
Figure 11: Corporate relations of five top non-OECD NOCs 1997 & 2007
Source: data collection by author, see method and data section
Although Gazprom (Russia) has the most corporate relations in absolute 
numbers, the increase in corporate relations over this particular period is most 
spectacular for CNPC (China) and NIOC (Iran). PDVSA (Venezuela) and Saudi 
Aramco (Saudi Arabia) have also seen a significant increase in corporate 
relations. What Figure 11 fails to show, however, is how this increase of 
corporate relations of the five non-OECD NOCs relates to other core companies 
in the global energy sector. Graphs 1a and 1b below show the networks of 
corporate relations of these top five non-OECD NOCs with actors both within 
and outside the PIW top 50 core, in 1997 and 2007.
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Graph 1a: Global non-OECD NOC Network 1997 
Key
Black Circles: NOCs       
Grey Circles: IOCs   
White Circles: Hybrids
Node degree: 
Total nr relations with other actors
Tie strength: 
Total nr affiliations between each pair
Nodes right upper hand: Isolates
Circles: Companies belonging to PIW top 50 
Squares: 
Companies not belonging to PIW top 50
Source: data collection by author 
1997
Unconnected top 50 
Companies
(isolates)
14    NOCs
10    IOCs
6      Hybrids
30    Total
Gazprom (node degree) 45
PDVSA (node degree) 15
CNPC (node degree) 4
Saudi Aramco 
(node degree)
10
NIOC (node degree) 3
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Graph 1b: Global non-OECD NOC Network 2007 
Key
Black Nodes: NOCs       
Grey Nodes: IOCs          
White Nodes: Hybrids 
Node degree: 
Total nr relations with other actors
Tie strength: 
Total nr affiliations between each pair
Nodes right upper hand: Isolates
Circles: Companies belonging to PIW top 50 
Squares: 
Companies not belonging to PIW top 50
2007
Unconnected top 50 
Companies
(isolates)
5     NOCs
6     IOCs
3     Hybrids
14  Total
Gazprom (node 
degree)
64
PDVSA (node degree) 34
CNPC (node degree) 47
Saudi Aramco 
(node degree)
19
NIOC (node degree) 20
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This network is transposed from a so called two-mode network, which maps not 
only the relations between a set of actors but also their affiliations/memberships. 
The nodes in these networks thus represent the oil companies, whereas the ties 
between them represent the particular joint venture or other strategic alliances in 
which they participate together (which can be several). The two-mode network 
would have displayed all those joint ventures, which would have given more 
detailed information but had made the graph unreadable, for the same reason 
only the five non-OECD NOCs that form our initial cases are labelled. 
The size of the nodes in these network-graphs expresses the ‘degree’, 
that is: the total number of incoming ties, which in this case represent their 
connections to other companies through joint ventures, equity alliances and 
contract relations. Since a pair of companies can have several of such shared 
projects and since a particular joint venture or consortium can involve several 
other firms, the node degrees are different from the numbers provided in Figure 
12 (which give a total count of corporate relations, such as joint ventures, per 
individual NOC). The total number of corporate relations between each pair of 
companies is reflected by the strength of the ties between the nodes.
These graphs show that the non-OECD NOC network has not only 
expanded in terms of corporate relations, but has also become more integrated 
into the core of the global energy sector (the PIW top 50). The nodes (circles) 
on the right side of the graph represent the companies of the PIW top 50 core to 
which the five major non-OECD NOCs are not connected; the colour represents 
the type of company (black is state owned, white is hybrid, grey is private). The 
shape of the node indicates whether the company is inside (circle) or outside 
(square) the top 50.48
A comparison of Graphs 1a and 1b shows that in 1997, 30 of the 45 PIW top 50 
companies were not yet connected to the non-OECD NOCs, whereas only ten 
were connected to them. In 2007, however, only 14 of the PIW top 50 
companies were not connected to five top non-OECD NOCs. Put in numbers, 
whereas the network constituted by the corporate relations of these five major 
NOCs in 1997 included only 40 percent of the other key players in the global 
energy market, in 2007 the network incorporated almost 75 percent.
Since I only mapped the non-OECD NOCs’ relations, the integration of 
these companies into the expanding NOCs’ network implies that this has taken 
place through joined relations with NOCs. The important finding here is that, 
whereas the largest non-OECD NOCs have been part of the PIW top 50 for 
decades, they have become significantly more integrated into its core through an 
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increase in corporate relations with the other PIW top 50 companies during this 
ten-year period. Moreover, they have not only increased their cooperation with 
other state-owned oil companies from the PIW top 50, but also with IOCs and 
Hybrids (which can be judged from the colours of the isolates). This will be 
further elaborated in Chapter Six.
In order to obtain a more quantitative measure of integration the 
cohesion of the network can be analysed. A measure often used in SNA in this 
respect is the ‘geodesic distance’ – the number of relations involved in the 
shortest possible path of one actor to another (a direct connection is one path, a 
connection via another actor is two paths and so on). From the geodesic 
distance, one can calculate that the average distance in the non-OECD NOC 
network was less than three paths (2.8) in 2007, compared with almost three and 
a half paths (3.3) in 1997. The distance-based cohesion (‘compactness’) 
increased from 0.169 to 0.328; the range is from 0 to 1, where larger values 
indicate greater cohesiveness. Another common way of assessing the distance 
of a network is to look at the diameter, which is given by the largest geodesic 
distance in the connected network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005); this measure 
tells us how many steps are necessary ‘to get from one side to the other’. In 
1997, the diameter was seven, whereas in 2007 it was four, which means that 
the distance between actors in the connected network decreased significantly 
over time.
In sum, it can be concluded from these findings that the networks of the 
five top non-OECD NOCs seem not only to have expanded over the measured 
period, but also to have integrated significantly into the core of the PIW top 50. 
The question remains of how they have expanded and how they have integrated. 
What kind of strategies can one detect behind this process of expansion and 
integration and what does it say about the distribution of power between them? 
It is therefore necessary to qualify these relations, which I shall do in the 
following section. First, looking at strategy, I examine how the expansion took 
place geographically and to what extent vertical integration increased along the 
value chain (i.e. upstream or downstream integration). Second, looking at the 
distribution of power through ownership structures and at the changes that have 
been taking place in that respect, I assess to what extent an increase in NOC-
dominated ownership structures has actually taken place.
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Strategies of Geographical Expansion
While the global expansion of non-OECD NOCs is often referred to in the 
literature, there is less empirical evidence of how exactly this global expansion 
is geographically configured, and what kind of corporate relations it entails. The 
particular configuration of such a geographical expansion strategy might, 
however, not only provide indications of the motives behind the expansion, but 
moreover, has important implications for the distribution of power in the global 
energy sector and the pattern of conflict and cooperation emerging from it.
To provide such an overview, I mapped and then aggregated into 
regions the home states of each of the corporate relations of the five top non-
OECD NOCs measured earlier, that is, all the joint ventures, equity investments 
and wholly owned subsidiaries that e.g. Gazprom or CNPC has in for instance
Europe or Latin America are added up. Graphs 2a and 2b (below) show the 
regional distribution of the corporate networks of the five non-OECD NOCs in 
1997 and 2007. Each squared node (i.e. region) in these graphs thus contain all 
the different projects of the five non-OECD NOCs within this particular region 
combined, with the size of the node expressing the total number. The tie 
strength between circles (oil companies) and squared nodes (regions) on the 
other hand expresses the number of projects/investments that each NOC has in 
this particular region.49
Key: Black Circles: NOCs and Hybrids
White Circles: IOCs
Grey Squares: Regions
119
Graph 2a&b:Geographical Distribution non-OECD NOC Network 1997&2007
Source: data collection by author
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A comparison between the networks of 1997 and 2007 confirms the expectation 
of a remarkable expansion. The comparison reconfirms that the expansion of the 
non-OECD NOCs has taken place, in part, through integration with the PIW top 
50 companies, indicated by the decrease in isolates – the small nodes in the left 
upper corner of the graphs. Those isolates are the companies of the PIW top 50 
core that have no affiliation with the NOCs and, replicating Figure 1a and 1b -
they have become significantly fewer over time – from 30 in 1997 to 14 in 
2007. In terms of strategy this means that, in general, the expansive strategy of 
the largest non-OECD NOCs involves an increasing number of joined relations 
with private companies from the PIW top 50 (i.e. IOCs). 
This integration, importantly, then also implies a transnationalisation 
and hybridisation of the network. Despite this general finding, there are, 
however, also significant differences in the individual companies’ geographical 
strategies, which one can see by comparing the tie strengths.50 CNPC (China), 
for instance, displays a strategy of both geographical diversification and 
substantive intensification. The most remarkable expansion of CNPC is towards 
Africa (from 2 to 30 affiliations), Central Asia (1 to 20), and Asia (1 to 15), but 
the CNPC has also increased its activities in the Middle East (1 to 10) and Latin 
America (4 to 10).
Gazprom’s (Russia) strategy – by contrast – is regional rather than 
global, focusing on the European region and the former Soviet Union (Russia 
and Central Asia). This is partly because gas, which is Gazprom’s primary 
product, is more regionally bounded than oil. With respect to Europe, in 
particular, the ten years witnessed a drastic increase of Gazprom’s relations –
from 37 affiliations in 1997 to 66 in 2007. An interesting detail when looking at 
Saudi Aramco’s (Saudi Arabia) strategy is the relative high and increasing 
number of affiliations with the Asian region (from 9 to 13), which implies that 
this Middle Eastern giant is increasing its cooperation with Asia.
Comparing the regional affiliations of the PDVSA over time reveals a 
vast increase in its affiliations with Latin America (from 4 to 36). This shift 
results from the renationalisation that started with the restructuring of PDVSA 
in 1997, and culminated in a massive renegotiating of exploration and 
production contracts (E&P) within Venezuela. However, that there are still 
extensive ties to both the USA and Europe (11 and 12 respectively) indicates 
that a considerable shared interest remains between these different powers as 
earlier noted, and confirms that (re)nationalisation does not necessarily take 
place at the expense of transnationalisation.
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The most important finding from looking at the geographical configuration of 
the expansion is that it went hand in hand with increased transnationalisation 
and hybridisation of the network, since it entails an increase of relations across 
borders and between state and non-state actors and because it implies that the 
network contains more hybrid corporate relations in which private capital and 
state capital join forces.
Strategies of Vertical Integration and Diversification
Increasing vertical integration, i.e. expansion along the global hydrocarbon 
value chain, to increase their share of the value capture and make them less 
dependent on IOCs for technological service and knowhow, is another aspect of 
the NOCs’ expansionist strategies that existing research highlights (cf. Wolf 
2009a). A different way to achieve the latter is diversification into non-core 
activities. To assess if this indeed has been the case, I categorized the types of 
investments along the hydrocarbon value chain of the selected non-OECD 
NOCs, using the common division of upstream (exploration, drilling and 
production of oil); midstream (supply and transport); and downstream (trading, 
refining, storage, distribution, marketing to wholesalers and retailers). In 
addition, to be able to assess their diversification strategies, I added the 
categories upstream-to-downstream support services, financial and other 
services, and non-core activities such as banking and media.
Figure 12 below shows that, whereas downstream integration has 
certainly increased for the five top non-OECD NOCs, upstream integration is 
relatively larger than downstream. This seems to imply that downstream 
integration is a certainly part of these non-OECD NOCs strategy (as we have 
also seen in the former chapter, this is an important aspect of the general NOC 
expansion), yet upstream integration is even more common/prominent. The 
increase in services and non-core activities, which is also an indication of their 
increasing independence from IOCs in terms of, for example, technological 
knowhow and services, confirms the expectation of a diversification strategy of 
the non-OECD NOCs. Some of the rationale and reasons behind these strategies 
will be further discusses in Chapter Six.
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Figure 12:Upstream-Downstream expansion top non-OECD NOCs 1997&2007
Source: data collection by author, see method and data section
Changing Ownership Structures
Ownership structures provide indications of how power is distributed, and 
changes in this respect can thus also signal a shift in power. The following 
analysis therefore focuses on the ownership structures within the corporate 
alliances of the non-OECD NOCs that are examined in this study. First of all, a 
distinction is made between joint ventures and equity alliances/interest (abroad 
and domestic), wholly owned subsidiaries abroad51 and different forms of 
contracts (operating contracts, lease contracts, services contracts).52 Results for 
the five top non-OECD NOCs together are shown in Figure 13 below.
The comparison shows that the expansion over the period 1997 to 2007 
took place in the first instance through joint ventures abroad, but also through 
joint ventures within the home states of the five top non-OECD NOCs, which 
have nearly tripled. A great deal of the expansion also took place through the 
increase in equity alliances/ interests abroad and wholly owned subsidiaries 
abroad, whereas the number of equity alliances at home, as well as the number 
of operating contracts, have remained roughly similar.
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Figure 13: Types of Alliances five top non-OECD NOCs 1997&2007
Source: data collection by author, see method and data section
An interesting finding is the rise in the service contracts of the selected non-
OECD NOCs from virtual non-existence in 1997. This, again, confirms the 
expectation of an increasing vertical integration and diversification strategy on
the part of the non-OECD NOCs, and indicates a shift in power in terms of the 
NOCs becoming less dependent on the technological knowhow of the IOCs. 
This suggests that non-OECD NOCs are starting to compete with the IOCs in a 
domain in which the latter had previously enjoyed a unique competitive 
advantage, a finding which will be elaborated in Chapter Six.
Do the combined findings above imply that the power balance is indeed 
tipping towards the NOCs? Have the resource-rich non-OECD states 
increasingly nationalized their energy sectors and thrown out the private 
majors? Have major resource-seeking states from the global South sent their 
state-owned majors abroad to capture whatever value they can? Are we 
witnessing the emergence of a NOC-dominated global energy market, as some 
influential analysts in the field have been predicting? Figure 14 shows the 
aggregate changes in the configuration of ownership within the corporate 
alliances of the five top non-OECD NOCs with other companies of the PIW top 
50 core.
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Figure 14: Ownership Alliances five top non-OECD NOCs 1997&2007
Source: data collection by author, see method and data section
Whereas relations between fully state-owned energy majors (NOC–NOC) have 
increased significantly, those between fully state-owned energy companies and 
private companies (NOC–IOC) have also more than doubled and still exceed 
NOC–NOC relations. The relatively largest increase seems to have taken place 
between the hybrid companies and the state-owned companies (HYBR–NOC), 
which is an indicator of ongoing hybridisation. All of this clearly demonstrates 
that the development during the 1997–2007 period is not only one of ‘NOC 
growth’, but also of increased cooperation between state-owned, hybrid and 
private oil companies. Additionally, it should be noted that a NOC-IOC alliance 
does not imply shared ownership; it is a cooperative agreement between state-
capital and private capital, not a fusion. Hence it is another indicator of 
hybridisation of the core of the energy market.
From the above analyses, one can identify some general developments 
during the years between 1997 and 2007. The top five non-OECD NOCs 
expanded globally by means of a significant increase in the number of their 
corporate relations. This expansion took place primarily through an increase of 
joint ventures, equity interests and subsidiaries abroad, and configured 
geographically as a significant regional shift towards Asia, Africa and Central
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Asia, whereas relations with Europe, the Middle East and Latin America 
intensified. This expansion has also led to more integration of the non-OECD 
actors into the global energy market. This was achieved, first of all, through 
progressive vertical integration of the state-owned energy corporations along 
the global hydrocarbon value chain with increased downstream and upstream 
integration and the growth of service related activities, and second, 
significantly, with an increase in shared ownership relations between NOCs, 
IOCs and Hybrids.
Conclusion
In the previous sections, I have analysed how the rise of non-OECD NOCs has 
unfolded in terms of changes in their corporate relations and strategies between 
1997 and 2007. From the findings presented here, one can conclude that with 
respect to these five top non-OECD NOCs, there was a remarkable expansion 
and a simultaneous integration with the core of the PIW top 50 companies. This 
dual development – which contradicts the commonly held view of simple ‘NOC 
growth’ – is bound to have important implications for the distribution of power 
in the global energy market and the way in which the contestation over energy 
resources is configured. In the literature this power distribution is often depicted 
as a ‘NOCs vs. IOCs’ game, or ‘net-exporters vs. net-importers’, and the 
cyclical nature of power shifts between them is explained by the price of oil and 
forces of demand and supply. I took a different approach by focusing on the
underlying networked relations between the different companies, which also 
generated a different view of the distribution of power in the global energy 
market. Although high oil prices might empower resource holders and their 
NOCs, and contribute to resource nationalist tendencies at the expense of 
resource seeking IOCs, the finding that NOC expansion has in part taken place 
through increasing cooperation with IOCs, implies that they have also 
increasingly joined forces. In other words, the power structure of the global 
energy order is becoming more hybrid.
Put in a different way, these findings show that, alongside the resource 
nationalism trend that the high oil price fuelled, a transnationalisation trend has 
taken place that has significantly transformed the structure of the core of the 
global oil sector. This contradictory development has been theorized in earlier 
chapters to be rooted in the dynamics of the state-capital nexus, i.e. the function 
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and role of the state in enabling capital expansion; the latter which is seen to 
generate an expanding and deepening transnational dimension because it aims 
to transcend state borders. This growing transnational dimension might be the 
most important and fundamental aspect of the recent period, compared with 
how the literature depicted earlier power shifts in the global energy sector. 
Whereas competition for energy resources could previously be more validly 
framed as ‘OPEC vs. the West’, or the ‘IOCs vs. the NOCs’, the distribution of 
power between them seems to become increasingly diffused and energy 
relations increasingly interdependent, as the non-OECD NOCs are 
progressively integrating into the global energy market.
To gain a better understanding of the implications and meaning of these 
changes and their impact, we do however need to open up the ‘black box’ of the 
corporations and analyse the relations of the actors inside them. In the next 
chapter we will therefore shift the focus of analysis to the level of personal 
interlocks, i.e. the directors of these companies. It will be assessed first of all, 
how these directors are embedded in broader corporate elite networks and 
secondly, to what extent and how the increased cooperation between IOCs and 
non-OECD NOCs has impacted upon elite formation, and has effected a
possible integration of the non-OECD oil elites into Western corporate elite 
circles.  
A different research question pertains to how shifts in the composition 
of this global corporate network influence the governance of global energy 
markets, which is the subject of Chapter Six. More generally, questions about 
the meaning of found patterns in social relations generated with this type of 
research (i.e. social network analysis) can only be answered by doing additional 
qualitative research, i.e. by adding ‘narrative detail’ to the network architecture 
(see Carroll 2010: 2011). Yet, one can only conduct a qualitative interpretation 
of the meaning of these patterned relations after these patterns have become 
visible. This chapter has provided an empirical basis for such questions by 
offering an in-depth mapping of the shifting power balance in the global energy 
market, which I operationalised in terms of changing corporate relations of non-
OECD NOCs with the main corporate actors of the global energy market.
127
CHAPTER FIVE
Oil Elite Networks in a Transforming Global Oil Market3
Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that the global expansion of a selection of top 
non-OECD state-owned oil majors has been paralleled by their integration into 
the global oil market through increased joint relations and cooperation with 
other key players of the top PIW 50, including the private oil majors. This has 
been interpreted as an increasing transnationalisation and hybridisation of the 
global oil markets corporate relations.
This chapter will look at the how the expansion of non-OECD NOCs 
has impacted upon the formation of corporate elite networks in the petroleum 
industry. In spite of the vast power that is amassed in this industry, there is very 
little systematic research into the configuration of social power at the 
commanding heights of the petroleum sector. This study will undertake a first 
step in such a direction, by exploring the networks of social power constituted 
by the global oil elite, operationalised as the directors of the world’s largest oil 
companies, both state owned oil majors originating in non-OECD countries and 
private oil companies from the OECD world.
Research on the impact of the rising powers from the so called Global 
South53 upon Western corporate circuits, as well as the influence of 
globalization on the Southern (non-OECD) corporations and their leading elites, 
is still in its infancy (see Nölke and Taylor 2010, Nölke 2011). Nevertheless, 
there is a rapidly growing body of studies focusing on the Asian countries (Li, 
Sun and Liu, 2006, Mathews 2006, Child and Rodrigues 2005); foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from the global South (Brennan 2011, Sauvant et al. 2010, 
Buckley et al., 2007, Witt and Lewin 2007); state-owned enterprises and 
sovereign wealth funds (Cohen, 2009; Helleiner ed., 2009; Kirshner 2009; 
Lavelle, 2008); and state-owned oil companies in particular (Marcel, 2006; 
Stevens, 2008; Van der Linde, 2000; Vivoda, 2009). However, there is no 
3 This chapter is based on a single authored article published in International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology (2012), 53(4): 275-297 (De Graaff 2012a).
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study, as of yet, that looks at the recent expansion and integration of non-OECD 
corporate networks from the perspective of the corporate elites and elite 
formation. The latter also applies to the tradition of corporate elite and class 
formation studies (see Chapter Two), which still largely excludes the corporate 
elites from the global South (see Carroll 2010), nor has focused in particular on 
the energy sector. Those studies that address the rising elites from the global 
South tend to assume their cooptation within a largely de-territorialised global 
or transnational capitalist class (see e.g. Robinson 2004, 2007; Robinson and 
Harris 2000), yet without providing systematic empirical underpinning for these 
claims.
This chapter will provide empirical evidence of the nature and 
configuration of elite formation at the height of the oil sector. The primary 
question pertains to the extent to which integration between Western corporate 
elite networks and the non-OECD state-corporate elites has taken place.
Shedding light on this question will contribute first of all to a better 
understanding of the social organisation of power of the world’s leading oil 
elites, and how that power is extended beyond the domain of their corporate 
boards into civil society and politics. Second, it will provide more insight into 
the relations between OECD and non-OECD oil elite networks and the extent to 
which the latter have integrated into Western corporate elite networks, or form 
distinct networks. The chapter is structured as follows, the section below will 
conceptualize the key terms and dimensions of analysis, including a method and 
data description, section three contains the empirical analysis of the corporate 
networks of the OECD and non-OECD oil elites, the concluding section 
summarizes and discusses the main findings and their implications.
Analysing Oil Elites
Corporate boards, according to Carroll, are ‘key nodes in networks of economic 
power’ (2010:8). Their composition and the interlocking of corporate boards 
through directors  that hold multiple board memberships provide insight into the 
workings of a broader capitalist class. The corporate elite networks that this 
study examines are however partly centered around state-owned corporate 
boards, which is a different breed, and importantly does not have its power 
based primarily in ownership of private property (i.e. is not essentially 
capitalist, see below).
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Whereas most corporate elite and class studies take as their starting point a set 
of companies of which the interlocking directorates are analysed, this analysis 
takes a somewhat different approach: it starts from the directors of a selection of 
the world’s largest oil companies and maps all their affiliations in the following 
domains: corporate affiliations (including financial capital), policy planning 
affiliations, and state affiliations. The point of departure hence is not so much 
the companies, but rather the ‘ego networks’ of the directors in charge of them. 
This approach provides a more comprehensive insight into the networks of the 
oil elites: assessing not only their extent of potential corporate control and 
economic power, but also their embeddedness and influence within civil and 
political society. These networks thus represent different domains in which 
corporate elite power is exercised ‘in and through social relations’ (see 
conceptualisation of power in Chapter Two). Let me elaborate on these different 
domains and how they are operationalised within this analysis below, followed 
by a method and data subsection.
The corporate affiliations of the oil elites are analysed by looking at 
interlocking directorates of the oil company directors. Interlocking directorates 
are linkages among corporations created by individuals who sit on two or more 
corporate boards. These interlocks provide elites with inter-organisation ties that 
are, as Carroll put it: ‘’traces’ of strategic and allocative power across firms’ as 
well as ‘expressive, cultural-political relations that build solidarity and trust 
among leading corporate directors’ (2010:7-8). ‘Strategic’ and ‘allocative’ 
power refer to different types of economic power, the former occurs at the level 
of structural decision-making and long-term planning, whereas allocative power 
refers to power to determine the broader conditions in which (other) firms make 
their corporate strategies (these distinctions were first made by Scott 1997, see 
Carroll 2010:8). Relating back to the conceptualisation of power as employed in
this thesis (see Chapter Two) these networked social ties thus contain both 
‘compulsory’ forms of power, i.e. how to get B to do what B otherwise would 
have not done, and more indirect forms such as ‘productive power’, which 
entails the creation of a common outlook and discourse (see Barnett and Duvall 
2005a:55). Interlocks, as Carroll points out, can serve as channels of 
communication among directors, facilitating a common worldview and allow 
for ‘the integration of potentially contradictory interests based on property 
ownership alone’ (Soref and Zeitlin 1987 in Carroll 2010:9). 
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Corporate interlocking in essence also implies a two-mode network approach, 
an important characteristic of which is that they contain a duality of persons and 
groups (Domhoff 2009:6): interpersonal relations (through common 
organisational affiliations) and inter-organisational relations (through the 
persons’ memberships). Indeed as Carroll emphasises: ‘in corporate 
interlocking, not only firms but individual directors exert the agency that 
constitutes the network of overlapping affiliations. Such networks have a dual 
character: they are formations both of corporations whose board interlock, and 
of directors whose multiple affiliations create the interlocks’ (Carroll 2010:11).
In the literature on corporate elite networks and how they have been 
transformed by globalization, the tendency towards increased transnational
interlocking among the world’s largest corporations is generally confirmed. The 
overall conclusion is, however, that the basic structures of the elite networks are 
still to a large extent nationally or at least regionally embedded (e.g. Carroll and 
Fennema 2002; Kentor and Jang 2004; Nollert 2005). Carroll, building further 
upon a study by Fennema (1982), finds one quarter of transnational corporate 
interlocks compared to three quarters of national interlocks in a global network 
of leading corporate and financial firms in 1996 (2010:29). Given the findings 
presented in the former chapter of growing cooperation between the OECD and 
the non-OECD oil majors and the continuing transnationalisation of the global 
energy market, it could be expected that integration at the elite level would 
follow. On the basis of the corporate interlocks it can both be assessed to what 
extent the oil elite networks identified in this study are still largely nationally 
organized or also increasingly transnational and to what extent integration 
between OECD and non-OECD oil elites has taken place at the corporate level. 
Policy planning bodies have been shown to form a crucial part of the 
formulation and formation of wider business interests and strategies of 
corporate communities (e.g. Carroll and Carson 2003; Gill 1990; Van 
Apeldoorn 2002; Van der Pijl 1998). It is therefore proposed here that linkages 
to such bodies – which are here deliberately broad and loosely defined to 
include a wide array of think tanks, business coalitions, policy planning 
institutes and other governance bodies - indicate the integration of the oil elites 
with a broader corporate community, in particular when these linkages are 
transnational. Connections between the OECD and non-OECD oil elites at this 
level would moreover be a crucial indication of integration since it would imply 
access of the non-OECD elites to the ‘heart’ of transnational corporate business 
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strategy formulation and representation. It is in this domain of the policy 
planning networks that ‘institutional power’ is most clearly harboured, 
exercised, as Barnett and Duvall describe it: ‘through socially extended,
institutionally diffuse relations’ (2005a:52, see also Chapter Two).  
There is an apparent state dimension to the global contestation over 
hydrocarbon resources, as elaborated in earlier chapters. Not only because states 
are fundamental to the process of production, but also because of the 
territorially fixed nature of hydrocarbon resources in combination with the 
territorially defined global order of states (i.e. the patchwork of sovereign social 
spaces). Corporate elites are argued to form an important nexus in the 
interrelation between the state and the capital accumulation process as 
conceptualized in Chapter Two. However, it is expected that there are 
considerable differences between the OECD and non-OECD oil elites in terms 
of the configuration of their ‘state-business relations’, not the least because in 
the case of the latter, the state is the owner of the oil companies. Indeed, what I 
have labelled state-corporate elites have a different powerbase from capitalist 
elites, since they are intimately linked to the state, even if their powerbase might 
also partly derive from private wealth and property ownership. Yet, it should be 
pointed out that the focal point of enquiry is the extent of transnationalisation 
and possible integration of the non-OECD state-corporate elite networks with 
Western corporate elite networks, and not so much a comparison of distinct 
characteristics or in-depth study of the nature of non-OECD statist elites.
Method and Data
The method that was used is a combination of ‘biographical mapping’ (see 
Chapter One) and Social Network Analysis (SNA). As was mentioned in the 
introduction of this dissertation, SNA makes it possible to visualize social 
structure (i.e. social relations) and also provides basic measures which are 
indicators for social power and influence (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and 
Montgomery, 2009). Since no empirical study of this kind exists yet, an original 
data base had to be constructed. In addition to the five NOCs studied in the 
former chapter, five IOCs from the top of the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 
(PIW) annual ranking were chosen as point of departure (Energy Intelligence 
Group, 2008). This generated a total N of 182 executive and non-executive 
directors (see Table 1, Chapter One).54
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As earlier explained, priority was given to the largest and most dominant types 
of IOCs from major OECD countries and prominent non-OECD NOCs because 
the main interest of this study is about elite formation at the apex of the system 
and the extent of incorporation of the non-OECD oil elites into the typical 
Western elite circuits of power. Because of this focus it was decided to 
prioritize collecting data from multiple domains in which elite formation takes 
place (see Chapter One) rather than to extend the number of cases, that is, to opt 
for depth rather than breadth. If integration is found at this level then it is a 
crucial indicator of oil elite integration, because it takes place at the very top of 
the system. As a consequence, however, this selection excludes relatively 
smaller oil companies, lower in the PIW ranking, as well as the ‘deviant’ 
examples of Western Hybrids such as Statoil, and of non-OECD IOCs such as 
Lukoil. While it would be very interesting to research the latter ‘deviant’ cases, 
they are clearly exceptions rather than the rule. In order to assess whether these 
exceptional cases confirm or deviate from the general pattern that can be found 
by looking at the more dominant types, however, that pattern first needs to be 
established; which is why this study focuses on an analysis of the dominant 
types, a selection that includes the majority of both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
Seven Sisters (see Hoyos 2007a, 2007b).
2007 is taken as year of measurement to make the findings compatible 
with those of the previous chapter. Whereas this ‘static’ approach does not 
provide an analysis of the trajectory of integration, it does allow for an analysis 
of the extent of integration at a certain point in time. If little to no integration is 
found at that point in time, it seems hardly plausible to assume that high levels 
of integration would have taken place in the past, and that the period prior from 
1997 to 2007 would have been one of disintegration. Now that the main 
conceptual and methodological points of departure of this chapter have been 
outlined let us turn to the analyses of the networks.
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OECD and non-OECD Oil Elite Networks
Corporate Networks
First of all, in terms of board composition of the selected oil companies, of the 
182 directors there were no cases of non-OECD  directors sitting on the IOC 
boards analysed here, and only six OECD directors serving on the selected 
NOC boards in 2007.55 This indicates a substantial lack of OECD / non-OECD 
integration at the level of oil company board composition. It also shows that 
although some OECD directors do have access to non-OECD NOC boards, 
non-OECD directors do not yet have access to OECD IOC boards, which 
implies that the OECD directors have more opportunity to exert influence 
within the non-OECD companies analysed here, than the other way around.
Turning to the interlocking directorates it was found that of the total 
selection of directors 52 percent had interlocking directorates. On the basis of 
the nationality of those directors it was calculated that 39 percent were OECD 
directors and 13 percent were non-OECD directors (see Figure 15 below). In 
relation to the total number of oil company directors this implies that 71 percent 
of the OECD directors have interlocking directorates (71 out of 100), whereas 
in the case of the non-OECD directors this is only 26 percent (23 out of 82). 
Clearly, the practice of interlocking directorates is – as of yet – much less of a 
common practice amongst the non-OECD oil elites than amongst the Western 
oil elites.
Figure 15: Oil Company Directors’ Corporate Interlocks
Sources: Company Annual Reports, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis
Directors 
without 
Corporate 
Interlocks
48%
OECD Director 
with Corporate 
Interlocks
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non-OECD 
Directors with 
Corporate 
Interlocks
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Figures 16a and 16b: Distribution Transnational-National Corporate Ties
Sources: Company Annual Reports, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis
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Figure 16 a and b give more insight into the particular nature of these interlocks 
by providing an overview of the transnational and national corporate ties of 
these interlocking directors.56 The OECD directors had 241 national ties (53 
percent) and 133 transnational ties (29 percent). In the case of  the non-OECD 
interlocking directors there were 63 national ties (14 percent) and only 17 
transnational ties (4 percent). This makes clear that the oil elites in general 
establish more national linkages than transnational linkages and that this applies 
in particular to the non-OECD oil elites. Nonetheless, in the case of the OECD 
oil elites, almost 30 percent of their corporate ties are made up of transnational 
linkages. 
These findings show that although the oil elites are predominantly 
nationally connected to the corporate world, a subgroup of them does have a 
substantial number of transnational corporate ties and connections. In that sense 
the pattern found here, at least for part of the oil elites, does seem to confirm the 
general finding in the literature of a transnational corporate ‘superstructure’ 
resting on firm nationally integrated bases (e.g. Caroll and Fennema 2002). The 
share of transnational interlocks is a bit higher than that found in a cross-
sectoral global corporate network where about 25 percent of the ties were 
transnational (Carroll 2010:28-9, also Fennema 1982, but see Heemskerk 2011, 
who recently found that 34 percent of the interlocks amongst 273 of Europe’s 
largest firms were transnational, also Heemskerk 2013). What this study shows 
in addition to those general findings is that the non-OECD oil elites are still 
almost exclusively nationally connected in terms of corporate ties: with only a 
few transnational corporate linkages (4 percent) there is little integration into a 
transnational superstructure. Whereas these findings give insights into the 
accumulated number and distribution of ties of the directors of the selected 
NOCs and IOCs, it does not reveal who has ties to whom - i.e. if and how they 
are connected - and to what extent through these ties there is integration 
between the networks of these NOC and IOC boards. This can be done by 
looking at the network(s) that are created by the corporate interlocks of these oil 
company directors in 2007. 
Graph 3 below shows the complete network of companies.57 First of all, 
this graph makes clear that the corporate network of these oil elites consists of 
three components: whereas the major IOCs ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, 
Total, BP and Chevron are connected to each other, as well as to the NOCs 
Saudi Aramco and Gazprom, PDVSA (in the upper right corner) and CNPC and 
PetroChina (in the lower right corner) form two separate clusters disconnected 
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from the main component. Components of a network are parts that are 
connected within but disconnected between other parts of the graph. Since 
NIOC, the Iranian NOC, had no directors with interlocking directorates, it is not 
part of this network at all. The lack of integration between these IOCs and 
NOCs is hence clearly illustrated by this graph.  Whereas all the IOCs are 
indirectly connected to each other through corporate interlocks of their board 
members, these two NOCs are entirely disconnected both from each other and 
from the IOC network. Gazprom and Saudi Aramco however are two NOCs 
that are not isolated components but are indirectly connected to the IOC 
network, although - as will be shown later - only through a few weak ties. 
Secondly, the graph illustrates a lack of integration through corporate 
interlocking between the non-OECD and the OECD in general. Within the 
OECD component non-OECD companies (black squares) are hardly present, 
and within the non-OECD parts, there are only a few clusters of OECD 
companies (white squares); in the network surrounding Gazprom there seems to 
be most integration in this respect.
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Now that a first broad outline of the structure of the network has been 
generated, the nature of these connections will be more closely analyzed.  What 
are the meeting places of the oil elites, what are the main channels of 
cooperation and communication, how strong are these ties and who are the 
central actors? Graph 4 below gives the two-mode network, i.e. displaying both 
directors and companies (see Endnote 57 for explanation), of the main 
component, only including the ‘big oil linkers’ (corporate directors with at least 
three board memberships) which is a total of 46 directors. In this graph 
companies are only are displayed if they are connected to each other through 
actors having positions at their boards, in other words: it shows the corporate 
meeting places of the ‘big oil linkers’.58
A distinction is made between executive and non-executive directors, 
given their very different relations to the company. Executives are much more 
closely involved in the day-to-day strategy and operations of the company, 
whereas non-executives have a more distant, monitoring, advisory relation to 
the company. Although most of the ‘big oil linkers’ have a non-executive 
position at their oil company, some prominent oil executives are part of this 
circle of ‘big oil linkers’, such as Shell’s CEO Van der Veer, Saudi Aramco’s 
President and CEO Jum’ah, and BP’s Chairman Sutherland.59 Moreover, it 
should be noted that most of these ‘big oil linkers’, even if they are not 
executives on the board of one of the major oil companies, do have at least one 
executive position in another company connected to this network.
The major oil companies in this network are all indirectly connected 
through at least one director sharing a board membership at an intermediate 
company. There are even three (indirect) connections between Royal Dutch 
Shell and BP, and they have one executive each at the board of Unilever, which 
seems to suggest a strong connection and exchange of influence between the 
boards of these British/Dutch companies. Total reveals the most extensive and 
strong ties, with as many as four executives and a total of thirteen directors 
establishing interlocking directorates, constituting what seems to be a quite 
cohesive French-Belgium cluster. BP, however, has the most (indirect) 
connections to the other IOCs and NOCs. In fact BP is (indirectly) connected to 
all other oil companies within this component, except Total, and is the only IOC 
(indirectly) connected to both Gazprom and Saudi Aramco.
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If we look at the ‘geodesic distances’ (that is, the shortest paths between two 
actors) in this graph, it is interesting to see that Saudi Aramco directors are 
much ‘c loser’ to the other IOCs in this sample than Gazprom directors; the 
former is only two steps away from BP and Chevron and three steps from Shell, 
whereas Gazprom is two steps away from BP as well, but four steps away from 
all the other oil companies and even six steps away from Total. Of all the IOCs, 
BP clearly has the most close connections – in terms of geodesic distance – to 
the other oil companies in the network; with the exception of Total it is only 
two steps distant from all other companies.60
In general this group of ‘big oil linkers’ - aside from the national 
networks that they establish – are collectively spanning a transnational network 
including a selection of the world’s major TNCs, and global financial players. 
Apart from other petroleum companies (such as GDF Suez, Motiva Enterprises)
and major extractive industry firms (e.g. Rio Tinto, Anglo American) a 
selection of the world’ s key TNCs are connected to this network, such as: 
Unilever, Vodafone, IBM, Northrop Grumman, Rolls Royce Group, Coca Cola, 
General Electric and Alcatel-Lucent. Also some of the global financial giants 
are connected to this network, such as Goldman Sachs, Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), J.P Morgan Chase, Société General, Banque de France, AXA Finance 
and Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (GBL). These ‘big oil linkers’ thus form a 
transnational network of corporate meeting places that provides them with a 
platform for information sharing, exchange of ideas and views and coordination 
of interests; not only amongst each other, but also with a broader transnational 
corporate community (see with respect to the latter also the findings in Carroll 
2010). But who are these oil elites and how are they positioned within these 
networks? 
The ‘big oil linkers’ in the network above are all men (in fact, in the 
whole sample of directors, there are only fifteen women, that is eight percent) 
and they have a high number of interlocking directorates, many of them with at 
least one executive function. The highest number of interlocks range between 
thirteen and nine and almost half of them has six interlocking directorates or 
more (these are not all shown in Graph 4 above, but see Table 9 in Appendix 
D). Although we do find directors of Gazprom and Saudi Aramco in this 
selection these are mostly Western directors at the boards of the companies (the 
exception being Jum’ah and Federov).
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Graph 5 below shows a larger one-mode network of all the interlocking 
directors (a total of 94, see Figure 16b), i.e. those directors that make up the 
‘inner circle’ of the oil elite (Useem 1984).61 Inner circle directors with a 
‘broker’ position are labelled and those with an executive position at one of the 
major oil companies within our selection are coloured grey. Being a ‘broker’, 
i.e. the only connection between two subgroups of the network, potentially 
gives an actor particular influence, because it gives privileged access to a 
subgroup to which other actors are not connected (e.g. Granovetter 1973). Thus, 
the graph immediately reveals that some of the major executives of the selected 
oil companies have important broker positions within this inner circle, some of 
which are non-OECD directors, such as Jum’ah (Saudi Aramco) and Fedorov 
(Gazprom). 
Graph 5: Oil Elites Inner Circle
Key: Labelled Squares = Broker positions                   Grey Squares = Oil Executives
Note: The directors in the disconnected Chinese subgroup (middle below) and since Mendoza, the 
PDVSA director (upper left) are also labelled for reasons of identification. 
Sources: Company Annual Reports, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis
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Summarising the findings above, it can be concluded that a substantial part of 
the oil elites (46 out of 182) are embedded into a wider corporate elite network 
interlocking some of the world’s largest TNCs in several core industries 
(extractive industries, car industry, defence, technology) and link key players of 
global financial capital with the selected major oil companies. This pattern –
however – applies almost exclusively to the Western oil elites. The non-OECD 
oil elites emerge as four separate components, of which only Gazprom and 
Saudi Aramco are (indirectly) connected to the OECD corporate network. 
Gazprom, however, has only one connection, and two out of the three 
connections of Saudi Aramco are established by OECD directors. Some of these 
non-OECD oil elites (e.g. Jum’ah and Fedorov) however have important and 
influential broker positions (as shown in Graph 5) and hence provide potentially 
crucial bridging positions between the OECD and the non-OECD. Yet, in the 
case of CNPC, PetroChina, NIOC and PDVSA there are no connections at all to 
the corporate networks established by the other oil company directors.
It can be concluded that, as of yet, there has been very little integration 
on the part of the non-OECD oil elites into wider transnational corporate elite 
networks, or business communities, through interlocking directorates. These 
findings also indicate that the non-OECD oil elites have very little access to 
these transnational corporate networks and have potentially little influence. 
Moreover, the data seem to imply significantly less basis for - and occurrence of 
- joint formulation and coordination of wider corporate interests at a 
transnational level by non-OECD oil elites. In the next subsection it will be 
assessed to what extent and how oil elite formation and integration has taken 
place beyond the realm of corporate boards.
Transnational Policy Planning Networks
From the total of 182 oil company directors only 26 turned out to have 
affiliations with 28 different transnational policy planning organisations in 
2007, which are shown in the graph below.62 Amongst them there is a near 
complete absence of non-OECD transnational organisations, directors and ties. 
We find a clear Western cluster of transnational ties between mostly 
IOC directors and transnational planning and regulatory bodies, with the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), the Bilderberg Group at its core and connected to these: e.g. the 
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Trilateral Commission, the Global Business Coalition Against Aids / HIV, the 
US-Russia Business Council, the International Accounting Standards 
Foundation (IASF), and some UN organisations. It should be noted that there is 
a wide variety of aims and means amongst the included organisations and that 
they cannot be simply compared. Clearly, there is a difference between the ERT 
or the WEF and, for instance, UN organisations or the IASF. When adopting the 
definition of transnational policy planning bodies, however, this was 
deliberately defined quite broadly and inclusively (see method and data 
section), because it aims to include all sorts of formal and informal socialising 
platforms where business coordination of some kind is assumed to take place. 
Big linkers in this network are Sutherland (Chairman BP); Moody-
Stuart (Saudi Aramco director and previously director at Shell); Collomb 
(Total); Ollila (Shell) and Robertson (Chevron): i.e. all OECD directors. The 
only non-OECD directors connected to this component are Al-Khayyal and 
Jum’ah (Saudi Aramco), Al-Khayyal as a participant of WEF in 2007 and 
Jum’ah as member of the WEF International Business Council.63 The other two 
NOC board members that are connected to this component: British Sir Moody-
Stuart (Saudi Aramco) and the Italian businessman Bernabe (PetroChina), are 
both Western. These actors are, however, important brokers between this 
transnational OECD network and the non-OECD elites. Another actor providing 
such a possible ‘bridge’ is Al-Assaf (Saudi Aramco) who is Governor for Saudi 
Arabia in both the IMF and the World Bank Group.  They are few, however, 
and they almost all point to a connection to Saudi Aramco.
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Graph 7 below shows how these oil elites are connected to each other through 
these bodies. An interesting aspect revealed by this graph is that half of the 
directors connected through this transnational network have executive positions, 
in fact, seven of them at the level of CEO and / or Chairman.
Graph 7: Oil Elite Connections through Transnational Policy Planning 
Organisations
Key: Black Squares = Executives Size of nodes = Degree
Note: Isolates in the upper left corner are oil company directors who are affiliated with 
transnational planning organisations but not connected to the others.
Sources: Company Annual Reports, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis
These findings indicate that a significant number of the key oil executives from 
the world’s major IOCs and from Saudi Aramco are closely connected through 
a transnational network constituted by what in the literature is recognized as 
some of the most central and influential transnational bodies critical to the 
formation and formulation of transnational capital and capitalist class interests 
and strategies (see e.g. Carroll 2010, Van Apeldoorn 2002, Gill 1990, Van der 
Pijl 1984). The fact that they are connected to and through these bodies suggests 
Al-Assaf (SaudiAramco)
Al-Khayyal (SaudiAramco)
Bernabe (PetroChina)
Burgmans (BP)
Collomb (Total)
Desmarais (Total)
Desmarest (Total)
Emadi (NIOC)
George (ExxonMobil)
Jum'ah (SaudiAramco)
Kerr (Shell)
Kok (Shell)
Moody-Stuart (SaudiAramco)
Nelson (ExxonMobil)
O'Reilly (Chevron)
Ollila (Shell)
Orellana (PDVSA)
Prosser (BP)
Pébereau (Total)
Reinemund (ExxonMobil)
Robertson (Chevron)
Simon (ExxonMobil)
Sutherland (BP)
Tillerson (ExxonMobil)
Veer, van der (Shell)Wu (PetroChina)
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an exchange of views, ideas and information and a coordination of interests. 
These might not be the particular interests of the oil companies that they 
represent, but rather – as is often suggested – a broader business community 
interest. This is confirmed by the fact that indeed, many of the ‘institutional big 
linkers’ are also ‘corporate big linkers’, most of them with brokerage positions 
within the corporate ‘inner circle’ (see Graph 5).
Even more significant is the finding that the non-OECD oil elites have 
very few connections to this broader transnational network (although for some 
of these organisations, such as the ERT and the Trilateral Commission, this is of 
course rather logical). Apparently, at this level of elite cooperation the non-
OECD oil elites do not yet participate and integrate - except for some Saudi 
Aramco directors - nor do they form any alternative transnational networks 
themselves. But this does not preclude the possibility that the non-OECD elites 
might have other meeting places and networks that they use for a broader 
exchange of views and ideas and a coordination of corporate interests. One 
domain that stands out in this respect is the state, to which the analysis turns 
next.
State-Business Relations of the Oil Elites
In order to assess the relation between the oil elites and the state, all state 
affiliations of the NOC and IOC board members were mapped. Included also 
were political affiliations (i.e. political activities that did not involve formal 
positions within the state apparatus) and military affiliations. The results for 
2007 are shown in Table 8 below. 
In 2007 six IOC directors turned out to have a simultaneous 
engagement at the state level (a total of 7 interlocks). The major NOCs in this 
selection, however, had 27 directors simultaneously at positions at state level (a 
total of 46 state interlocks), pointing to a much more direct and extensive set of 
relations. Moreover, when the actual positions that the interlocking directors 
inhabited are taken into account, it shows that in the case of the IOC directors, 
the simultaneous positions only involved advisory positions within state bodies 
(an overview of all 2007 state positions can be found in Appendix D, Table 13).
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Table 8: State positions of the Oil Elites in 2007
Total 
Positions State Political Military
N
directors
Saudi 
Aramco 22 21 0 1 6
PetroChina 8 5 3 0 7
PDVSA 6 4 0 2 5
Gazprom 4 4 0 0 4
NIOC 3 3 0 0 3
CNPC 3 1 2 0 2
Total 2 2 0 0 2
Royal Dutch 
Shell 2 2 0 0 2
ExxonMobil 2 2 0 1
BP 1 1 0 0 1
Chevron 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: Company Annual Reports, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), Lexis Nexis
In the case of the NOCs, however, the directors had highly ranked state 
positions, often even at a ministerial or vice-ministerial level. PDVSA directors 
were for instance simultaneously ‘Minister of Popular Power for Energy and 
Oil’; Gazprom directors were also ‘Minister of Petroleum’. NIOCs directors 
held positions as ‘Minister for Economic Development and Trade’ and ‘First 
Deputy Prime Minister’, and Saudi Aramco’s directors had positions ranking 
from ‘Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources’ to ‘Secretary General of 
the Supreme Economic Council’. The state in these cases, therefore, is not only 
the ultimate owner of the corporation, but the actors in charge of these majors 
are moreover themselves state executives at often high level positions. This 
confirms that the non-OECD oil elites are also very explicitly ‘statist’ elites, 
whereas the OECD oil elite members have more indirect connections to the 
state, while they do advise states on policy, they operate more ‘independently’ 
from them.64
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Conclusion
This chapter set out to provide a better understanding and empirical 
underpinning of the organisation of social power at the commanding heights of 
the oil sector in light of the wider transformation that is taking place in the 
global oil market due to the rising powers from the Global South- in particular 
the expansion and integration of the non-OECD state owned oil companies.  
This was done by analysing the affiliation networks of the directors of the 
world’s largest National and International Oil Companies (NOCs and IOCs) 
within several domains: corporate networks, policy planning networks, and 
state-business networks. It has been assessed to what extent the directors of the 
world’s major oil companies are integrated into wider elite networks at both a 
national and at a transnational level, and if so, how the non-OECD oil elites are 
related to the OECD oil elite networks, i.e. to what extent they have integrated 
into, or differ from, the circuits of the typically Western corporate elite.
First of all, it is found that in terms of board composition there was very 
little OECD/non-OECD integration. No non-OECD directors are found on 
Western oil company boards, and only six OECD directors were present on 
non-OECD oil company boards. The presence of these few Western directors 
deserves a bit more elaboration. The fact that Saudi Aramco has three Anglo-
American directors on its board is probably not surprising given the heritage of 
the company (see Chapter Three), and its close cooperative relation with the US 
and other major Western powers. The presence of a German director on the 
board of Gazprom (Burckhard Bergmann, since 2011 appointed Advisor on 
International Affairs to the CEO Miller) arguably also has a (geo)political edge 
to it. There is a close relation between Germany and Russia in terms of energy 
trade,65 forged in particular under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder, who had 
close ties to Putin and after his chancellorship became head of the shareholder 
committee of Nordstream – the contested new pipeline which transports gas 
directly from Vyborg in Russia to Germany. The US on the other hand is wary 
of Russian influence in Europe and is urging the EU to diversify its energy 
supply sources and become less dependent on Russia.66 These corporate 
alliances hence can also be seen in light of geopolitical power balances and 
conflicting interests – both corporate and political – within the OECD area.
However the fact that there is no non-OECD director on any of the IOC boards 
analysed here is nonetheless telling.
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The practice of interlocking directorates was in general much less common 
within the non-OECD oil elite, only 13 percent of those directors had 
interlocking ties to other companies. Within the OECD oil elite however this 
number was quite high, 39 percent. In terms of a distribution of national and 
transnational ties, the national ties clearly dominated, which confirms the 
general findings in the literature of a transnational corporate superstructure 
embedded in strong corporate national bases. Nonetheless, 29 percent of all 
corporate ties consisted of transnational linkages; indeed, a substantial number 
of the Western oil elites - involving some of the key executives of the major 
IOCs – are closely linked to a network of large transnational corporations and 
financial capital. These ‘big oil linkers’ hold between 13 and 3 corporate board 
memberships simultaneously, with often at least one executive function. This 
pattern, however, applies almost exclusively to the OECD oil elites. In the case 
of the non-OECD oil elites, transnational ties were nearly absent (4 percent). 
Hence very little transnational integration is found through corporate 
connections of non-OECD oil elites, and almost no integration seems to have 
taken place between the Global South and the West in this respect. Exceptions 
are Gazprom and Saudi Aramco that do have a few directors at potentially 
influential bridging positions with ties to the transnational corporate network; 
however, these directors in many cases turned out to be OECD directors.
Also within the domain of transnational policy planning organisations 
little integration between the non-OECD and OECD oil elites is found. A small 
number of the OECD oil elites generate a dominantly Western subgroup, with 
their meeting places being some well known transnational bodies - such as the 
ERT, the WEF, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission - that are 
core platforms for the organisation of the wider transnational business 
community. While some of these organisations per definition exclude non-
OECD members, such as the ERT and the Trilateral Commission, it remains 
telling that the oil elites of major non-OECD NOCs are hardly connected to this 
transnational network - with again the exception of Saudi Aramco - and do not 
form transnational policy planning networks themselves.
When looking at differences between the non-OECD and OECD oil 
elites in terms state affiliations it was confirmed – even if not surprising - that 
the former is intimately linked to the state, with the NOC directors holding high 
profile state positions, often at ministerial or vice ministerial level; whereas the 
IOC directors demonstrate a more indirect pattern of state involvement, 
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confirming the ‘revolving door mechanism’, and in the actual cases of an 
overlap, often concerning advisory positions at state level.
Overall, this analysis makes clear that the differences between the 
OECD and non-OECD oil elites are still very large in terms of the relational 
patterns analysed, e.g. the practice of interlocking directorates, affiliations with 
transnational policy planning bodies and their affiliations with the state. 
Whereas the Western oil elites inhabit a core place within a global or 
transnational corporate elite, as they interlink not only with powerful 
transnational capital groups, but also with central transnational policy planning 
networks and have an advisory relation to the state and state policy; the non-
OECD oil elites are only scarcely connected to these Western corporate and 
civil society networks and do not form any similar alternative networks 
themselves. Instead the non-OECD oil elites ‘state-business relations’ indicate 
very distinctive forms of elite cooperation, intimately related to the state-
apparatus, in fact, holding simultaneously high executive positions within the 
state and the major NOCs. Non-OECD oil elites thus still have little access to 
typical Western elite and business circuits, and OECD oil elites, vice versa, still 
have limited inside access to the networks of power of the NOCs. This implies 
that little ‘strategic and allocative power’ (Carroll 2010:7-8) is projected across 
the corporate OECD/non-OECD divide, nor do we at this level find the kind of 
cultural-political relations and communication channels that are conducive to 
the building of a common worldview, trust and solidarity, i.e. factors that bridge 
the inherent inter-corporate and intra-elite conflicts of interests and that would 
allow for a diffusion of ‘productive power’ (see Barnett and Duvall 2005a:55).
In sum, these results make clear that whereas the non-OECD oil elites 
are increasingly active within the West in terms of business activity, and are 
directing a major expansion of their NOCs - which at the same time generates 
increased cooperation with OECD private oil majors - these developments have 
not yet transpired into non-OECD-OECD integration at the level of elite 
formation. This indicates that the Western corporate elite networks are still 
dominant, but also that the non-OECD oil elites have not been co-opted (cf. 
Robinson 2004, 2007, Robinson and Harris 2000). Although it might be a 
matter of time, i.e. it may be the case that there is a time lag between closer 
corporate cooperation and elite integration, it could also be expected that the 
corporate elite networks of the non-OECD powers will at some point come to 
challenge the Western ‘core’, or that a more multi-polar corporate elite structure 
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emerges with a more balanced representation of both OECD and non-OECD 
corporate elites.
The growth of the non-OECD world, which in terms of energy 
production and consumption now outpaces the combined OECD countries and 
which is characterised by the existence of a few significant growth poles in Asia 
(i.e. China and India) has given rise to the notion of a multi-polar global 
political economy. However, this multi-polarity is arguably of a rather different 
nature than the ‘trilateral’ multi-polarity that developed during the 1980s. 
Whereas in the latter period the formation of an overarching transnational 
corporate elite was forged, not only – or even primarily - through corporate 
interlocks, but also through transnational policy planning networks such as the 
Trilateral Commission (see Carroll 2010, Van der Pijl 1998, Gill 1990), it is not 
a given that a similar development will take place with the current 
transformation (which moreover coincides with stagnant growth in the US and 
the EU). 
How these developments will affect the configuration of corporate elite 
power at the global level remains an open question and requires additional and 
different analysis. This analysis has focused on the questions to what extent the 
non-OECD oil elites have become transnationalised along patterns typical to 
Western businesses and practices, and to what extent they have become 
integrated into the latter. Little evidence has been found pointing in those 
directions. What has been found is the distinctive statist configuration of the 
non-OECD oil elite networks. However, it is very well possible that different 
elite network structures exist within and amongst these state-corporate elites, 
based on family ties and bureaucratic or other civil society organisations for 
instance. Further analysis into these distinct configurations in other words 
points towards promising avenues for further research. The question on which 
the remainder of this study will focus is to what extent and how the mixed 
findings of Chapter Four and Five impact upon the current rules of the game, 
the governance of the global energy order. Does the rise of the non-OECD 
NOCs and their distinct corporate elite networks imply that they are adapting to 
the ‘rules of the game’ that have been prevailing in the global energy order– or 
are they re-defining them? Do we see a deepening of capitalist discipline and 
market mechanisms or are we witnessing the emergence of more ‘statist’ forms 
of governance? Or perhaps both? These questions form the basis of enquiry in 
the next chapter. 
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__________________PART III___________________
Rules of the Game 
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CHAPTER SIX
Rules of the Game – Hybridisation of (Global) Energy Governance 
China and other emerging economies will shape the global energy future –
where will their policy decisions lead us?
(IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011)
Introduction
The findings in Chapter Four, on the expansion of the major non-OECD NOCs, 
revealed the increasingly networked nature of the global energy market in 
which a new configuration of a global corporate energy network has emerged 
since the mid 1990s. The results showed that the global expansion of non-
OECD NOCs has led to increased cooperation of such NOCs with other key 
players of the energy market, importantly also private oil majors (IOCs). 
Chapter Five, however, showed that the directors of the two different types of 
oil companies display very different patterns in terms of their ties to businesses, 
policy planning bodies, and state agencies, i.e. in terms of what I have labelled 
‘oil elite networks’. Whereas OECD IOC directors are significantly integrated 
into national and transnational business networks, both in terms of interlocking 
directorates with other firms and in terms of their affiliations with policy 
planning bodies, the non-OECD NOC directors are not (with exception of Saudi 
Aramco directors). The majority of the latter are, however, closely tied to the 
state apparatus of their home countries, and often hold high-level (executive) 
state positions. The state-business relations of the OECD directors on the other 
hand, are much less extensive and are often characterised by the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon (i.e. alternating between formal state positions and corporate 
board membership).
In combination, these findings thus present a ‘mixed picture’. On the 
one hand we see increased cooperation at the company level, with the non-
OECD NOCs becoming active global players outside their domestic borders; a 
development that testifies to both a widening, and a deepening transnational 
dimension. On the other hand, hardly any integration has occurred at the level 
of oil elite networks, i.e. between those that are directing the expansion of the 
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NOCs and those directing the IOCs. This, in turn, points towards the 
continuation of a strong national statist dimension.
The aim of this present chapter is to see what impact this changing 
configuration of power within the global energy order has had on the existing 
rules of the game, that is, on the governance of energy. Many now argue that 
NOCs and the rising powers in general are becoming rule makers instead of rule 
takers. However, I will contend that with the (ongoing) global expansion of 
Western capitalism, a rule set of both formal and informal rules has been 
projected globally. And that this rule set is not only primarily a reflection and 
representation of the interests and power of Western capitalism and its 
protagonists, but also to a major extent conditions the way newly rising players 
(can) play the game. Indeed, as Peter Newell argues: ‘the particular relationship 
between energy and growth, the overriding logic of capitalist development, 
means that changes to existing patterns of energy governance are fiercely 
resisted by those state and corporate actors that benefit from the prevailing 
distribution of power associated with the contemporary organization of energy 
in the global economy’ (Newell 2011:95).
In this present chapter I will look at three dimensions of energy 
governance, seeking to assess and explain to which extent and how (global) 
governance of energy has been transforming, in light of the new balance of 
forces as illustrated in the forgoing chapters. Since the focal point of the 
research presented here is on the relations between private and state-owned 
corporations, the first dimension that will be assessed is the governance that 
concerns these relations; examining the question to what extent the rise of non-
OECD NOCs and the hybrid alliances that they increasingly form (see Chapter 
Four), signify the emergence of a new ‘statism’ in energy governance. What 
different forms of governance can we discern within these hybrid alliances and 
the strategies of the internationally expanding NOCs? Do we indeed find a 
tendency towards increased interstate bargaining, i.e. more ‘statist’ governance? 
Or rather towards a deepening ‘marketisation’ of the energy relations between 
companies and governments, i.e. is governance increasingly mediated by 
market-mechanisms? (see Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007 on the concept of 
‘marketisation’)? The second dimension of governance relates to private actors, 
other than IOCs, that have become increasingly influential in the (global) 
governance of energy. These private actors are, at least partly, shaping the 
particular content of the rules of the game and are contributing to the conditions 
in which corporations and states have to play by those rules. In particular, I will 
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focus on how corporate lawyers, financial speculators, investors, and energy 
service companies, contribute to the commercialisation and financialisation of 
global energy governance. The third dimension that will be analysed, concerns 
global governance of energy, and in particular the global institutional landscape. 
The aim for this dimension is to assess to what extent and how the social 
relations as analysed in the previous chapters (Three, Four and Five) are 
reflected in the current global institutional landscape of energy governance 
(including rule making bodies such as the International Energy Agency and 
OPEC).
Before turning to these three dimensions I will, however, briefly discuss 
the concept of global governance as well as some of the recently emerging 
literature on global governance of energy. The analyses in this chapter are 
primarily based on the interview materials as described in the introductory 
chapter, Chapter One. The thirty four interviewees included corporate officers, 
consultants and lawyers, directors of (global) governance bodies (such as the 
IEA and IEF), high level state representatives (e.g. former Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Ambassadors, Energy envoys), and a selection of renowned experts 
(see Table 2 in Chapter One, and Appendix A for a full list of interviewees and 
their affiliations / functions). Although these interviews have informed other 
parts of the thesis, they constitute the primary source of data for this particular 
chapter. All interviews (except two) have been recorded, after which I have 
transcribed them. Subsequently, I have analysed these transcriptions by way of 
identifying recurring main themes and structuring the interviews along these 
main themes. The findings on the basis of the interview data are supplemented 
with secondary literature sources primarily from the field of global (energy) 
governance and interpreted through a critical political economy framework as 
described in Chapter Two.
Defining the Rules of the Game
Governance is defined as the process of formal and informal rule making that is 
binding, or significantly constraining, and/or facilitating the behaviour of 
particular communities or collectives, such as nations, groups, sectors, or 
individual actors (cf. Van Apeldoorn, Nölke and Overbeek 2007:5). Following 
this definition, global governance, as used in this chapter, simply refers to such 
rule making that transcends national borders and thus takes place in a 
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transnational social space.67 The term ‘global governance’ has become a 
catchphrase in both academic and policy debates, but is equally contested and 
hard to define (see for a critical discussion of the concept, for instance, 
Overbeek et al. 2010). This is not the place for an elaborate discussion of these
debates, which could fill a dissertation in itself, but I do want to emphasise two 
aspects that I consider relevant in this respect. The first aspect pertains to the 
question how to conceptualise the role of the state in global governance. The 
second aspect deals with the inclusion of power as a fundamental element in 
global governance, an issue which is often bracketed or omitted in global 
governance literature (see below, also Barnett and Duvall 2005b).
Following North (1991), the phrase ‘rules of the game’ is often used to 
refer to institutions composed of formal rules (laws, regulations) and informal 
rules (norms, conventions, principles). Whereas, for instance, Goldthau and 
Witte (2010) subsequently operationalise ‘rules of the game’ as the ‘institutional 
architecture that underpins global energy’ which governs central aspects of e.g. 
financing, trading, investment treaties and trade agreements (2009:2), this study 
distinguishes rule making institutions (that is, organisations, actors, or groups of 
actors) from the actual sets of rules, practices, norms, or conventions (see also 
North 1991). Hence, the concept ‘rules of the game’ as conceptualised in this 
research, includes, yet also stretches beyond, the ‘institutional architecture’ as 
identified by e.g. Goldthau and Witte (2010:7-9). Moreover, I want to stress the 
importance of informal rules of the game, that is, non-institutionalised codes, 
norms, expectations, and ‘logics’, which exert significant influence within the 
institutional architecture, and partly account for the latter’s particular shape and 
resilience to change. In sum, rules of the game as understood in the present 
study distinguishes between the rule making institutions (organisations) and 
actors and the actual rule sets, and emphasises the importance of informal rules 
and rule makers.
Recently, there has been a surge of studies on global governance of 
energy. Similar to the global governance literature in general, the suggestion 
within much of this literature is that we have to look for governance beyond the 
state (Goldthau 2011, Biermann 2010, Bierman et al. 2009, Pattberg and 
Stripple 2008). This study fully acknowledges – in fact even emphasizes - the 
transnational nature of the global energy market: the interconnectedness and the 
interdependency within the global energy market, the great impact that 
financialisation has on the oil market and on (the volatility of) the oil price, and 
the impact of climate change, are obviously forces and dynamics that cannot be 
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contained within the territorial borders of isolated nation states. However, this 
does not imply governance without the state. Both in its concrete manifestations 
and theoretically, the transnational nature of the global energy market and its 
governance, in effect presupposes state involvement. While agreeing that 
‘despite the re-emergence of state players and resource nationalism markets 
matter more than ever in global oil and gas’ (Goldthau and Witte 2010:11), I 
argue that the particular way in which markets function, and in which for 
instance transnational corporate law has developed, are to a large extent 
structured by - and expressions of - state power and agency (see also Sassen 
2000, Brenner 1998, 1999). This is a fundamentally different understanding 
from authors such as Goldthau and Witte, who assume a neutral or natural 
development of markets and ascribe market mechanisms an inherent efficiency. 
When referring to the (inter)state dimension, the purpose is not to 
provide a narrow geopolitical lens on the energy market’s complexity (cf. the 
criticism on state-centric approaches levelled by Goldthau and Witte 2010). 
Rather, it is to offer a geopolitical perspective that acknowledges how the global 
energy market – in its complexity and interdependency – is underpinned by an 
inherent geopolitical structure in which state power ‘matters more than ever’ 
(cf. quote above by Goldthau and Witte 2010:11) despite the increasingly 
globalized and interconnected character of the global oil and gas sector. 
Moreover, the perspective on the state that I adopt in this study is not to see it as 
a black box, but rather as made up of social relations that stretch beyond the 
state apparatus, i.e. ‘state-society complexes’ (Cox 1981). Subsequently, state 
power is seen as an expression of particular forces, interests, and ideas that have 
become dominant within particular governments and/or state forms (see also 
Jessop 1991, Van Apeldoorn and De Graaff 2012). The particular configuration 
of these social relations, and the world view and interests that are dominant 
within these configurations, consequently hold implications for the role that the 
state plays in capital accumulation.68 In this respect, there is a fundamental 
difference between Western state-society complexes and the state-society 
complex of, for instance, China and other more ‘statist’, authoritarian regimes 
(see Van der Pijl 2012, 2007, also Schmalz and Ebenau 2012), as will be 
illustrated below. In the latter, the organisation and coordination of capital 
accumulation is still primarily a function of the state and its leading elites. 
Although the state is also crucial to the organisation of capital accumulation in 
Western state-society models, as well as being key to the globalizing of capital 
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(as elaborated in Chapter Two), this organisation occurs under what van der Pijl 
has called the ‘sovereignty of capital’ (2007:619).  
Indeed, relating to the above, a key aspect of global governance pertains 
to the question: governance by whom and for whom? Most definitions of global 
governance build on liberal and pluralistic assumptions of common goals and 
interests in an interdependent world, to be overcome through cooperation and 
coordination. Young, for instance, defines governance as the ‘establishment and 
operation of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or more generally 
alleviating collective-action problems in a world of interdependent actors’ 
(1994:53). And the Commission on Global Governance defined global 
governance as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public 
and private, manage their common affairs’ (1995:2). However, these definitions 
mask the underlying dimension of power (see Barnett and Duvall 2005b:6). 
A critical perspective, instead, directs our focus to those in charge of 
(global) governance and challenges pluralistic approaches based on egalitarian 
assumptions by pointing to the highly unequal distribution of power (both 
material and immaterial), capabilities, and opportunities that characterises the 
‘world of interdependent actors’ (see quote by Young above). From this 
perspective, today’s dominant practices of global governance, are first and 
foremost a means for particular actors or collectives to impose a set of rules 
from which they themselves greatly benefit,  or that expresses their ideas and 
interests, at the expense of less powerful groups in (global) society (e.g. 
Overbeek 2010, Rupert 2005, Fuchs 2007, Soederberg 2010). Joseph Stiglitz, 
who, as a former chief economist of the World Bank, can be seen as both a 
descendant and a dissident from the corporate elite, is equally critical in his 
observations of global governance, although from a somewhat different 
perspective. He regards global governance, in particular as practiced by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a form of ‘market fundamentalism’ 
(Stiglitz quoted in Rupert 2005:206) that according to Rupert: ‘authorizes the 
imposition of austerity, privatisation and market liberalisation on scores of 
developing countries facing chronic indebtedness and recurrent balance-of-
payments crises’ (ibid.). Marxist scholars tend to highlight the structural power 
that is inherent in and manifested through global governance, referring to 
fundamentally oppositional forces in society, most basically the relation 
between capital and labour.69 As Overbeek has framed it in a recent 
contribution: ‘global governance is the ensemble of regulatory practices and 
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institutions that has been developed over the past decades to manage the 
conditions for the global mobility and accumulation of capital’ (2010:699).
The analysis provided in this chapter will include power as an important 
dimension of global governance, but with a focus on the two forms of indirect 
power that Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 2005b) distinguish (see also Chapter 
Two). In particular, I will look at the workings of productive power in (global) 
energy governance, that is, the power to define discourse and the limits of what 
is ‘normal’, (im)possible, (im)probable, what counts as a problem, and so forth 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005:55). And at (instances of) institutional power, i.e. 
longstanding frozen institutional relations that indirectly constrain the behaviour 
of particular actors and benefit others (ibid.:52). Without proper attention to 
(these) power dimensions, neither the particular content of governance that has 
become dominant, nor the (resistance to) change in that particular content can 
be fully understood.
The following sections will explore the different domains of energy 
governance as outlined in the introduction. The first of these sections will 
provide a closer inspection of the expansion of non-OECD NOCs, and the 
hybrid energy alliances that are developing in conjunction. The aim here is to 
examine, to what extent this expansion has generated a new ‘statism’ in energy 
governance, i.e. whether we find an intensification of the involvement and 
participation of the state.
A New ‘statism’ in Energy Governance? 
Hybrid Alliances
The main finding presented in Chapter Four, i.e. the increase of cooperation 
between NOCs and IOCs, was generally confirmed by the interviewees. Indeed, 
most of them anticipated more future cooperation between these different types 
of companies. As summarized by Noé van Hulst, until quite recently Secretary 
General of the International Energy Forum (IEF), i.e. the most inclusive and 
representative platform for both IOC and NOC interests: 
I think that we are going to see all kinds of different forms of cooperation, a 
wide colourful range of them, depending on the particular corporate cases 
available. I don’t think that we are going to see one dominant form, but rather 
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more variation…. more hybrid forms of cooperation, you see that happening 
almost daily (author’s own translation).70
Within this plurality of cooperation forms, the focus here will be on two main 
types of NOCs and the new hybrid alliances that they form, resource seeking
NOCs and resource holding NOCs. Resource seeking NOCs increasingly 
become competitors to the IOCs, which forces the IOCs to adjust their 
strategies. In turn, these NOCs, face challenges similar to those of the IOCs, 
particularly with regard to difficulties of access. Indeed, Xiaojie Xu, former 
director overseas investment of CNPC, identifies the problems and uncertainty 
with respect to the investment policies of resource holdings states, such as 
Venezuela, Nigeria, and Russia, as the number one challenge for the NOCs and 
also as one of the major commonalities they have with IOCs.71
In the relation between resource holding NOCs and IOCs, which is a 
more traditional NOC-IOC relation, there is a level of interdependence between 
the resource holders and resource seekers, as has been explained earlier. 
Because NOCs depend on IOCs in terms of technology, technological 
knowhow, project management, and finance, the resource holders need the 
IOCs to develop their subsoil riches. However, as will be illustrated below, 
there are indications that resource holders use these partnerships as a ‘learning’ 
process, and once the NOC has obtained the necessary skills and knowhow, the 
IOC is no longer needed and is side-tracked or expropriated. Moreover, a new 
dimension is emerging that indicates what may be termed a ‘re-statification’ of 
energy governance, This re-intensification of state involvement is manifest in 
the preference, on the part of resource holders, for direct interstate bargaining 
and for the involvement of state-owned entities in joint operations and ventures, 
rather than - or in addition to - private firms. 
With respect to the resource seeking NOC-IOC alliances identified 
here, many interviewees singled out the recent contracts in Iraq as typical of 
such new partnerships. It is indeed quite telling that when the US-led invasion 
of Iraq ‘opened up’ the country’s vast hydrocarbon resources to foreign oil 
companies, the IOCs did not get these contracts – in spite of the fact that that 
was the envisaged scenario prior to the invasion (see on the pre-invasion high 
level negotiations between oil companies and Western governments and the 
post-invasion lobbying and negotiation process e.g. Muttit 2012, Bignell 2011) 
– and moreover,  many of these contracts were actually given to NOC-IOC 
partnerships. This indicates a shift in the balance of forces within the energy 
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order, and signals a new development in which IOCs find themselves not just 
competing with resource seeking NOCs for access to such strategic new energy 
frontiers but increasingly partnering with them. While many commentators in 
the industry initially saw these contracts as a ‘losing bid’ for the IOCs – not 
only because of the involvement of NOCs, but also because the contracts that 
they obtained were service contracts, rather than the preferred Production 
Sharing Agreements (PSAs) - more recent research points to the renegotiations 
and the substantial position that IOCs and American energy service companies 
have managed to obtain within the Iraqi oil industry (see e.g. Muttitt 2012, 
Cafruny and Lehmann 2012). Moreover, it was stressed in the interviews that 
the IOC-NOC partnerships might have advantages for both IOCs and NOCs.72
An example that was mentioned in this respect was the BP-CNPC contract for 
Rumaila, one of the biggest producing fields in Iraq. While BPs bid (initially) 
surprised many competitors.73 it might be a win-win cooperation according to 
Carole Nakhle, energy economist the Surrey Energy Economics Centre. She 
mentioned for instance that it will be extremely expensive for BP to send 
employees to Iraq because of the security situation. Moreover, according to 
Nakhle, with this contract BP not only gained access to Iraq’s resources but it 
also established stronger relationship with a major Chinese player.74 From the 
point of view of CNPC, according to Xiajioe Xu (CNPC), the Rumaila field 
contract in Iraq is a way to share risks and costs, and to give CNPC access to 
technology and technological knowhow (through their cooperation with BP).75
Indeed, acquiring technological skills and knowhow is one of the key 
motivations for NOCs to cooperate with IOCs.
In sum, while the expanding NOCs – in particular resource seeking 
NOCs – pose a competitive challenge to the IOCs, these hybrid alliances are in 
the industry also seen as win-win partnerships in which both IOCs and NOCs 
have something to gain. Moreover, when expanding, the NOCs face similar 
challenges as the IOCs and while they may enjoy certain advantages due to their 
characteristic of state-owned entity (such as direct state backing and subsidies, 
see below), they also encounter particular challenges because they remain tied 
to the home state and face the expectations and responsibilities that come with 
their role as National Oil Company. In the next subsections I will explore these 
aspects to a greater depth. First by looking at the resource seeking NOCs –
focusing on the Chinese NOCs because of their primary role and geopolitical 
significance – and second, by examining the changing strategies of resource 
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holding NOCs and how this impacts upon their relations with, and the 
governance of, IOCs.
The Dual Role of Chinese Resource Seekers
Much has been made of the expansion of the Chinese NOCs, especially into 
West Africa (see e.g. Moyo 2012, Holslag 2006, Zweig and Jianhai 2005, cf. 
Downs 2007a, 2007b). China had been a net-exporter of oil since 1970, but 
turned into an oil net-importer again in 1993. This change was due to the 
substantive growth generated by domestic economic reforms during the 1980s, 
in combination with maturing oil fields, lack of investments in exploration and 
production of oil, as well as mounting debts, which accumulated in the 
implementation of the so called ‘Going Global’ strategy (Jiang 2012:385-
387).76
The common portrayal of the Chinese expansion abroad is one of a 
mercantilist strategy plotted by the Chinese state to ‘lock up’ energy supplies 
around the world for the sole purpose of supplying Chinese consumers. The 
state backing of Chinese oil majors in terms of financial support such as low-
interest loans for the host country is asserted to amount to unfair competition for 
the IOCs. This is added on to the fact that NOCs are able to settle for lower 
rates of return than IOCs, because they have access to subsidised capital and do 
not pay dividends to their primary shareholder (i.e. the Chinese government). 
Lastly, it has been the assumption that the oil supplies obtained by Chinese 
NOCs are being shipped back to China, thereby reducing global supplies and 
hence driving up the oil price.
However, this portrayal of China’s motives for Going Global and the 
attributed negative effects of this process, need to be put into context, as was 
repeatedly made clear by interviewees for this thesis and has also been 
established in several recent studies (e.g. Downs 2007a, 2007b, 2008, Jiang 
2012). In general, it should be noted that the Going Global strategy contains 
contradictory elements and has both corporate and geopolitical dimensions. 
Whereas the strategy initially was a state driven and state sponsored initiative, 
the Chinese NOCs in fact have gained increased autonomy vis-a-vis the Chinese 
government through their expansion abroad, and as a result now try to balance 
their corporate interests with the geopolitical motives of the state. By framing 
the expansion of Chinese NOCs as a uni-dimensional, state-driven, mercantilist 
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strategy, these interpretations miss out on crucial external and internal 
dynamics that interplay with this strategy and its objectives.
With respect to the external dynamics several aspects need to be taken 
into consideration: a) how forces and dynamics of the global oil market 
interplay with the Chinese strategy and objectives, b) which obstacles and 
interests the Chinese face in the host country, and c) the way in which US 
geopolitical and military power is underpinning, and to an extent controlling, 
the workings of the global oil market, which brings us back to point a. To start 
with this first point, contrary to beliefs, Chinese investments and acquisitions 
abroad are not so much aimed at shipping back oil exclusively to China. In 
effect, only about 10-15 percent of the oil produced by Chinese NOCs abroad is 
being shipped directly back to China, while the rest is sold on the global oil 
market (see e.g. Downs 2007a, also Goldthau and Witte 2010: 11). If the 
strategy aims to secure supply, this is thus primarily done through increased 
participation in the global oil market. Whereas selling the equity oil abroad, 
instead of shipping it back to China, is beneficial for the Chinese state, since it 
will increase the revenues of their NOCs, it simultaneously functions as an 
incentive for the corporation to make profits and try to evade government 
control.77 It should also be noted here that much of the fossil fuel that is burned 
within China is not so much for domestic use (i.e. Chinese consumers), but for 
the production of commodities for Western consumer markets. In this sense, 
even if securing oil supplies serves Chinese economic and political interests (i.e. 
by sustaining their export-oriented growth model), it in many respects rather 
benefits Western consumers than Chinese consumers.
With regard to obstacles and conflicting interest encountered in host 
countries (point b), it was pointed out repeatedly by interviewees that, in terms 
of an acquisition strategy, the Chinese NOCs still only hold a relatively small 
share in upstream production in for instance West Africa78 (see also Downs 
2007a, 2007b). Furthermore, they are mostly buying up assets that the IOCs are 
not interested in, and they face similar constraints as IOCs regarding tough 
terms and conditions imposed by resource holders, as well as the possible 
outbreak of violent conflict and war (which for instance happened in Sudan). 
Even if they indeed have a bigger chance of gaining access or better terms 
because of state-backed financial aid - for instance, the $ 2 billion loan of the 
Chinese Export Import Bank to Angola most likely facilitated the 
entrance/enlarged footprint of Chinese NOCs in Angola (see Downs 2007a: 53) 
- many interviewees raised doubts as to whether the Chinese would ultimately 
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receive preferential treatment by the host country, once the contracts were 
signed.79
The third point (point c), which was highlighted several times during 
the interviews, is that, even if the Chinese would receive preferential treatment, 
in the event of a major physical disruption crisis they could not ship the oil 
without implicit consent of the US, given the latter’s maritime dominance.80
Over 80 percent of China’s energy import passes through the Malacca Straits 
and waters patrolled by US and South-East Asian navy vessels (Shell 2011:33). 
Contrary to liberal institutionalist and hyper-globalist claims that the 
geopolitical dimension is of less importance because of the existence of a global 
oil market, the fungibility of oil, and spot prices, the examples provided above 
underscore how the global oil market is in fact underpinned by a military and 
security infrastructure built upon the geopolitical power of the US state. The 
geopolitical dimension of (in this case) American power does matter – in spite 
of, or perhaps even because of, the existence of a global market. Since, at the 
end of the day, the US can actually prevent the Chinese to ship their oil, i.e. 
obstruct the workings of the global oil market. China, with its growing global 
economic clout, and well aware of this situation, is significantly building up its 
naval power and taking measures to challenge the maritime dominance of the 
US, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. Rising Sino-Japanse tensions over the 
Senkaku/Diayou island group in the East China Sea, the launch of China’s first 
aircraft carrier in November 2012, the expansion of its fleet and amphibious 
warfare ships, and the building of a military garrison on the Paracel islands in 
the South China Sea, are some examples that testify to the growing 
assertiveness and ambitions of China as a military and naval power.
In this regard, China’s corporate expansion abroad also entails the
enlargement of China’s global foot print and may be interpreted as a broader 
geopolitical strategy of the Chinese state, not for the mercantilist sake of energy 
supply security, but as a response to US dominance. As Joe Barnes expert on 
geopolitics and energy security at the James Baker Institute, Rice University 
emphasised:
Here you are in China, US is head of NATO, US is the chairman of the board 
of the World bank, we have those security organizations in South East Asia, 
we have treaties with Japan and South Korea. Everywhere you look, all over 
the globe, the US is embedded in this thick web of alliances and treaties and 
agreements. China has nothing, except for the UN and the WTO, so it is 
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looking for ways to, even at the margins, to expand its international footprint 
because it is loath to do so in institutions where the US is already dominant.81
In addition to the external dynamics described above, there is also a range of 
crucial internal dynamics that interplay with the Chinese NOCs resource 
seeking strategies. As previously mentioned, while the initial impulse for 
foreign expansion was generated by a need for energy supplies and by the 
perception that an expansion of the NOCs would be an effective way to attain 
that goal, it is as much - and increasingly so - driven by corporate interests and 
incentives (Jiang 2012, Downs 2007a, 2007b). In fact, it is the latter that have, 
according to Jiang, been the main reason why the expansion abroad has 
continued and grown (2012:404). Moreover, he adds: ‘it is now CNPC business 
decisions that are the dominant explanation for the push overseas’ (ibid.).
Indeed, a range of different reasons for Going Global were brought to 
the fore by the various Chinese energy experts and CNPC consultants 
interviewed for this research, which were all rather indications of commercial 
drivers than political ones:82 the incentive to sell oil abroad at higher prices 
given price controls within China, the objective to invest in assets abroad in 
order to avoid taxation (round tripping) or to evade government control, or 
because of the anticipated increase in power of financial markets and the 
awareness that investors will not invest in assets that are tied to regulation from 
government, especially Chinese assets (i.e. an indication of growing 
financialisation of energy governance), the desire to have access to company 
controlled equity, and the objective to become an internationally operating 
national champion. 
In fact, some commentators argue that oil executives pay lip service to 
what is in effect seen as a flawed assumption (i.e. that energy supply security 
can be obtained through Chinese companies acquisitions abroad, see above), 
because these company directors want support for their foreign investments, 
based on corporate interests in reserve replacement and profit, while at the same 
time wanting to demonstrate that they value the interests of the party-state 
(Downs 2008:128).83 The latter reason points to the complex, entangled, and 
contradictory relation between the Chinese NOCs and the state, and the way in 
which the Chinese ‘oil elites’ form a nexus in this regard. As Professor Weihan 
Wang (academic expert and consultant Chinese oil companies) explained, 
climbing the ladder to the top managerial level of CNPC is seen as a stepping 
stone to gaining access to higher echelons of the Communist Party – the Central 
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Committee.84 And, as also argued by Jiang (2012: 416): ‘CNPC leadership is a 
governmental position first and foremost’.
Downs identifies several ways in which the state controls the NOCs. 
First and primarily there is what she refers to as the ‘nomenklatura system’, i.e. 
a hierarchical system of appointing personnel. Although formally top managers
are appointed by the board of directors, the authority regarding top positions de 
facto lies with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Organization Department, 
whose decisions require ratification by the Politburo Standing Committee 
(Downs 2008:123). Subsequently, NOC managers must learn to balance 
corporate and party-state interests if they want to advance their political careers, 
because their evaluation by the CCP is based not only on general performance 
but also on their commitment to party-state interests (ibid.: 123-124). While the 
formal corporate governance of the Chinese NOCs according to Jiang 
(2012:396) ‘mimics the best practices of the West’ - referring for instance to the 
annual corporate responsibility report -, the performance criteria by which 
managers are evaluated do not include traditional metrics of stock price, 
shareholder returns, or economic value added, but rather more subjective 
measures such as ‘improving ideological and political work, enhancing Party 
conduct and anti-corruption campaign’ [...], ‘eliminating factors that cause 
instability’, and ‘preventing occurrence of mass commotion’ (Jiang 2012:397, 
see Downs 2008 for some concrete examples of how this plays out).85
On the other hand, Downs describes how increasingly, NOCs top 
managers/executives are being recruited to the CCP top (such as the Sixteenth 
Central Committee) because of their credentials as leaders of globally 
competitive (partly listed) firms and presents anecdotal evidence to underpin his 
description. According to her these globally operating managers are considered 
well suited to a top position in the CCP both because of China’s emerging 
dominant role in the global political economy and because of the centrality of 
energy to China’s continued growth (Downs 2008: 131-137). Hence she sees 
the emergence of what she calls a ‘new petroleum faction’. Apart from their 
credentials as leading corporate elites, a distinguishing characteristic of this new 
‘faction’ is that they share fewer experiences (such as educational background) 
and therefore do not form a coherent group promoting a common worldview 
and related policy prescriptions (ibid.:135-6).
However, although ‘central government oversees most major decisions 
such as allocation of capital and strategic choices for oil and gas exploration’ 
(Jiang 2012:382),86 as well as the appointment and removal of top managers, it 
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seems that ‘government is partly loosening its grip’ (ibid.). Downs identifies 
several ways along which the NOCs are becoming increasingly autonomous and 
also more influential vis-a-vis politics (2008:129): Firstly, because of their 
growing profits and thus their financial contribution to governance (about 16 
percent of all corporate taxes in China in 2005 come from NOCs). Secondly, 
because their listed subsidiaries, such as PetroChina, open up governance to 
influences from actors other than the party-state: apart from stock exchanges 
and investors (see later), also for instance the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), international auditing and engineering firms, and 
independent shareholders. Thirdly, the overseas expansion tends to limit the
control of the state, which, in combination with a weakening of the energy 
bureaucracy, provides the companies with a window of opportunity to increase 
their influence, as was confirmed by the interviews conducted for this study.
The ‘two faces’ of the Chinese oil elites, as described above, are 
mirrored in descriptions of the double role played by Chinese NOCs. As Shan 
Weiguo, CNPC Director Petroleum Market Study, explains, these Chinese 
NOCs work as an IOC abroad but are NOCs domestically: ‘....As a NOC,
CNPC must bear responsibility for the nation's social development and energy 
security. As an IOC, CNPC is doing business in over 40 countries, and must be 
responsible for all shareholders in the JVs with host NOCs, catering the needs 
of host governments, using more local employees.’87 Xiaojie Xu, former 
director of CNPCs overseas investments, similarly stresses this:
...they [CNPC] are really a national oil company at home, but not a national oil 
company abroad... Internationally they are run like an independent oil 
company...they have to make this distinction, at home and abroad.88
This observation of the dual character of expanding Chinese NOCs warrants a 
study of its own. Moreover, it needs to be investigated to what extent this also 
applies to other resource seeking NOCs. However, for the analysis in this 
chapter, this observation holds two important implications.  First, it implies that 
even if parts of the Chinese NOCs become increasingly IOC-like, and also 
increasingly adapt to Western-style governance and rules of the game, the 
NOCs in fact remain firmly tied to a very different form of governance, with a 
set of priorities and interests that are tightly knit to the state, and which is 
reinforced by Chinese oil elites that want to make a political career and 
therefore keep up the balancing act between their ‘two faces’. Second, and 
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following from the first implication, this dual character is an indicator of 
hybridisation, because it means that with the expansion abroad, Chinese NOCs 
are essentially combining private and ‘statist’ governance in one entity.
This duality of the Chinese resource seeking NOCs strategies contrasts 
two contradictory and reductionist misperceptions: 1) that the rise of the NOCs 
is an indicator of a singular trend towards state capitalism, and 2) that 
transnationalisation of the global energy order simply erodes state power. 
Taking the case of Chinese NOCs - which are commonly perceived as strongly 
state-directed - as a point of departure, this analysis has shown that the 
expansion of resource seeking NOCs is a more complex phenomenon, and in 
effect comprises the contradictory dynamics of transnationalisation on the one 
hand, and a resilient role of the state on the other, in a hybrid duality. The next 
subsection turns to resource holding NOCs, assessing the extent to which their 
changing strategies and preferences influence the partnerships with IOCs and 
addressing the question whether this is instigating a turn towards ‘statism’ in 
energy governance.
Resource holding NOCs and their New Partnerships – a turn toward ‘statism’?
Several interviewees highlighted how the cooperation between NOCs and IOCs, 
on the one hand, is a necessity for IOCs in order to gain access to reserves, and 
on the other hand, is a means for NOCs to acquire the necessary skills and 
knowledge to eventually take over the role of IOCs. An example was provided 
by David Woodward, who observed how during his time as President of BP 
Azerbaijan, SOCAR (the state-owned oil company of Azerbaijan) initially 
played a quite limited role in the operation of the BP-partnered projects. Yet, 
towards the end of his time there, it was not only very clear that SOCAR was 
seeking to take the lead, but that to a significant extent it had acquired the 
capability to do so by closely observing BP as it had undertaken the major oil 
and gas developments in teh country over the previous 10 to 15 years.89
Another example of a project, initially partnered with an IOC, that 
according to Woodward signified the ambition of resource holding NOCs to 
acquire the capabilities of the IOCs and ultimately become sole or main 
operators (with preferential access to the domestic resource) regarded the so 
called ‘N-block’ in Kazakhstan. The N-block is a large offshore prospect 
considered highly prospective for both oil and gas. The Joint Operation 
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Company (JOC) operating the field was at the time of the interview composed 
of Kazmunay Gaz (KMG, a state-owned oil company of Kazakhstan), 
ConocoPhillips (an American IOC) and Mubadala (an Abu-Dhabi state-owned 
investment company). But, as Woodward – who between 2008 and 2009 was 
Chief Operating Officer of Mubadala’s Oil and Gas Division - recounted:
[T]here is a clear timeframe for the nationalisation of the JOC over a period of 
years, such that ultimately it is purely staffed by KMG [Kazmunay Gaz] 
personnel. It is their intention that they will become the operator of the field 
having acquired the capability to do so [italics added]. 90
In fact, recent events seem to underpin this claim, as ConocoPhillips has just 
recently (in February 2013) had its 24.5 percent stake in the JOC acquired by 
Kazmunaygaz.
Postma, former Energy Envoy of the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, provided a similar example concerning Kazmunaygaz. In this case, he 
referred to the international consortium (IOC-NOC partnership) that operates 
the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan, which is a joint venture of Shell, ENI (Italian 
hybrid oil company), ExxonMobil, Total, ConocoPhillips, and Inpex (Japanese). 
Shell was the operator in the particular phase of the project at that point in time, 
which in the words of Postma: 
...implies a complex operation, they have to send hundreds of personnel 
there...But in the contract it states that in about 20 years Kazmunaygaz will be 
the operator and not Shell. So Kazmunaygaz has built in a learning process, 
Shell will have to educate all these people, there are terms in the contract about 
local contact, training, capacity building, etcetera and from the point of view of 
Kazakhstan this will eventually enable them to do it themselves (author’s 
translation).91
From this perspective, the NOC-IOC partnerships are thus not necessarily a sign 
of the NOCs integration into the Western energy order, but rather of their long-
term aim to take control of the operations.92
These examples point towards a potentially significant transformation. 
Within a longer timeframe, it could imply that the resource holding NOCs will 
no longer depend upon IOCs. As summarized by David Woodward, former 
President BP Azerbaijan: 
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For all the reasons that you describe I think that many NOCs are now at a place 
where they believe they can take on a role previously played by the IOCs, and 
their host governments are expecting them to play that role, certainly when it 
comes to the development of domestic resources. 93
Yet, as pointed out in the examples above, meanwhile – i.e. during this process 
– the NOCs are learning, or rather being socialised. That is, they are acquiring 
skills and capabilities (formal and informal rules) that are essentially set by the 
IOCs and the Western oil industry. This is first of all an indication of the 
productive power of the latter two, and also has the implication that the NOCs 
might internalize some of these rules (and underlying ideas or worldview). 
Should they become rule makers themselves - which the examples above 
suggest might be the case within a longer time frame - then the outcome can be 
expected to partly reflect these internalized rules of the game. In other worlds, 
while the examples presented here point to an intensification of state 
involvement, the outcome is suggested to be a more hybrid form of governance, 
rather than a complete rejection of the current rules of the game.
Another way in which a form of ‘statism’ in energy governance is 
becoming manifest is the preference of resource holders for state-to-state deals, 
or what Steve Mann, Senior Counselor for International Affairs at ExxonMobil, 
framed as, ‘state-to-state confidence’.94 This basically refers to the experience 
that in resource holder countries, where the state traditionally has a strong 
directing role in energy production and trade, the government wants to be 
assured of firm state-backing when important contracts are being closed, and 
therefore - at times - will prefer the involvement of state-owned entities over 
private firms.  An illustrative case of state-to-state confidence was described to 
me from different perspectives by several interviewees, and pertained to how 
the negotiations regarding the N Block in Kazakhstan had evolved. Over a 
period of six years several parties had been negotiating with the Kazakh 
government regarding this major off-shore field. The key competing foreign 
parties were Shell and Conoco-Phillips. As former Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ben Bot recounted:
I negotiated with the president of Kazakhstan for that oilfield [N block] on 
behalf of Shell and I had the deal on paper, I had spent two days negotiating 
his deal, and a year later Shell tells me that it has been withdrawn and given to 
the US, while he [the president of Kazakhstan] had assured me that this would 
172
not happen. Well, what I mean to say is that we have to start taking this kind of 
situations into account (author’s translation).95
David Woodward, at the time Chief Operating Officer of Mubadala’s Oil and 
Gas Division, a AbuDhabi state-owned investment company, took part in these 
negotiations on Mubadala’s behalf. According to Woodward, the primary 
reason for this move on the part of the Kazakh government was their preference 
for state-to-state deals. His version of the story was as follows:
Mubadala together with Conoco Phillips last year successfully negotiated a 
contract for the exploration and development of a block in the North Caspian 
called the N-block... Over a considerable period of time a number of 
international companies,  had endeavored to gain access to the block without 
success. It was only when ConocoPhillips partnered with Mubadala that an 
agreement was finally concluded.96
According to Woodward this example illustrates the preference of resource 
holding countries like Kazakhstan to deal with a state-owned entity such as 
Mubadala. Even if IOCs receive high-level state backing by their home 
governments – as indicated by the involvement and intensive negotiations by 
the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs described above - apparently this does not 
always offer sufficient confidence for resource holders. To some extent their 
hesitation probably relates to the fact that, when push comes to shove, 
governments in effect have little say over the IOCs. 97
This trend of re-statification of energy relations is impacting upon the relation 
between IOCs and their home states. As illustrated, it is not the case that IOCs 
have no political ties or lack political support. On the contrary, there are ample 
examples of home states providing support to ‘their’ oil companies abroad. In 
some highly strategic cases, such as the N-Block negotiations, political support 
can be quite intense and high level. As another case in point, an anonymous 
source at Shell recounts how the then Dutch prime minister Balkenende had 
been highly involved in for instance the ‘Sakhalin debacle’, where Shell was 
forced to give up its majority share in the production of this major offshore 
oilfield in favour of state-owned Gazprom.98 Indeed, the history of oil (as has 
been sketched in Chapter Three) is strewn with examples of state backing and 
intervention; in particular the post-war geopolitical strategy of the US has been 
closely entwined with the aim to control uninterrupted oil flows (see Stokes and 
Raphael 2010).  Similarly, there is a continuous dialogue on the national level, 
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between Western governments and their IOCs. As Carole Nakhle, economist at 
the Surrey Energy Economics Centre, who has worked for several oil 
companies, tells: 
I am really impressed by the continuous dialogue between the industry and the 
government and I hope that this is not going to change [...] After all these two 
stakeholders need each other.99
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Foreign ministry has seconded a Government 
Relations Advisor to Shell, who was kind enough to participate in this research 
but wished to remain anonymous (see for the longstanding relation between 
Shell and the Dutch Foreign Ministry dating back to the 1920s, e.g. Baudet and 
Fennema 1983). It is probably for similar reasons that Sir Mark Allen, formerly 
employed by the British Foreign Service, is now special advisor at BP. Indeed, 
as has been shown in Chapter Five, there is a persistent revolving door pattern 
amongst IOC board directors and (advisory) state positions (see also Appendix 
D). As indicated by the above, this relation would probably become even more 
robust if government advisors, diplomats, and top intelligence officers would be 
included in such analyses as well.
But in spite of these longstanding relations between the government and 
private major oil companies, it transpired from the interviews that there is 
nonetheless a perceived change in the current role of the state, which is 
markedly different from its role during the 1990s, when deregulation and 
privatisation were the central dictum.  As described by Van Hulst (International 
Energy Forum):
…if you look at the long term scenario’s of Shell today and compare them with 
those 10 years earlier, you can see how the worldview has changed. It has 
certainly been observed and realized that there is an increasingly pronounced 
role for the state and for national authorities, not only in the resource holding 
countries, but also in their [IOCs] countries. Since IOCs are increasingly 
dependent upon cooperation with NOCs, or access through NOCs, they 
increasingly need the state to facilitate this. Because in many resource holding 
countries, traditionally the state has a prominent role and therefore they prefer 
government-government relations. These governments want to be assured that 
an IOC is supported by a national state and that certain issues or problems are 
being addressed. So whether they [IOCs] like it or not, and some…many of 
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them… of course do not like it, they are being drawn into this (author’s own 
translation).100
Indeed, an anonymous interviewee at Shell, who is also involved in the 
development of Shell’s energy scenarios, confirmed this: ‘it is a return of the 
state (often under popular pressure), forcing stronger regulation and 
compliance.’ 101
To sum up, the examples above have shown that the global energy 
market is a more complex and difficult environment with hybrid forms of state 
and market forces. While a decade and a half ago, the expectation was that of a 
more market oriented business environment, we in contrast see a resurgence of 
more ‘statist governance’. This is partly a broader phenomenon (cf. the role of 
the state in the financial crisis), but it is also partly due to the shifting balance of 
forces within the energy order itself, with a growing presence of state-owned 
companies and re-emerging preferences for state-to-state energy relations. For 
IOCs this implies that they will need to take into consideration new strategies. 
In addition to seeking active support from their home states, they need to 
increasingly join forces with other state-owned entities such as SWFs and 
NOCs in order to gain access to resources. In addition, this transformation leads 
to a restructuring of the energy relations on the part of states themselves. In the 
Netherlands for instance, this ‘awakening of the state’ as one of the 
interviewees (Shell, anonymous) called it,102 took place around mid-2000. 
Postma (former Dutch Energy Envoy) explained that once the Dutch 
government was struck by the realisation that security of supply through one 
main IOC (Shell in this case) would no longer hold, their first response was to 
establish formal energy relations with a number of selected countries, originally 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, with the aim to strengthen 
bilateral ties. The intention was to have delegations of top diplomats and state 
executives, e.g. the Minister of Economic Affairs and selected corporate 
representatives (from diverse industries, but always including the energy 
industry), visit these countries and look for exchanges in terms of for instance 
knowledge and trade. These visits would always be linked to the prospect of 
bilateral energy deals, in particular gas. However, this approach did not seem to 
work out as anticipated, because it left government straddling between its own 
objectives and obligations on the one hand, and the corporate interests that they 
could promote and support, but ultimately had little to say about, on the 
other.103
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All in all, this section has illustrated how the expansion of the non-
OECD NOCs is a manifestation of - and to some extent instigates - more 
‘statist’ governance of energy, i.e. a more directing role of the state in capital 
accumulation. Yet, at the same time, it has been shown how the NOC’s 
expansion is generating more hybrid forms of cooperation, and entails a 
persistent marketisation and transnationalisation of the global energy relations, 
which reinforces the rules of the game that prioritize corporate interests and 
profit making. This contradiction is perhaps most vividly expressed through the 
double roles played by the expanding Chinese NOCs and their managers, as 
they increasingly operate as IOCs abroad, while retaining their role as NOCs 
domestically.
With the transnationalisation of the global energy order, new groups of
private actors are becoming increasingly autonomous and influential. They 
significantly impact upon the power balance between the traditional ‘trilateral 
oligopoly’ of consumer states, producer states, and oil companies (Roncaglia 
1985) and contribute to the marketisation and financialisation of energy 
governance. The next section will illustrate this process by focusing, first, on 
the domain of international commercial law. It will show how the global 
projection of the particular form and content of commercial law through the 
agency of corporate lawyers, is both enabling the non-OECD resource holders, 
as well as conditioning them. Secondly, it will focus on the role of financial 
speculation and investors. And last, on the question how the rise of international 
energy service companies impacts upon the relations between the oil companies 
and their governance strategies.
Marketisation and Financialisation of Energy Governance
Globalizing Commercial Law
Although it is often seen as a manifestation of resource holders changing the 
rules of the game, I will in this section show that the expansion of the non-
OECD NOCs and the current wave of resource nationalism are, to a large 
extent, structured by the rules of the game following the commercialising logic 
of Western capitalism.
A key element here is the expansion and globalization of commercial 
law. In terms of rules of the game, the (international) legal domain is crucial 
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when it comes to conflicts regarding production of hydrocarbon resources or the 
distribution of profits and rents between host states and major (oil) TNCs, and 
between oil companies themselves (see below). Energy and resource disputes 
are complex, and include a wide range of actors. Disputes can range from 
involving sovereign states, such as between states regarding territorial rights 
and resource ownership or investor-state arbitrations arising from bi-lateral 
investment treaty protections (such as expropriation of the assets, or rights of
resource companies) to joint venture disputes over e.g. investment, financing, 
accounting, or operational decisions. Disputes may also arise from, for instance, 
service contracts, gas transmission issues, maritime contracts, or charter parties 
and royalty regimes (Quick 2012).
The global projection and increasing influence of commercial and 
corporate law is not confined to the realm of resource conflicts, but involves a 
broader transnationalisation of the legal profession (Cutler 2003, Sell 2003, 
Sassen 2000, Dezelay and Garth 1995). The growth of international commercial 
arbitration in the last two decades demonstrates this trend (see Sassen 2000:381; 
Dezalay and Garth 1995). This development also reveals the contradictory 
dynamics that form the central ‘theme’ of this study, between a 
transnationalising movement on the one hand and the ongoing importance of the 
state and sovereign social spaces (see Chapter Two) on the other hand. 
International commercial arbitration takes conflicts over distributional issues 
(such as, in the case of resource extraction and production, the share of ground 
rent and the appropriation of surplus profit) out of the realm of national 
jurisdiction - and thus out of reach for democratic accountability - and is hence 
evidence of an increasing transnational dimension. In fact, as Sassen (2000) 
notes, it amounts to a private law system. Nonetheless, there is a significant 
national dimension to the transnationalising of commercial law as well. For it is 
not just any lawyer from any country that can participate in this arbitration 
arena, let alone influence and formulate the particular content of ‘international’  
law or arbitration.
In particular, the large English and American law firms have been able 
to impose a specific conception of arbitration, and they have set the standards of 
practice for international commercial law (see Sassen 2000:387). As Sassen 
argues: ‘[t]here is no global law [...] the international emerges as a site for 
regulatory competition among essentially national approaches….”international” 
or “transnational” has become in the most recent period, a form of 
“Americanization”’ (ibid.:382, referring to Dezalay and Garth 1995). A simple 
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indicator hereof is the dominance of American and (to a lesser extent) British 
law firms in the top 100 largest law firms in the world (by revenue): in 2012 
seventy six of these hundred law firms were American, fourteen were British, 
the ten non-Anglo-American firms were: six from Australia and one firm each 
from Canada, France, Spain, and the Netherlands (The American Lawyer 2012). 
These law firms would not have been so defining and influential without the 
preponderant power of the US, pointing towards an underpinning geopolitical 
dimension. Sassen puts it as follows:
These transnational regimes could, in principle, have assumed various forms 
and contents. But they are, in fact, assuming a specific form, one wherein the 
states of the highly developed countries play a strategic geopolitical role. The 
hegemony of neo-liberal concepts of economic relations with its strong 
emphasis on markets, deregulation, and free international trade has influenced 
policy in the 1980s in USA and UK and now increasingly also in continental 
Europe. This has contributed to the formation of transnational legal regimes 
that are centred in Western economic concepts (ibid.:382, emphasis added).
The ‘hegemony of neoliberal concepts’ within transnational legal regimes, that 
Sassen refers to in the above quote, on the one hand refers to the fact that these 
rules are not coercively imposed, but rather adopted out of perceived self 
interest (i.e. an interpretation of hegemony from a critical political economy 
perspective, e.g. Cox 1981, see Chapter Two). It illustrates the productive 
power on the part of the originators of these rules (law), that is, the power to 
define what is normal and desirable. On the other hand, it refers to the primacy 
that is given to the interests of capital(ist) investments. This interpretation can 
be underpinned by the response of one of the lawyers interviewed for this 
research who, on first instance, insisted on the use of the term ‘international 
law’ and objected to it being termed ‘Western law’:
The home of Western law, even if it is based upon international law, you can 
argue, is clearly a derivative of Western concepts over a series of centuries… 
[but] you know…they will not coercively adopt it, they adopt it for a reason 
because they seem to benefit from it... So…to say its Western law…It is so 
charged with political meaning... the genesis of these rules is clearly an OECD 
framework, which is, if you want us to come and invest you have to attract our 
investors, you’ve got to offer certain minimal levels of protection....(emphasis 
added).104
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This quote illuminates both that the genesis of these rules originates in the 
OECD world and that the content is tailored toward a prioritising of investor 
interests.A further indication of the power harboured in international 
commercial arbitration, and the way it is centred around (neo)liberal regimes 
and tied to Western organisations, is the importance the financial sector attaches 
to it. 
An illustration of this is provided by the reaction of the financial 
community to Venezuela’s withdrawal from the World Bank International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. This move directly affected the 
prospects of oil companies to receive financing from banks for the participation 
in the development of Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt (which is estimated to be one 
of the world’s largest un-conventional petroleum reserves, see USGS 2009:1). 
As one commentator put it: ’Without international arbitration of some form you 
won’t get a penny from the banks’ (Mander 2012). Without capital for 
investments private companies cannot participate, which will make it harder for 
Venezuela to obtain the investments and technology it needs to exploit their 
potential oil wealth. The latter is hence in effect made conditional upon 
Venezuela adhering to the rules of commercial arbitration as represented by an 
organisation as the World Bank.
Although these examples point to underlying geopolitical power 
relations in the arena of global politics, I will show below how the globalization 
and normalisation of a rule set that is thus typically Western is also crucially 
driven by the concrete agency of corporate lawyers and law firms (see Dezalay 
and Garth 1995 for a more general analysis of the agency and drivers of lawyers 
in the construction of a transnational legal order). In the social organisation of 
power, as conceptualised in this study, corporate lawyers and consultants have 
been singled out as closely tied to the corporate elites and as often playing a 
facilitating role in advancing the interests of these elites. But, as this section will 
show, corporate lawyers also advance interests that run counter to those of the 
corporate elites. Yet, by doing so, they do reinforce and expand the use of 
Western corporate rules as characterised above.
As the non-OECD players have become better at playing by these 
Western (or OECD) rules of the game, they are increasingly perceived by 
OECD actors as having become much ‘more sophisticated’ over the past 
decades. As remarked by a senior international dispute partner in an 
international Texas-based law firm: ‘if you put the modern concession on your 
desk and the one that was signed in the 1960s they do look alike but the level of 
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sophistication is remarkably different’.105 According to this lawyer this is due to 
states’ increased access to legal technology; i.e. the ‘toolkit’ that states have at 
their disposal has expanded:
...globalization [is] bringing not just the ability to hire Alan or David [the other 
lawyers in the room] but the knowledge that you can hire Alan and David and 
knowing Alan and David. Because now the Iranian national oil company 
[NIOC] has a young woman, very very bright, went to Harvard, has an LLM 
from Harvard, and has been exposed to all this and knows that NIOC can now 
hire Alan and David, whereas previously they would have hired a law 
professor in Tehran who knew nothing about the rough and tumble of 
international dispute...106
Yet, the point is precisely that this ‘toolkit’ basically refers to international 
commercial law, i.e. a rule set that is rooted in (neo)liberal concepts, and that 
this legal technology is not globally manufactured but primarily ‘made in the 
US’. In order to be able to play the game by those rules, you need American 
lawyers or lawyers trained in the US, and not an Iranian law professor. An 
aspect that is often overlooked in this regard is the role that lawyers and law 
firms themselves play in this context. Indeed, the increased ‘sophistication’ on 
the part of the non-OECD resource holders, is to a large extent due to the fact 
that they are better able to play by the rules of the game. While this gives more 
power to the non-OECD players, it however also aptly illustrates the 
‘productive power’ on the part of the lawyers/law firms. The latter have the 
power to create ‘discourse’ as Barnett and Duvall conceptualize it; that is, to 
define ‘the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts 
as a problem’ (2005a:55). And in as far as these rules also become 
institutionalised, they are further reinforced through ‘institutional power’ 
(ibid.:52). The quote below illustrates the role of corporate lawyers in this 
respect:
Governments now have become much smarter because they’ve been able to 
hire good advisors and because there is a record in international law as to how 
nationalization may be accomplished with reduced exposure to claims under 
bilateral investment treaties. So governments are now more sophisticated this 
time around, because there are so many advisors and lawyers among them to 
tell them how they can best get away with nationalizing foreign investment 
without exposing themselves to arbitration risk.107
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This quote underlines that corporate lawyers (and advisors) have not only been 
instrumental in providing legal technology and thereby expanding and thus 
transnationalising a particular rule set, but at the same time have provided 
governments with the tools to evade these rules. In fact - as pointed out by a 
senior international disputes partner in a top Texas based international law firm 
– they might have accelerated the current trend of resource nationalism.108
Driven by competition, profit motives, and career prospects, corporate lawyers 
try to broaden their clientele thereby bringing resource nationalism to the 
government instead of the other way around. In the words of this particular 
lawyer:
...lawyers are terrific at identifying market trends within legal business and 
trying to capture that wave and riding that wave to earn money [...] so what 
happened is that [...] some law firms that traditionally represent states have
seen what’s happened and have begun going around to governments and 
marketing that expertise saying ‘did you know that you can probably squeeze 
more value out of project X because there are all these things that you can 
do’... 109
What we thus find here is a very particular manifestation of what has been 
labelled ‘resource nationalism’ being marketed to governments by private 
actors from the West (i.e. American corporate lawyers). In the particular cases 
referred to here (which for obvious reasons of privacy could not be named) 
corporate lawyers acted as self-directed catalysts of a trend – resource 
nationalism in this case – that they identified and then marketed further to other 
clients, and while doing so actually accelerated this trend. This presents quite a 
different picture of the motives and drivers behind current resource nationalism, 
from how they are portrayed in the existing literature (e.g. Bremmer and 
Johnston 2009, Wälde 2008, Stevens 2008).
In sum, these examples show that in the realm of energy disputes the 
rules of the game - defined within an OECD framework with corporate and 
investor interests at its core, i.e. primarily aimed at the facilitation of global 
capital expansion - are being played with increased ‘sophistication’ by a wide 
range of state actors, both within and outside the OECD, with the aid of a 
globalised legal profession predominantly stemming from the Anglo-American 
corporate law culture, and driven by a heterogeneous mix of private and 
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national statist interests and actors. It also shows how these private actors, while 
on the one hand closely affiliated with Western corporate elites, also operate 
autonomously and - following a corporate logic themselves – at times 
counteract the interests of these elites. Yet, while this empowers non-OECD 
NOCs and resource holding states at the expense of IOCs, this process is 
conditional upon knowledge of, or access to, governance that has its origins 
within the OECD.
The role of Speculators and Service Companies
A similar ‘accelerating effect’ as described by the international dispute lawyers 
above, is caused by speculation and (futures) trading on the price of oil, as part 
of the ongoing financialisation of the global oil (futures) market. Although still 
contested, there is a growing consensus on the fact that speculation increases 
volatility in price (e.g Mabro 2000, 2005; Labban 2010; Gilbert 2010; Masters 
2008). More recently, triggered in particular by a congressional hearing of a 
former hedge fund manager (Masters 2008) and warnings by for instance 
George Soros (see Gilbert 2010), several studies have highlighted the crucial 
role of institutional investors (such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds)110
and commodity index trading (a ‘passive’ investment strategy of distributing a 
particular allocation of dollars across the 25 key commodities futures according 
to the popular indices)111 on the price of oil and the estimated sources of 
demand (e.g. Stoll and Whaley 2009, Gilbert 2010). As described in Chapter 
Three, the oil futures market developed out of the spot market for oil trading, 
but has become more and more important, to the extent that it now more or less 
determines the price on the spot market (e.g. Fattouh 2007). From the early 
2000s the oil futures market became attractive to institutional investors because 
its returns are unrelated to returns on traditional assets, stocks, and bonds and 
thus ‘provide a significant opportunity to reduce the risk of traditional 
investment portfolios’ (Stoll and Whaley 2009:1).
Michael Masters, who is himself a former commodity investor, in his 
testimony to Congress argues and puts forward evidence that these, what he 
calls ‘Index Speculators’, initially constituted only a tiny fraction in the 
commodities futures market, but have now become the single largest force, with 
assets allocated to commodity index trading strategies rising from $13 billion at 
the end of 2003 to $260 billion as of March 2008 (Masters 2008).112
182
Correspondingly, he argues that the increase in demand of for instance oil - and 
the correlating price rise - does not only, or even primarily, come from 
increased demand from for instance China, but from the Index Speculators that 
have been stockpiling (via the futures market) an equivalent of 1.1 billion 
barrels of petroleum (i.e. eight times as much as the US has added to its 
Strategic Petroleum Reserves) over a period of five years (ibid.).  Moreover, 
according to Masters, there is an incentive for Index Speculators to engage in 
‘virtual hoarding’ via the commodities futures market, i.e. to buy more as prices 
rise and to never sell: ‘Institutional investors are buying up essential items that 
exist in limited quantities for the sole purpose of reaping speculative profits’ 
(Masters 2008, pages not numbered). While the issue is highly contested, there 
is some consensus on the fact that these actors, although perhaps not causing 
high oil prices, are certainly acting as accelerants to the price of oil futures 
(Gilbert 2010). This subsequently leads to a price rise of real commodities (such 
as oil), that in might instigate for instance resource nationalism, but also - as
Masters forcefully argues - implies a huge cost for society (i.e. ‘ordinary 
consumers’) in terms of inflation and economic instability (see Masters 2008).
The above is particularly important to establish because of the centrality 
that is assigned to oil price, and the assumption that the oil price is determined 
by forces of demand and supply in the realm of production, i.e. that there is a 
tight market because of increased demand due to growth patterns in rising non-
OECD countries. The line of explanation given here, however, indicates instead 
that the price of oil is to a large extent influenced by forces and dynamics in the 
realm of finance. It also points to a completely different arena of actors and 
agency. The price of oil is crucial in the relationship and power distribution 
between IOCs and NOCs, producers and consumers, resource holders and 
resource seekers, yet the dynamics outlined above entirely evade their control 
and power. Moreover, this type of speculative activity remains as of yet entirely 
unregulated, highlighting a potentially crucial role for the state, which it 
however does not (yet) act upon (see Masters 2008). The lack of government
intervention in this regard illuminates how the agency of states and the decision 
whether or not to intervene in markets are also matters of political choices and 
preferences.
As a final example of a ‘new’ type of transnational private actors that 
have become increasingly influential in the global energy order and who impact 
upon relations and governance of IOCs and NOCs, I will now discuss the role 
of international energy (oilfield) service companies (abbreviated as ESCOs). 
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The growth of these ESCOs was to a large extent facilitated by the 
organisational restructuring in the upstream part of the oil production chain that 
took place in the era of low oil prices and neoliberal restructuring (1980s-90s, 
see Chapter Three). In order to become more ‘efficient’ and increase returns for 
shareholders, many IOCs started to outsource crucial exploration functions to 
oil service providers, resulting in a dramatic growth of the oil service market, 
with players as Schlumberger (more than $39.5bn in revenue in 2012, with
operations in about 85 countries and around 113.000 employees), Halliburton 
(nearly $25bn revenue in 2012, 68.000 employees in approximately 80 
countries outside the US), and Baker Hughes (almost $20bn revenues in 2012, 
57.700 employees and operating in 80 countries) assuming increasingly 
dominant roles and gradually extending their global reach.113
Quite telling in this respect is the role and position of Schlumberger in 
Saudi Arabia, the world’s second largest oil producer, as Tony Meggs (until 
2008 Group Vice President Technology at BP) who shared a board position 
with a Schlumberger director at the King Fahd University of Petroleum and 
Minerals in Riyadh, highlighted:
If you look in Saudi Arabia for example, you know, the only people in Saudi 
Arabia who were allowed to even have any knowledge of, or access to, the 
state secret, which is the subsurface, is Schlumberger. And Schlumberger drills 
a substantial proportion of the wells and provides services on probably every 
single well drilled in Saudi Arabia....Probably, Saudi Aramco is …. its biggest 
customer. 114
Paradoxically these, primarily American, firms are now contributing to the 
further emancipation of non-OECD NOCs since they can provide services and 
technological knowhow for which the NOCs previously depended upon the 
IOCs. Most interviewees indeed identified major energy service companies, 
such as Schlumberger and Halliburton, as having an impact upon the balance of 
forces between IOCs and NOCs. Meggs (former BP) expressed the general 
sentiment within the industry as follows: 
....this is a big issue inside an IOC – certainly, in terms of the topic of 
conversation and a narrative...the role of service companies... Whereas 
previously NOCs would have turned to a BP or an Exxon, or something like 
that, now I think that there is a sense that they feel that they can turn to a 
service provider, because actually in the view of some NOCs, we - the IOCs -
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are really rather hollow, because actually we got a lot of expertise and our real 
actual stuff done by service providers, so ... I would say that that is a big trend. 
If you look at Schlumberger and what Schlumberger does in Mexico, in Saudi 
Arabia, in many parts of the world they are providing an increasingly 
sophisticated set of services that does enable NOCs to basically say we ‘don’t 
need you guys’.115
One of the lawyers interviewed for this study compared the provision of legal 
technology to the technology provided by energy service companies and which 
now has become increasingly available to NOCs and host states. As this 
international disputes counselor of a major Houston based law firm framed it:
...it is kind of funny, if you think about the legal technology and the financial 
technology. As major well-and field- service companies are to NOCs, these 
energy service companies are bringing high technology and a level of 
technological capability to NOCs that might otherwise not have it... In some 
sense the legal technology has been outsourced to legal firms that work equally 
for both sides so in an odd sense it’s a triumph of technocracy, but it is also 
equally available to all. It falls equally on all, so it’s a commercial proposition. 
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Although it is questionable to what extent it is ‘equally available to all’, the 
increasingly influential role of energy service companies indeed underlines how 
the relations within, and governance of, the global energy order are marked by a 
deepening of commercialisation and marketisation in spite of the resurgence of 
‘statist’ governance. It can be interpreted as ‘a triumph of technocracy’ but that 
does also imply a ‘triumph’ of Western capitalist rules. While on the one hand, 
energy service companies make NOCs less dependent upon IOCs for their 
operations abroad and at home, and thus contribute to the ‘emancipation’ of 
NOCs, their involvement does on the other hand imply that NOCs increasingly 
incorporate commercialised relations and rules. It should also be noted that 
although the growth of energy service companies may imply a loss of power 
and influence for IOCs vis-à-vis the NOCs, these energy service companies are 
mainly of US origin and thus in this sense still make the non-OECD NOCs 
reliant on knowledge, technology, and services coming from the West.
To sum up, this section has illustrated how globalizing commercial law, 
as well as energy service companies, empower the non-OECD players, but that 
the rules are still dominantly defined by Western players, organisations, and 
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interests (e.g. Anglo-American law firms, American service companies). Apart 
from the factors mentioned above – i.e. access to service and legal technology –
the non-OECD NOCs, as we have seen, are also increasingly subject to 
imperatives from financial markets and investors, as well as requirements of 
transparency, e.g. the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and 
of ‘good governance’ (see Arnott 2004, Lahn et al. 2007, Benner et al. 2010). In 
terms of governance, all of this signifies the primacy of the logic of capital 
accumulation, which is further reinforced by the financialisation of the oil 
market. The latter has introduced a new type of players and dynamics that 
impact heavily on IOCs, NOCs, states, and citizens interests, yet entirely evade 
their control and power. It also demonstrates how these kinds of ‘behind the 
scene’ actors (consultants, service companies, commodity investors) become a 
relatively autonomous, driving force in the global expansion of capital that 
contributes to a further deepening of the contradictions, in this case the impact 
upon the governance of energy. Moreover, it exhibits how the theoretical 
dialectic of a deepening and widening transnational dimension and of a resilient 
state dimension plays out in transnational conflicts regarding hydrocarbon 
resources, between resource holders and energy TNCs.
The following section of this chapter shifts attention towards the global 
rules of the game, by examining the institutional landscape of so called global 
energy governance. 
Global Rules of the Game – the Institutional Landscape
In spite of the fact that even the most dominant and influential Western 
international governance body for energy, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), recognises that rising economies from the global South will be decisive 
for the future shape of the global energy future (as illuminated by the quote at 
the beginning of this chapter), the current global institutional landscape (as well 
as the IEA’s present organisation) does not reflect this changing reality. 
Emblematic of this state of affairs is the fact that the IEA, supposedly the 
‘watchdog’ for consuming countries, excludes non-OECD members. The latter, 
however, currently are the biggest consumers of primary energy (see Figure 2, 
Chapter Three) and will most probably hold this position for at least a few 
decades ahead. Indeed, as is also established in the growing body of literature 
on the topic of global governance of energy, the existing institutional 
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arrangements still very much reflect the ‘old system’ and do not yet represent 
the new balance of forces (see e.g. Lesage et al. 2010, Dubash and Florini 2011, 
Van de Graaf and Lesage 2009, Knodt et al. 2012). Dubash and Florini, for 
instance, argue that the trend of a resurgence of the role of the state and the 
narrative of energy supply security is not reflected in the existing global 
organisations: ’The dominant narrative of the IEA, for example, backed by 
political declarations by the G8 and G20 is of a liberal market order to govern 
energy’ (2011:14), while China and India according to them have a mercantilist 
approach. Hence: ‘[c]ontinued mixed sentiments over the wisdom and viability 
of mercantile versus market strategies are likely to heighten the challenges of 
future global governance of energy’ (ibid.).
The major existing governance body is the IEA – which is, as already 
mentioned, the Western consumer countries’ watchdog and probably the most 
influential organisation in terms of the production of knowledge and facts about 
the global energy order (the World Energy Outlook). As has been described in
Chapter Three, the IEA developed in 1974, in response to the oil crisis of 1973 
and to the earlier establishment of Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in 1960. The latter is, of course, a governing body 
exclusively for the producing countries. A more recently founded institution is 
the International Energy Forum (IEF), established in 1991 as a forum for 
dialogue and exchange between (conflicting) producer and consumer interests. 
From the 2005 summit in Gleneagles onwards, the G8 (i.e. US, UK, Canada, 
Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia) have entered the new energy 
governance debate and started their initial ‘outreach’ towards the so-called G5 
(i.e. Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa). The UN does, as of yet, 
not have any relevant organisation related to energy issues or governance; and 
while the WTO does not have an exemption for energy trade, it does in practice 
never deal with energy issues either (Lesage et al. 2010:53-68). The Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), a legally binding, multilateral treaty stemming from the 
‘heyday of post-Cold war euphoria’ (ibid.:66) and explicitly designed to 
introduce GATT/WTO standards of international trade into the realm of energy, 
was never ratified or signed by major producers, such as Norway and OPEC 
members, nor by major importers, such as the US and China. Since Russia’s 
withdrawal in 2009 from the ECT it has been considered practically ‘dead’ (see 
for an extensive overview and more in depth analysis of the institutional 
landscape of global energy governance Lesage et al. 2010: 51-72, also Knodt et 
al. 2012).
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I will now discuss the major organisations of influence in global governance of 
energy, focusing on their role in the current energy landscape and assess the 
way each are responding, or not responding, to the changed balance of forces.
The International Energy Agency
While the IEA increasingly expresses the ambition to more actively involve the 
major emerging consumers as well as major non-OECD producers such as 
Russia, membership is still limited to OECD members and as far as 
Ambassador Jones, the Deputy Executive Director of the IEA, could see, there 
would not be a groundswell of support for including e.g. China and Russia as 
actual members unless they had already joined OECD.117 The role and 
membership of the IEA has changed and substantially expanded over time (see 
on both change and continuation Van de Graaf and Lesage 2009, also Colgan 
2009, Florini 2011). Yet, it still fulfils the basic function of binding together the 
interests of its members, i.e. OECD consumers, that formed the basis for its 
establishment (see Chapter Three), with central roles for both the US and Japan.
The IEA’s original aim was to co-ordinate a collective response to 
major disruptions in oil supply through the release of emergency oil stocks onto 
the markets. This is still a key function of the IEA, but it has expanded its role, 
particularly in terms of the diffusion of highly authoritative knowledge on the 
energy sector through research, analysis, statistics, and recommendations. Its 
global aims, according to the mission statement, include promoting energy 
security and economic development: ‘Ensuring the stable supply of energy to 
IEA member countries and promoting free markets to foster economic growth 
and eliminate energy poverty’ (IEA 2012c). The combined promotion of energy 
security and free markets are a clear expression of the neo-liberal values and 
assumptions that underpin the IEA’s ‘global dialogue’. While global 
engagement is a stated aim, this engagement is directed from a US dominated 
platform. Despite repeated calls for a redistribution of the voting shares within 
the IEA Governing Board (Colgan 2009:8; Bamberger 2004:29), the 
distribution is still based on the net oil import levels from 1973 (ibid.). The US 
in 2003 held about twenty six percent of the weighted voting rights, whereas 
Japan, at the second place, held ten percent and most other members held 
between two and (a maximum of) six percent.
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Under these conditions the rising powers are not willing to become full 
members either, see below. Rather, what the IEA tries to do is to exert pressure 
(i.e. use its institutional and productive power) in order for these countries to 
comply with standards and practices that the IEA deems ‘right’. As the IEA 
deputy executive director Richard Jones explains:
...we talk to them, we tell them about our experiences…about the issues and 
how we try to address them, basically.  We do this on technology issues; we do 
it on all sorts of policy issues, we try to demystify and talk about what we 
consider to be best practice and I think it is working. The energy policies of a 
number of emerging economies, including China and Russia, have become 
more market-oriented in recent years (emphasis added).118
While IEA governance is also ‘pretty weak’ with respect to existing members 
(i.e. they can make recommendations and they try to hold members accountable, 
but they cannot enforce compliance or sanction non-compliance) non-members 
need greater engagement to encourage them to move into the ‘right (more 
market-oriented) direction’ according to Jones:
...we really don’t have any power to force them (Member countries) to adopt 
specific policies.  That’s true already now and you can bet it will be even more 
true when China or India become more actively involved, or Russia. Like most 
other countries, these countries only want to be pushed in directions that they 
are already willing to go. But we hope that through greater engagement they 
will become more and more willing to move in what we consider to be the 
right (i.e., market-oriented) directions for our mutual benefit (emphasis 
added).119
These quotes are illustrative of how the informal ‘rules of the game’, i.e. 
practices and norms as established by the West and embodied by an 
organisation as the IEA, are still dominant within the global energy governance 
landscape. In fact, this is a rather exemplary illustration of ‘productive power’ 
on their part, in terms of defining the ‘right direction’ and what is considered 
‘best practice’. These beliefs are primarily informed by the objective to promote 
free markets, economic growth, and liberal democracy. The dominant position 
of the US (and to a lesser extent, Japan) within the IEA, as well as its dominant 
imprint on the content of (global) energy governance and on the criteria 
imposed on consideration of membership, might also explain why the Chinese 
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and other non-members still have hesitations with respect to membership of the 
IEA. Xiaojie Xu, former director of overseas affairs of CNPC, for instance 
wonders whether the IEA will be able to work with a ‘truly’ new system:
...we recognize to continue to work with IEA but we also like to work to build 
on a new one, we want to be part, to be included into a new system. We will try 
to contribute our best to a new global energy system, including all 
stakeholders, all parties involved.120
Surely China, much aware of its growing weight in the global energy order, is 
unlikely willing to be annexed by such a US dominated organisation and instead 
will want to be a an equal partner with more proportionally distributed voting 
rights within a global governance body.
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
As has been elaborated in Chapter Three, OPEC – established in 1960 - was the 
outcome of a longer term build-up of discontent from the world’s major 
producing countries (except for the Soviet Union) with the disproportionate 
power of the IOCs. The initiative came from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, and 
OPEC’s original aim was to bundle the forces of the producing countries 
(resource holders) against unilaterally imposed price conditions by the IOCs. It 
was not until the 1970s, during the large nationalisation wave (see Chapter 
Three), that OPEC engaged in price setting and put to use their so called ‘oil 
weapon’ (see Yergin 1991). Particularly during the ‘Golden Age’ of OPEC 
(1974-1978), when its members provided the majority of the world’s oil 
production and reserves (see Figure 1 and Table 3 in Chapter Three) and when 
‘tight market’ conditions were in place, the organisation wielded considerable 
influence over global oil prices. However, throughout the existence of the 
organisation, OPEC’s power has been considerably weakened by internal power 
struggles, international (political) conflicts, lack of internal discipline, and 
external global market conditions (see also Stevens 2008). Due to these
impediments, some commentators argue that OPEC does not have much 
governing power and that it is rather Saudi Arabia – with its capacity to act as 
the world’s swing producer – that has an influential role in global governance of 
oil and oil prices.121 Yet, irrespective of the question whether it is due to Saudi 
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Arabia in particular, or OPEC in general, most commentators contend that 
OPEC has played a positive role in mitigating price volatility and has at times 
acted as a stabilising governing body in the global oil market (Noreng 2006, 
Fattouh 2007, Lesage et al. 2010). As Sir Mark Allen, special advisor BP, 
commented: ‘lots of people are very critical of OPEC but they have at least got 
some mechanism for moderating unstable pressures on the oil price. And they 
recognize that in all this uncertainty, there are incentives for them about long 
term use for hydrocarbons, so they would not drive up the price too fast’.122
This stabilising role has also been evident in some of the more recent 
‘crises’ on the global oil market, such as the Iraq war in 2003 or the renewed 
and expanded sanctions on Iranian oil in 2012, when OPEC has played an 
important role in keeping supply and demand balanced and at keeping the price 
relatively stable (see Lesage et al. 2010:58). A significant recent development is 
OPEC’s closer cooperation with Russia – the world’s major non-OPEC 
producer - in the aftermath of the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008 
(ibid.). In light of falling oil prices, OPEC and Russia agreed to aim to stabilise 
oil prices around $70-75 per barrel and plans were discussed to bestow a 
permanent special observer status in OPEC on Russia (Westphal 2008, in 
Lesage et al. 2010:58).
The G8+5 and G20
The G8+5 and the G20 are generally seen as potentially representative bodies 
for global energy governance and there is a realisation within these 
organisations that the shift in power towards the global South calls for a more 
inclusive governance of energy. Nonetheless, several studies (e.g. Lesage et al. 
2010; Knodt et al. 2012) have shown that these bodies in effect are trying to 
‘reach out’ to the new powers exclusively on the terms of the West and in the 
language of the West, with the underpinning motives and interests of the West. 
As Lesage et al. conclude on the basis of their in-depth research:
Although attendance of the G5 leaders has become a recurrent pattern since 
2005, the G8 has never officially decided that those five countries are from 
then onwards the privileged partners. Each G8 chair has to make a new 
decision on their invitation. At the summits itself, the G5 can only attend a 
limited part. The policy process remains largely G8- driven, with the G8 
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setting the agenda. As for the temporary Heiligendamm Process…G5 co-
ownership is weakened by the fact that the G8 has defined that agenda and 
clearly puts forward its own priorities, while the OECD and IEA act as the 
secretariats (2010:154).
These priorities of the G8 core powers were for instance reflected in the 
normative direction of the agenda, mentioning ‘protecting innovation’, ‘freedom 
of investment’, ‘enhancing an open investment environment’, and ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ (ibid,: 155). The outreach of the G8 is limited to inviting 
energy ministers from major oil and gas producing countries like Algeria, 
Libya, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia, and of a range of major energy companies, 
such as Shell, Gazprom, CNOOC, EDF and ENI (ibid:156-7). The so called 
‘emerging economies’ subsequently still view the G8+5 as a Western initiative, 
in which they participate hesitantly and cautiously, and in which they repeat 
their well-known standpoints. Vice-versa, the West does not acknowledge its 
ecological debt, or any subsequent financial commitments (ibid.:153).
The only domain where some convergence can be found is on a more 
technocratic level. This convergence implies, however, that the emerging 
economies are, as Lesage et al. document, socialised ‘into the technological and 
administrative approaches of the advanced industrialized countries in this field’ 
(2010: 153). Examples of such technocratic projects are: the energy working 
group of the G8+5, the ‘Heiligendamm Process’, and the IEA’s Networks of 
Expertise in Energy Technology (NEET) initiative.  However, even with these 
initiatives it is clearly the West that takes the lead and it is also clear, according 
to Lesage et al., that the G8 ‘opts to operate from international organizations it 
controls politically’ (2010:174). Apart from the IEA this also includes the 
World Bank. As they explain:
The choice for the IEA and the World Bank meshes with the G8’s traditional 
preference to work with Western-dominated international organizations in 
which the group has a lot of institutional power and combined voting weight. 
The preference for these institutions is reinforced by the – not coincidental –
fact that these organizations are relatively well-equipped. The G8s energy 
actions have broadened the organization’s scope and provided additional 
budgetary means. For the IEA, the G8 is a higher-amplitude loudspeaker for 
getting its messages out and for giving the institution a higher profile 
(ibid.:178).
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Indeed, this situation seems rather exemplary of what Barnett and Duvall frame 
as a manifestation of institutional power: ‘Longstanding institutions represent 
frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future 
choices of actors’ (2005:52).
The International Energy Forum
The International Energy Forum (IEF) - the only inclusive and more 
representative body for both producer and consumer interests - is seen by many 
in the industry as a promising platform. Some even argue it is potentially far 
more important than the IEA, at least with respect to governance of the global 
energy security.123 Yet, its influence and impact are still limited, which might be 
related to its modest budget and should perhaps not come as a surprise given the 
extent of power that some OECD core states have vested in the ‘old’ 
institutional order, as described above.
The role of the IEF, according to its (former) Secretary General Noé 
van Hulst, is to act as a neutral facilitator of a global dialogue between 
consumers and producers, both within and outside the IEA and OPEC. Since 
2009 the IEF has established a NOC-IOC Forum with the aim to learn from 
each other’s ‘best practices’.  Van Hulst, similar to the IEA’s deputy executive 
director, does not belief there will be any global hard rules because the major 
powers – old and new – are not willing to subject themselves to such hard rules. 
Rather it will be what he calls ‘soft rules’: 
Is this world ready for new governance? […] we all want it, and for years we 
have, in particular politicians have, pushed for it, but will we get it? …when I 
listen carefully and watch closely what the Chinese are doing, and the Indians -
and increasingly we are becoming dependent on what they are doing, I mean, 
not what the traditional powers such as the US and the UK are demanding and 
claiming - I am not convinced that these powers want to subject themselves to 
a regime of global governance on this terrain… So we’ll get more soft 
power…not rules that can be enforced by a court, but more peer pressure and 
mediation, more informal, soft, ad-hoc rules rather than hard rules that can be 
enforced by courts with sanctions (author’s translation).124
These ‘soft rules’, or ‘guiding principles’ as Van Hulst calls them, should 
reflect both producers’ and consumers’ interests and should seek to strike a 
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balance between them. This is a rather different view from the one formulated 
by the IEA deputy director, who expressed the ambition to make the non-
members ‘willing to move into what [the IEA] considers to be the right 
directions’ (see quote Jones on p. 173).
However, even if the IEF potentially provides a more equal platform, it is – as 
of yet – rather a discussion forum than a site where global energy governance is 
shaped. Colgan et al. (2012) have interpreted the creation of the IEF as a 
structural change in the ‘energy regime complex’ (i.e. an array of partially 
overlapping and non hierarchical institutions governing energy, Colgan et al. 
2012:118), resulting from dissatisfaction with the unequal representation within 
the global energy order. It is questionable, however, to what extent it indeed 
represents such a structural change, in the sense that it actually challenges or 
transforms the power structure or governance of the existing order. In fact, even 
van Hulst was modest in his expectations. The development of the guidelines 
for NOC-IOC cooperation was seen as a sensitive issue and he was not sure 
whether it would succeed. However, just ‘talking about it - the exchange of 
views and ideas - was considered useful’, according to him.125 Although this 
might indeed be the starting point of a transformation, the exchange of views 
and ideas can hardly be seen as a structural change to the rules of the game. A
more structural change would be to include e.g. China and Russia in the IEA, or 
at least to adapt the voting structure of the IEA to the contemporary situation, or 
to establish a ‘truly’ new system as Xu Xiajoe from CNPC argued for.
Again, this illustrates the continued institutional and productive power 
of the OECD core states and refutes the hypothesis of Colgan et al. (2012) that 
dissatisfaction alone will lead to change: dissatisfaction will not lead to change 
if the dissatisfied are not powerful enough. At the current juncture, the 
institutional power that is embedded in the landscape for global governance is 
still heavily leaning towards the Western core. Yet, as has been illustrated in 
Chapter Three, the weight in terms of the share of production and consumption 
of energy (as well as other economic parameters), has since the mid-2000s 
tipped towards the non-OECD world. Although it is not possible to predict the 
future, it is thus clear that at some point in the (near) future, the global 
institutional landscape will need to be more fundamentally adjusted to this new 
reality.
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Conclusion
In addition to the empirical mappings and network analyses provided in the 
previous chapters, this chapter has assessed if and how the rise of non-OECD 
NOCs has impacted upon the rules of the game of the global energy order. This 
was done by way of an analysis of three key dimensions of energy governance: 
the emergence of a new ‘statism’ in energy governance, the marketisation and 
financialisation of energy governance (globalizing commercial law, index 
speculation and energy service companies), and the global institutional 
landscape of energy governance.
We have seen that with their transnationalisation and expansion – non-
OECD NOCs not only become competitors to the IOCs, but are also confronted 
with similar challenges and are increasingly playing by the rules of the game as 
dictated by Western capitalism: they have (to) become more ‘transparent’, to 
comply with financial markets expectations, to compete for technology as well 
as for access to ‘legal technology’, and if they are resource seeking, they face 
resource nationalism.
On the other hand, there is a growing trend of ‘statist’ energy 
governance, with a preference of non-OECD NOCs, in particular the resource 
holders, for state-to-state bargaining. This forces both IOCs and net-importing 
governments to restructure their strategies; for the companies to seek more close 
cooperation with either state-owned entities or (their home) states, and for states 
to develop strategic energy relations. For resource holding and resource seeking 
NOCs the IOC-NOC partnerships are also a way in which they seek to acquire 
the skills (in particular with respect to technology and project management) that 
will allow them to become less dependent on IOCs.
In sum, in terms of the rules of the game it has been established that the 
expansion of the non-OECD NOCs is not solely empowering them, as often 
claimed. It appears that this expansion to a large extent depends upon their 
capacity to play by the rules of the game as defined along Western (business) 
standards and interests. I have shown, for instance, that the current wave of 
resource nationalism, which is commonly interpreted as a changing of the rules 
of the game, and subsequently as a threat to Western corporate and consumer 
interests, is also to a great extent shaped by the ongoing transnationalisation of 
particular Western concepts, norms, rules, and expertise through the agency of 
Western firms and actors. As to the global governance of energy, it was made 
clear that the institutional landscape, in which OPEC performs a stabilising role, 
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is still very much configured according to the interests of the Western powers 
and companies, instead of reflecting the changed balance of power in which 
non-OECD countries have grown to become the world’s major producers and 
consumers of energy.
Two qualifications of these findings are important with respect to the direction 
of the transformation of the energy order and its rules of the game. One is the 
qualification of the time line of change. While it can be concluded – for the 
reasons outlined above - that, as of yet, no fundamental power shift has taken 
place, a more profound power shift might very well occur once the NOCs have 
mastered all the required ‘skills’, and once the major rising powers have 
gathered more economic and political weight and strength. Once that point is 
reached they are more likely to become (global) rule makers. However, 
secondly, this chapter shows that it is quite likely that certain aspects of the 
rules that are ‘mastered’ in the process will become internalised, including some 
of the underlying Western ideas, values, and world views. The implication 
being that once the non-OECD major players become rule makers, the new 
rules will continue to reflect aspects of these internalised rules of the game. 
Rather than constituting a complete rejection of the current rules of the game, 
these new rules will exhibit a more hybrid form of governance.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion - A Hybrid and Multi-polar Energy Order 
The global energy order is undergoing a major transformation, marked by e.g. 
the transnational expansion of state-owned oil companies from the global South 
and Russia, a resurgence of resource nationalism in various key producing 
regions across the globe, an exceptionally high oil price, and a growing 
awareness of the dramatic consequences of climate change. Arguably, the most 
profound aspect of this transformation however is the rapid development of 
major growth poles outside the OECD world. This transformation can also be 
observed in the global political economy and entails a drastic reconfiguration of 
the geographical patterns of energy production and consumption. This study has 
contributed to the growing body of research on this transformation by 
describing and analysing the rise of non-OECD state-owned oil companies and 
their impact on the existing corporate and institutional power relations within 
the global energy order, as well as on the prevailing mode and content of 
governance of energy. The following research question was formulated to guide 
the study:
How do we explain the nature of non-OECD National Oil Companies growth 
and expansion since the turn of the millennium, and their impact on corporate 
networks and governance of the global energy order?
This research question also reflects a theoretical puzzle within the field of 
International Political Economy. The recent re-articulation of state power and 
the global expansion of state-owned capital challenge the assumption of a 
general retreat of the state. However, this renewed importance of the role of the 
state and ‘statist capital’ has not led to a reversal of transnationalisation and 
financialisation of the global political economy, but has instead – as this study 
has confirmed - further expanded and deepened these processes. In their 
analyses, state-centric approaches fail to include the persistent 
transnationalisation and interdependency that characterise the world oil market, 
whereas liberal-institutionalist and hyper-globalization approaches tend to stress 
the latter, but neglect to take account of the resurgence of state power.
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By applying a critical political economy approach I have instead theorised about
the interrelatedness between state power and the globalization of capital, and 
focused on the social relations that underpin this ‘state-capital nexus’ in the 
analyses. I operationalised these particular social relations as ‘corporate elites’ 
which are proposed to form a nexus between the state and the processes of 
capital accumulation. Applying the method of social network analysis in 
combination with biographical and organisational mapping, this approach 
enabled me to undertake a systematic enquiry of the social organisation of 
power at the apex of the global energy order, both in terms of the inter-
organisational corporate networks of the major oil companies and of the inter-
personal oil elite networks. This mapping of the configuration of the social 
organisation of power was triangulated with qualitative analysis based on more 
than thirty elite- and expert interviews that were conducted for the purpose of 
this study.
In this concluding chapter I will summarize the study’s main findings in 
relation to the central research question, discuss its empirical, methodological, 
and theoretical contributions, explore the implications of these findings for the 
future trajectory of the ongoing transition in the global energy order, and outline 
future avenues for research.
Main Findings and Contributions
Main Findings
First, the development and nature of the recent growth and expansion of non-
OECD NOCs was placed in a broader context. The historical exposition of the 
evolution of the global energy order since World War II in Chapter Three, 
illustrated the transition of ownership of reserves: from being largely owned and 
exploited by the Anglo-American cartel of the major private oil companies in 
the mid-20st century to - in the current juncture - being controlled for at least 70 
percent by the resource holding state-owned oil majors, mostly with a non-
OECD origin. It also illuminated how the crucial turning point in this transition 
- i.e. the early 1970s, when most resource holders nationalised their reserves 
and most of the now dominant NOCs were established - simultaneously gave 
the impetus to an exponentially growing and increasingly globalised oil market, 
which now forms the core of oil trade activity and price setting. Crucially the 
198
gradual ‘emancipation’ of the non-OECD resource holders thus took place 
alongside a development of ongoing transnationalisation - and later 
financialisation - of the oil market. As has been pointed out, this paradox 
captures precisely the contradictory dynamic manifest in the current energy 
order of persisting transnationalisation on the one hand and the 
(re)pronunciation of state-power on the other.
This broad sketch of the changing contours of the energy order 
furthermore crystallised that the latest re-pronunciation of state-power – which 
became manifest around the change of the millennium - is markedly different 
from the earlier wave. The latter had a more defensive and emancipatory 
character - marked by a battle over prices, rent-capture, and ownership -
whereas the current wave is of an expansionist and competitive nature: NOCs 
are increasingly taking up the roles previously reserved for IOCs by expanding 
beyond their borders and intervening in traditionally ‘IOC exclusive’ domains. 
Moreover, what is entirely novel about the current transition is that it coincides 
with the aforementioned rise in production and consumption of energy in major 
growth poles outside the OECD, in particular China. This trend was 
documented on the basis of aggregate data showing a crucial shift in the late 
2000s when non-OECD countries surpassed the traditional ‘core’ (OECD) in 
terms of energy consumption. Finally, Chapter Three outlined the process 
through which the corporate top of the global petroleum sector has in the past 
decades become more hybrid and less ‘OECD-exclusive’. The aggregate 
longitudinal analyses did however not reveal drastic changes in terms of a 
‘NOC-overtake’ or dominance; rather NOC presence in the upper echelon of the 
global petroleum sector had somewhat declined. This finding emphasised the 
need for a different approach to studying the expansion of non-OECD NOCs, 
which moves beyond the aggregate descriptives; this formed the starting point 
of the empirical heart of this thesis.
For the analysis of the impact of the rise of non-OECDs NOCs on 
corporate networks, the approach of this study has been to focus on the 
corporate relations of the companies, and to provide a systematic in-depth 
mapping of the transformations undergone by these relations in the period 
between 1997 and 2007. By focusing on social and corporate relations, instead 
of comparing individual attributes or aggregate statistics, the data revealed the 
parallel developments of NOCs’ expansion on the one hand, and their ongoing 
integration into the core of the global energy market on the other. Chapter Four, 
through social network analysis, charted how the geographical expansion of the 
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corporate networks of five of the world’s most prominent non-OECD NOCs, 
reflected their increased cooperation with other key players from the corporate 
top of the petroleum industry, including IOCs, NOCs, and hybrid oil companies. 
In a more general sense, this finding underlined the dual development that I 
have argued to be characteristic for the transition of the global energy order: 
increased participation of states and greater presence of state capital in global 
energy markets, paradoxically developing alongside a persistent 
transnationalisation trend. Moreover, it illustrates how the power structure of 
the global energy order is becoming more hybrid. As indicated, joint ventures 
and other partnerships between NOCs and IOCs, or Hybrids, do not imply a 
fusion of ownership: within these partnerships we find the co-existence of state-
owned capital and private capital, which is precisely what makes them hybrid 
alliances.
The relevance of these differences in the ownership structure of the oil 
companies also came to the fore in Chapter Five. Indeed, the analysis of the oil 
elite networks in which directors of the worlds’ major oil companies participate, 
revealed stark differences between the OECD and non-OECD networks and, 
importantly, a near complete lack of integration between them. This transpired 
a) from the lack of corporate interlocking on the part of the non-OECD elites, 
such interlocking is seen in the literature as a powerful social mechanism to 
forge a common outlook and bridge intra-elite and inter-corporate differences; 
and b) from a near complete lack of affiliations of the non-OECD oil elites with 
transnational policy planning networks, which are seen as crucial platforms for 
transnational (corporate) elite formation and for shaping global governance. 
Moreover, these systematic mappings made clear how extensively and directly 
connected many of the non-OECD oil elites are with higher levels of 
government in their respective countries. While this is not an unexpected 
finding, it does constitute another difference between non-OECD and OECD oil 
elites, as the latter turned out to have more indirect, advisory relations to the 
state, characterised by a revolving door pattern.
The ‘mixed’ nature of these findings was further elaborated on in 
Chapter Six, by gauging the impact of the rising non-OECD NOCs on the mode 
and content of governance of the energy order, i.e. addressing the last part of the 
research question. While some argue that resource holders have become rule 
makers instead of rule takers and that the NOCs are enabling this process, my 
argument has been that - depending upon their bargaining power – resource 
holders can decide to break with particular rules or use them to their advantage, 
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but this does not make them rule makers. A distinction should be made in this 
regard between negotiations and rule setting (or rule disputing) that takes place 
between individual resource holders and resource seeking companies on the one 
hand, and the more global level of energy governance on the other hand.
Chapter Six has shown that with respect to resource disputes non-
OECD oil elites have become better at playing by the rules of the game, yet they 
are not defining those rules. Rather, they are adapting to them and trying to 
balance between these adaptations and the different rule sets and expectations 
‘at home’, i.e. related to their directorship of a state-owned company and the 
interwoven interests with the state. Particularly illustrative in this respect are the 
findings on Chinese NOCs, indicating how close ties to the state, in 
combination with the company’s expansionary drive abroad, have generated 
‘two faces’ of governance and a dual role for these NOCs and their managers. 
Internationally, they are adapting to the rules of the game of international 
business – i.e. Western capitalism – and learning to play by these rules with 
increased ‘sophistication’, but domestically they still adhere to the national rules 
of the game, closely tied to the state-apparatus and to the respective set of 
expectations, responsibilities, and formal and informal rules. On a global 
governance level, Chapter Six showed that - although there is a clear awareness 
that the non-OECD major powers should no longer be ignored - the global 
institutional bodies of energy governance might be hesitantly ‘reaching out’, but 
in effect do not represent the non-OECD states’ and companies’ interests and 
values. While some of the non-OECD rising powers are invited to participate, 
the terms, language, and interests that are placed on the agenda are still 
dominated by Western players.
In sum, even if non-OECD actors are becoming increasingly influential, 
the content of the rules by which the game is played is still set by OECD actors, 
within an OECD framework. It is, for instance, by hiring an American lawyer 
that NOCs are seen as capable of understanding and playing the rules of the 
game, whereas consulting an Iranian law professor would be considered 
inappropriate. Similarly, it is likely to be an American service company that will 
provide the NOCs with the necessary technology to eventually compete with the 
IOCs. The content of governance is primarily tailored to competition, 
privileging shareholder value, and (short term) profit making, i.e. promoting 
and opening up space for the extension and deepening of capital accumulation. 
NOCs need to balance this dominant mode with ‘national’ requirements that -
while perhaps encouraging towards participation of NOCs in global oil markets 
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and financial circuits, and towards the generation of revenues - also emphasize a 
different content, related to e.g. the values of the dominant political ideology 
and national interests such as supply security and social stability.
Main Contributions
Although recently a host of studies has been appearing on both NOCs and 
newly emerging TNCs from the non-OECD world, a systematic empirical 
analysis of the way this expansion of non-OECD NOCs occurs and how this 
process impacts on corporate networks, has not been undertaken. Neither has 
the corporate elite from the non-OECD region been studied systematically. 
Empirically, this project has contributed to the further study of these topics by 
constructing two comprehensive databases on the world’s major oil companies 
and their directors, using a method I have termed ‘biographical and 
organisational mapping’. The firm data base contains panel data on five major 
non-OECD NOCs’ joint ventures, equity alliances, consortia, and other strategic 
alliances and investments abroad - in 1997 and in 2007, including, for instance, 
ownership structures and geographical distribution of the investments. The oil 
company directors’ database contains data on the ‘ego networks’  of 187 
directors of the major NOCs and IOCs, collected in 1997 and in 2007, including 
demographic information, educational background, corporate affiliations, 
affiliations with business coalitions, policy planning bodies and other 
socialising platforms, and the state. These databases – apart from forming the 
basis for the analyses conducted for this particular study - can be used for future 
work and by other scholars.
A particular methodological contribution of this study has been to show 
how two-mode social network analysis (SNA), which incorporates the duality 
of organizations and persons, can be applied within a framework of critical 
political economy. The study demonstrates how changing patterns in the social 
and corporate relations that make up the core of the petroleum industry can be 
revealed and analysed by combining SNA with a mapping method such as 
organisational and biographical mapping. It was also shown that SNA is 
particularly well suited to analyse the interplay between agency and structure as 
conceptualized from a critical realist perspective. SNA simultaneously 
visualizes the way social structures are shaped by agency and provides the pre-
existing context within which agency acts.
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Theoretically, this study has contributed by providing an explanation for the 
particular nature of the growth and expansion of the non-OECD NOCs and their 
impact on corporate networks and governance, by regarding its nature as an 
instance of a broader rearticulating of state power within deepening 
transnationalisation. The contribution of this thesis to the solution of this puzzle 
has been to show how the resurgence of the state is both driven and conditioned
by globalizing capital. Whereas existing explanations focus either on the 
continuance/primacy of state power or on the persistence of the 
transnationalisation at the expense of state power, this study put forward a 
theoretical account of how the state is integral to and plays a vital role in the 
globalization of capital. The latter implies, simultaneously, the constant drive to 
transcend the boundaries of state power and their re-articulation.
I have theorised how the expansion of capital, that is one of the driving 
forces behind the transnationalisation process, significantly depends on the 
existence of geographical and institutional boundaries, and how the borders as 
embodied by the state have become indispensible in this sense. Here I have put 
forward the notion of sovereign social space as embodied by states and 
structured by the interstate system, which has both a territorial dimension and a 
jurisdictional dimension. As capital expands globally it effectively transcends 
national borders – i.e. the boundaries of sovereign social space - but at the same 
time it still requires the continued existence of these boundaries. The patchwork 
of sovereign social spaces creates stable internal and external spaces which 
provide critical pathways for capital expansion as they allow for the avoidance 
of over-accumulation and devalorisation (i.e. they enable expansion through 
‘spatial fixes’). Moreover, the patchwork of sovereign social spaces creates 
exclusive spheres of differential development, which can be exploited by inter-
capitalist competition. This subsequently explains the dynamic between a 
widening and deepening transnational dimension and a resilient (inter)state 
dimension. It makes clear that, with the globalization of capital, the role of the 
state will not diminish but instead will be continuously re-articulated.
This theoretical approach showed that a focus on social relations in the 
corporate realm generates substantial findings and insights into the 
transformation of the energy order that also directly - and indirectly - involves 
the role of the state and interstate relations. Indirectly it sheds light on the 
important issue of an ongoing geopolitical power shift in the global political 
economy, with China rising in the ranks and challenging the dominant status of 
the US, and a gradual decline of the latter’s hegemonic power. This study 
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demonstrated how an analysis of the governance of oil and the strategies of 
Chinese state-owned oil companies, can at once highlight the importance of the 
global oil market and the ongoing marketisation and financialisation of the 
world’s energy relations, and shed light on the geopolitical dimension that is 
implicit in the workings of the global oil market. It also makes clear that the 
transition towards a more evenly balanced multi-polar order – even if it might 
imply increased geopolitical rivalry between the two major powers China and 
the US – will be characterised by hybridity, that is, the co-existence of statist 
and private forms of governance and capital.
Implications for the Future Trajectory of the Energy Order
Although the transformation of the global energy order is ongoing, and the 
outcome is still highly uncertain, a general conclusion following from this 
dissertation is that the nature and direction of the transformation indicates both 
hybridisation and multi-polarity. Linking back to the existing literature (as 
discussed in the theoretical chapter) this development entails not so much a 
trajectory towards either ‘regions and empires’ or ‘markets and institutions’ (cf. 
Correljé and van der Linde 2006), but is rather a transition towards both; a 
world divided by regions and empires, but also increasingly connected through 
global markets and institutions. Hence we are witnessing more hybrid forms of 
cooperation underpinned by multi-polarity.
Why hybrid? Because – as this study has shown - the fault lines between 
IOCs and NOCs are progressively blurring, and because an increasingly hybrid 
and varied set of corporate-state energy relations are emerging from the ongoing 
transnationalisation of the energy sector. Contrary to most expectations 
expressed in the literature, the expansion of NOCs has not led to a ‘take over’ 
by state-owned companies or a ‘return of state capitalism’. Nor has it resulted in 
a complete adaptation by ‘statist contenders’ to free market ideologies and 
Western business practices, or in their merger into a so called transnational 
capitalist class. Rather, this expansion has generated new alliances of state-
private, private-private, and state-state partnerships, in what one interviewee 
called a ‘coalition of the willing’.126 Yet, at the same time, fundamental 
distinctions remain in place in terms of ownership structure, distribution of rents 
and profits, and different ways in which corporate elites are involved in the 
organisation and coordination of capital accumulation. This first of all, 
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underscores the hybridity and duality of the rise of non-OECD NOCs, but also 
has potentially important consequences for the future governance of the energy 
order, to be addressed below.
Why multi-polar? Because a fundamental transformation has indeed 
taken place, departing from a multilateral order under US hegemony, towards 
an order in which the new growth poles - that are located outside the OECD 
area - can no longer be ignored. This is a vital change and it is bound to lead to 
a more drastic reshuffle of power and rulemaking in the global energy order. On 
a longer time frame it can be expected that at least some of the non-OECD 
players will become increasingly powerful and autonomous actors within the 
global energy order. In terms of governance my hypothesis is that such a power 
shift, while implying that these non-OECD players will be in a position to 
actually define the content of the rules of the game, i.e. effectively become rule 
makers, will not imply a complete break with, or rejection of, the current mode 
and content of energy governance. Rather, it will create a more hybrid form of 
global governance in which elements of the current rules are combined with the 
values and interests of the non-OECD powers. I base this proposition on the 
assumption that while the non-OECD players are in the process of adapting to 
the rules – which is imperative for them to be able to expand their influence and 
their reach in the first place – they are also learning. This socialisation process 
implies that they will internalise some of the existing rules and some of the 
underlying ideas, values, and interests. Once they become rule-makers 
themselves, those new rules will, at least to some extent, reflect this internalised 
worldview.
Avenues for Further Research
One of the key findings of this dissertation has been that global corporate 
energy relations are becoming increasingly hybrid. This finding was based on 
analysis of the some of the most prominent types of non-OECD NOCs, i.e. 
Saudi Aramco, PDVSA, CNPC (and PetroChina), NIOC, and Gazprom. A next 
step would be to extend the case selection in order to determine to what extent 
these findings have a wider applicability and/or what kind of variance might 
occur.  In particular, it would be very interesting to include ‘deviant’ or 
‘exceptional’ cases such as non-OECD private oil companies (e.g. Russian 
Lukoil), highly corporatized and internationalized non-OECD hybrid oil 
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companies (such as Brazilian Petrobras), or hybrid oil companies originating in 
the OECD (such as Norwegian Statoil and Italian Eni). While extending the 
case selection in those directions might offer fruitful avenues for further 
research, the opposite research strategy might also generate interesting 
questions, i.e. a more in depth focus on differences between the non-OECD 
NOCs and their respective networks. In spite of the common trajectories of 
these companies there is, of course, a great variety in their strategies and 
interests.
The focus of the analyses in this thesis was on the extent of 
transnationalisation and integration of the OECD and non-OECD oil elites. The 
finding of distinct oil elite networks in the OECD and non-OECD world, and 
the lack of integration between them, warrants more research.  Although there 
might be a time lag, i.e. it might be the case that elite integration in due time 
will follow from increased corporate cooperation, the findings in this study do 
not point to a co-optation of the non-OECD corporate elites by the West 
(contrary to what some authors belief, see e.g. Robinson 2004, 2007). Rather, 
there are strong indications that they will remain tied to distinctive networks of 
power (related to the state apparatus and political parties for instance) each with 
a distinctive nature and distinctive rule sets. First of all, it needs to be seen 
whether these findings hold in a more general sense, for instance in other highly 
strategic sectors such as finance. Second, both empirical and theoretical 
investigations are needed to determine the distinctiveness of non-OECD 
corporate elites and their state-capital nexuses. There is, as of yet, still very little 
research on the particular features of non-OECD corporate elite formation and 
little theoretisation of how this relates to the state and to capital accumulation 
processes, which points toward a promising new frontier of research. Given the 
ongoing power transition in the global political economy towards an order that 
increasingly needs to include – at least some of - the major non-OECD powers, 
it seems even more relevant to explore, chart, understand, and explain the 
distinct make-up of non-OECD corporate elite networks.
On the basis of the finding just described, a conclusion was drawn that 
non-OECD oil elites still have little access to, and influence within, the typical 
Western elite and business circuits. The question remains whether the non-
OECD directors are not allowed access – for instance due to their close ties to 
the state - or whether they do not want access. In either instance, a case can be 
made that it is a missed opportunity for the Western resource seekers, since 
inclusion of non-OECD oil elites on their corporate boards might provide them 
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with more opportunities to access resource holders’ ‘networks of power’ and 
their reserves. Along the same line of reasoning, inclusion of Western directors 
on non-OECD NOC boards might facilitate cooperation in energy relations. As 
was discussed, it is probably no coincidence that it is at Saudi Aramco’s board 
that we find Anglo-American directors, given the company’s historically close 
relationship with the US in particular. A similar line of explanation might apply 
to the presence of a German director on Gazprom’s board. More research into 
the motives and causes behind the lack of integration would likely provide more 
conclusive answers to these standing questions.
This thesis has shown how there is an implicit geopolitical dimension to 
the social organisation of power in the global oil market and how the roles of 
states and of interstate relations are inherent to the analysis of social relations in 
the corporate realm. However, the role played by states and interstate relations 
still needs more explicit and in-depth study. Indeed, state policy analysis and 
geopolitical strategies are domains that have been largely left out of this study, 
but require further elaboration, both empirically and theoretically, in order to 
complement the findings and explanations presented here. What are the main 
factors and ideas driving foreign policy makers and (foreign) policy making 
with respect to energy (security) in OECD and non-OECD major countries, in 
particular the US and China? How are energy (security) objectives related to 
other foreign policy objectives? And how are foreign policy makers related to 
the respective corporate elite and state-corporate elite networks? What are the 
main differences in terms of state-business relations between the OECD and 
non-OECD countries and how can those differences be explained? These are all 
questions that form a fertile basis for further analyses.
Lastly, this dissertation has focused on what may be labelled the ‘old’ 
energy order, i.e. the fossil fuel based energy order. While in even the most 
‘optimistic’ projections hydrocarbons still make up more than half of the share 
of primary energy use globally (see Martinot et al. 2007), it is hard to deny that 
the world is set on a path to develop an alternative, more ‘sustainable’, or 
‘green’ energy order. While the urgency of such a fundamental transition is 
increasingly being acknowledged and the evidence in terms of ecological, 
economic, and social necessity has been generally accepted, the daunting 
complexity of this task in political, economic, and practical sense is also 
apparent. The obstacles and opportunities for such a transition are - and will be -
widely studied in both environmental studies, governance, public policy, 
economics, and business. The research presented in this dissertation, by 
207
providing systematic insights into, and explanations of, the configuration of 
social power at the apex of the fossil fuel order, as well as of its governance, 
provides a fruitful backdrop for studies that want to focus on the power 
dimension involved in the transition towards a more ‘ sustainable’ or green 
energy order. The present study may contribute both with regard to questions 
about the substantial corporate interests involved in such a transition, and with 
respect to the related (geo)political dimensions;  e.g. questions about the role 
and responsibility of China and other emerging countries in such a transition 
vis-a-vis the role and responsibility of a long term major polluters such as US.
Concluding Remarks
The oil and gas industry is constantly changing. When this study took off in 
2007/ 2008, the energy world found itself in the grip of extraordinarily high oil 
prices, declining reserves in the major OECD producing regions, re-emergent 
resource nationalism, and a revived role for National Oil Companies. All of this 
- in combination with the growing sense of emergency regarding the impact of 
climate change – instigated, what may be called a ‘re-politicisation’ of energy 
security. Although many of these elements are still in place, what appears to be 
a watershed change has taken place since, which has shifted the terms of debate 
from a focus on scarcity to one of plenty, primarily due to the ‘shale gas 
revolution’ and, more recently, ‘tight oil’ in North America. Most basically, this 
refers to the opening up of large unconventional gas and oil reserves (in shale 
rocks), which is made possible due to upstream technological advances, such as 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, and which allows for a tapping into 
resources that were hitherto not accessible. If fully realised – this ‘revolution’ 
will drastically redraw the global gas and oil flows and the geopolitics that 
come with them. First of all, it would imply that the world’s largest consumer in 
due time would again become a net-exporter of oil and gas (IEA 2012a), a role 
which it lost in 1949. At least, the US could become self-sufficient, which 
would arguably have significant geopolitical implications, since the quest for 
control over sufficient energy supplies has played such a key role in shaping its 
global posture and foreign policy. Shale gas is, however, also potentially 
plentiful available in places like China and South Africa; it is thus also a matter 
of technological diffusion and capabilities that will determine the future 
geographical distribution of the production of, in this case, shale gas. Yet, there 
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are good reasons to be cautious about these ‘revolutions’, which come at a high 
cost, both economically and environmentally (see e.g. Stevens 2012). Moreover, 
while ‘revolutionary’, these developments constitute shifts within the ‘old’, 
fossil fuel based, energy order, which means that both high oil prices and the 
environmentally destructive course that such a continued fossil fuel based path 
of development implies, are being reinstated. Arguably, a real transition would 
involve a transformation towards a more sustainable energy order, the contours 
of which are starting to shape, but which still has a long way to go with vast 
challenges on its path. 
Notwithstanding these developments - the outcome of which is thus unclear - a
tectonic shift is taking place that will be defining the shape and direction of the 
current energy order; that is, a shift in the geographical patterns of energy 
production and consumption, in which the non-OECD world is taking up an 
increasingly large share of global production and consumption, even outpacing 
the OECD world. Concurrently and subsequently, non-OECD state-owned oil 
companies are becoming increasingly influential players within the global 
energy order. Any questions with respect to transitions within, or beyond, the 
fossil fuel based energy order, will need to factor in these developments. This 
study has contributed to a better understanding of these two ongoing major 
trends, by charting their impact on the configuration of corporate power at the 
apex of the global energy order and on the rules governing that order.
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Endnotes
1 In this thesis I will use the term OECD (Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development) and non-OECD to denote, respectively, the group of countries that are 
members, and are not members, of this Western oriented organisation dedicated to free 
markets and liberal democracies. Sometimes I will use this interchangeably with 
Western and non-Western. The OECD – which is probably the most commonly used 
nominator in the literature and the industry - refers to a more inclusive and precise set of 
countries than the West and is also a more neutral term. But – given the particular focus 
of this study – it is often rather a few major powers within these broader sets of 
countries that I am analysing, in that sense the term Western - with the (geo)political 
and ideological connotations it harbours - is at times more appropriate.  
2 The seven companies this refers to are: Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom 
(Russia), CNPC/PetroChina (China), National Iranian Oil Company, Petrobras (Brazil), 
Petronas (Malaysia), Pétroleos de Venezuela (Hoyos 2007a). 
3 The following countries had a GDP in 2009 that was above the combined total revenue 
of ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Total, Conoco Phillips and Chevron: USA 14.2 trillion, 
Japan 5 trillion, China 4.9 trillion, Germany 3.3 trillion, France 2.6 trillion, UK 2.2 
trillion, Italy 2.1 trillion (World Bank 2009). 
4 This definition is derived from Nye and Keohane  (1971) ‘a transnational interaction 
may involve governments, but it may not involve governments only’...’“transnational 
interactions” describes the movement of tangible and intangible items across state 
boundaries when at least on actor is not an agent of a government or an 
intergovernmental organization’ (p. 332).
5 As Valerie Marcel, Chatham House fellow and NOC expert, stated: ‘I think generally 
it will be a total blurry of categories....the categories we have today won’t be as relevant 
between service companies and IOC, between IOC and NOC’. Telephone interview, 16
December 2009. 
6 Valerie Marcel (NOC expert), telephone interview, 16 December 2009. Interview 
Prof. Malcolm Gillis (director Halliburton and Professor of Economics, Rice 
University), 25 February, 2010, Houston, Texas, US. Telephone interview Noé Van 
Hulst (IEF) 22 March 2010. 
7 It should be noted that these are indicators of potential influence and power; actual 
power and the way it is exercised ultimately depends on the nature of the node, the kind 
of tie and so forth. Although there is ample literature on basic power structures that can 
be identified within networks, as well as theories on the power dynamics that can be 
derived from these structures (see also Borgatti and Foster 2003, Scott 1991b, Fennema 
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and Schijf 1979) there is also severe criticism on these kind of network studies. 
Pettigrew (1992:168) in particular criticizes the focus on structural properties of the 
networks and suggests to analyse the content of the ties, their development and use. 
8 From a Marxist perspective such class relations are rooted in production relations (i.e. 
ownership of means of production, or lack thereof), and thus inseparable from the 
former level of capital accumulation.
9 More specifically Harvey contends that: ‘This structured coherence is strongly related 
to the cost and time of movement for socially necessary turnover time to remain 
profitable, i.e. the commuter range defined by cost and time of daily labour movement 
is a very important spatial disaggregation principle under capitalism’ (1985:146).
10 Over-accumulation can take many forms such as: a glut of commodities on the 
market; money surplus or excess of credit; surpluses of productive capacities (e.g. idle 
factories and machinery); excess of capital invested in built environments (property 
market crashes), surplus of labour (high unemployment) etcetera (Harvey 2006:xxiv).
11 The author likes to thank Bastiaan van Apeldoorn for making this point explicit.
12 The oil and gas sector is usually divided into ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’, whereby 
upstream refers to exploration, drilling and production of oil and gas, and downstream 
to trading, refining, storage, distribution, and marketing. In addition, supply and 
transport are at times singled out as ‘midstream’, the latter of course also has a clearly 
defined geographical and territorial dimension to it. 
13 Note that with the advance of global capitalism - in particular its transnationalisation 
and financialisation - several other factors have come to influence the price of oil, such
as the activities of traders and financial speculators (see Chapter Three and Six, and e.g. 
Mabro 2000, 2005, Labban 2010). 
14 In a more detailed analysis of rent Marx differentiates various forms of ground rent: 
monopoly rent, differential rent and absolute rent. As Harvey (2010:81-2) explains: 
‘monopoly rent attaches to all forms of property rights claims under the institutional 
arrangements that characterise capitalism’, whereas differential rent ‘arises in the first 
instance because of difference in fertility or yield on lands and mines relative to the 
least productive land, mine or oil well that needs to be brought into production in order 
to satisfy the demands of the market’ (ibid.). Absolute rent nearly exists in the real 
world.
15 See endnote 13. 
16 Bottomore in this respect refers societies in which a stratum of intellectuals or 
bureaucrats may be said to wield supreme power, e.g. China under the rule of the 
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literati, India under rule of Brahmins, or the former Communist countries with political 
party leaders. Although these ruling classes were often linked to the economic upper 
classes, their power base is still distinct from ruling classes which base their power 
directly upon ownership of property (1993:30). 
17 It should however be noted that these actors at times belong to or overlap with the top 
tier of the corporate elite as well; depending on the size of their firm and the position 
they have within the firm (e.g. partners in a top law firm, while having the function of a 
consultant can simultaneously be considered top tier corporate elites).
18 The notion of productive power comes close to what in the Gramscian sense is 
understood as hegemonic power (Cox 1981). Hegemonic power refers to the power to 
formulate particular interests as to seem general interests and thus to convince other 
actors to (seemingly voluntarily and freely) alter their beliefs, interests, or actions in 
concordance with those interest. While the conceptualisation of Barnett and Duvall 
leaves the question open who has or obtains productive power (anyone potentially has 
productive power), hegemonic power is seen as grounded in the inherent power 
asymmetry rooted in class relations.
19 Telephone interview Noé Van Hulst (IEF) 22 March 2010, interview Dr. Carole 
Nakhle (Energy Economist Surrey Energy Economics Centre) 4 December 2009, 
London. 
20 See for extensive and excellent historical documentation e.g. Yergin 1991, Sampson 
1975, Bamberg 1994, Noreng 1980.
21 Periodisation is always delicate. First of all, particular developments within a
particular period, or at a particular time, often have their origin in a previous period and 
the origin is hard to ‘pin down’. Any attempt at a more or less exact delineation of time 
necessarily oversimplifies the complex causal chain of events that has led to a particular 
salient characteristic of a certain limited period of time. Subsequently, periodisations in 
historical accounts on e.g. resource-nationalism tend to vary significantly (cf, Stevens 
2008, Bina 2006). The periodisations suggested here, hence should be seen as an 
indication rather than in any definitional sense. 
22 The term Seven Sisters, originally ‘Sette Sorelle’, was coined by Enrico Mattei (head 
of state-owned Italian AGIP that he transformed into ENI in 1953) and referred to the 
seven Anglo-American private oil companies, who’s monopoly he was determined to 
break: Standard Oil of New Jersey (that later became Esso and still later was renamed 
Exxon),  Socony (Standard Oil Co. Of New York, which later became Mobil), Socal 
(Standard Oil of California, later became Chevron), Texaco, Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch / 
Shell, and the Anglo-Persion Oil Company (APOC, later British Petroleum BP). In fact 
there was an eight ‘sister’, the French state-owned Compagnie Francaise de Petrole 
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(CFP), that had considerable influence and power at the time, but since ‘she’ was 
neither private nor Anglo-American, CFP was conveniently neglected in this term.
23 The agreement remained secret until 1952 when its existence was revealed during a 
series of Senate Hearings on the international oil industry (Stevens 2008:9).
24 Two additional major oil deals were, first, an agreement between American Gulf Oil 
and Dutch-British Royal Dutch / Shell in Kuwait, and, secondly, a deal between the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (UK) and two American companies, Jersey and Socony, on 
the production of Iranian oil.
25 The latter involved for instance the deployment of a large-scale US Military Training 
Mission, aimed at training the Saudi army to ‘maintain the internal stability of the 
Kingdom’ as well has the training of the Saudi Arabian paramilitary force (SANG) 
which the US took over from the British in 1973 (Stokes and Raphael 2010:87).
26 In the US this happened rather ‘organically’ due to its vast domestic industry, 
whereas in Europe this transition was actively supported and facilitated by the US’ 
Marshall Plan (see e.g. Layne 2006). As described by Yergin: ’the Marshall plan made 
possible and pushed a far-reaching transition in Europe – the change from a coal based 
economy towards one based on imported oil’ (1991:424). As described by van der Pijl, 
the Marshall plan also served to help implement so called ‘Fordist’ production methods 
(factory based assembly line production) in Europe, for which petroleum is also a key 
source of energy (van der Pijl 1984). At the time, approximately half of Europe’s 
petroleum came from American companies; subsequently oil was the single largest item 
in the dollar budgets of most European countries, in fact it was estimated that in 1948, 
20 percent of Marshall aid over the next few years would be spent on oil and oil 
equipment (Yergin 1991:424).
27 With the Mexican precedence in mind the IOCs tried to be as cooperative as 
necessary in order to assuage the complaints and demands of the resource holders, 
without losing too much control and revenues while at the same time making sure not to 
risk full nationalisation. 
28 Saudi Arabia for instance reached a similar deal with Aramco in 1950. They, 
however, opted for a pragmatic and ‘company friendly’ approach, which for Aramco 
just implied a redirection of payments: what otherwise would have been taxed by the 
US now would go to the Saudi government in royalties. In spite of this loss of tax 
revenues, the US tacitly agreed to the arrangements, because they were more worried 
about Saudi Arabian stability and economic growth than the loss of tax income (Yergin 
1991:446-447).
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29 Eisenhower was actually against the quotas, he criticized ‘tendencies of special 
interests in the US’ that were ‘in conflict with the basic requirement on the US to 
promote increased trade in the world’ (Yergin 1991:538). Indeed the quotas testify of 
the double standard of the US that on the one hand fiercely – and at times violently –
promoted the ‘Open Door’ outwards, but on the other hand kept the doors of its 
domestic market closed. The quotas lasted 14 years, they resulted in a higher price for 
US oil and helped to boost US crude oil output; in 1968 it was 20 percent higher than in 
1959 (ibid.).
30 Qatar, Libya and Indonesia joined in the following years, UAE joined in 1967, 
Algeria in 1969 and Nigeria in 1971, the latest members are Ecuador and Angola, that 
joined in 2007. Indonesia left OPEC in 2009 because it ceased to be a net-exporter.
31 Membership has meanwhile expanded to 28, all OECD members except Chile, 
Estonia, Iceland, Mexico, Israel. 
32 In fact the Saudi government had taken 25 percent of the assets in 1973 and 100 
percent in 1980, but at the time it is still Aramco, Saudi Aramco is established first in 
1988.
33 Tony Meggs (former Group Vice President Technology at BP) described this as a 
major transformation of the company as a result of the nationalisations. Telephone 
interview, 11 December 2009. 
34 In a remarkable illustration of the double standard of so called free market forces 
Bush was however explicitly instructed to stress to King Fadh that ‘market forces, not 
politicians, should determine price levels’ (Yergin 1991:756).
35 A publicly highlighted example of this strategy is when Shell was forced to cede 
control (i.e. the majority share) over the Sakhalin II project (a vast offshore oilfield) to 
state-owned Gazprom, allegedly for reasons of environmental concern and cost 
excesses.
36 Ian Cronshaw (consultant of the office of the Chief Economist of the International 
Energy Agency) confirmed this. Telephone interview, 11 March 2010. 
37 Telephone interview 8 March 2010.
38 This interpretation is similar to the one advanced by for instance the World Bank, 
who define multi-polarity as the existence of more than two dominant growth poles 
(World bank 2011). The importance here is to differentiate its meaning from how it is 
defined and used in realist IR, the tradition from which the term derives. Polarity in IR 
scholarship refers to the number of great powers in the international state system and is 
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seen as determining the behaviour of states and the stability of the system (e.g. Waltz 
1979).
39 It should be noted, however, that data on reserves are highly sensitive and generally 
not seen as very reliable. In particular large resource holders are said to have an 
incentive to inflate their reserves because it is an indicator of economic power. 
Nonetheless these kind of aggregate data provide a sufficient indication of the extent 
and direction of these trends.  
40 As section one has described, the decisive ‘battle’ over the ownership of reserves took 
place in the 1970s, after which no major transformations in ownership of reserves has 
taken place. This is significant in light of the importance that is generally attached to the 
latest wave of resource nationalism. 
41 One should take note of the fact that these regional data are based on the top 35 only. 
Yet, assuming that this does reflect a more general trend I consider these findings to 
contain relevant information, even if not entirely compatible with the other analyses.
42 In the period analysed here seven PIW Top 35 American companies merged into 
three companies, and five PIW Top 35 European companies merged into two European 
companies.
43 The category Hybrid has here been divided into majority and minority state-owned 
companies, following Wolf (2009b).
44 An example hereof is PetroChina which is a subsidiary of wholly state-owned CNPC, 
the latter which holds 86 percent of the shares. Similarly, Sinopec is a subsidiary of 
wholly state-owned China Petrochemical Corporation which holds 75 percent of 
Sinopec’s shares. 
45 Interview 3 December 2009, Oxford. 
46 As described in the introductory chapter, data were first collected from the 
companies’ annual reports, which were later cross checked and extended with data from 
the companies’ websites.
47 Wholly-owned subsidiaries abroad were included here even though they do not 
involve a relation with another company. I included them because they have a 
relationship with another actor, namely the (host) state and are an indicator of 
international expansion. For the same reasons, I excluded wholly owned domestic 
subsidiaries. Also excluded were the subsidiaries of subsidiaries; while a more complete 
picture would emerge if these were included, it would add to the level of complexity.
48 The names of the affiliated companies could not be included in these graphs, since it 
would render them unreadable.
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49 Since I combine all relations within a particular region, this graph cannot show how 
the different companies work together within a particular region. Looking at the 
different companies’ ‘ego networks’, or focusing on one region at a time, could provide 
more detailed insight into what kind of relations determine each company’s affiliation to 
each region. Since I analyse a broader trend in this study, I refrain from this line of 
enquiry, yet it might be an interesting avenue for further research.
50 Please note that, to avoid unnecessary clutter, the tie labels are not displayed in the 
graph, but the exact strength is mentioned below, when applicable.
51 While a wholly-owned subsidiary abroad of course does not involve corporate 
relation with another company, these are included because it is an indication of NOC 
expansion abroad, see endnote 47.
52 Here, in the presentation of the graphs, I cluster these different forms of contracts for 
the sake of clarity. One should note, however, that it differs considerably from the kind 
of contract made (see for example Mommer 2002).
53 The term Global South generally refers to countries in Africa, Central and Latin 
American, the Middle East and Asia. When used in this study it refers to a 
heterogeneous group of states that I mostly denote as non-OECD countries, and 
elsewhere is also labeled ‘emerging economies/markets’ or the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China). The term Global South is not entirely accurate geographically because in 
the case of the oil and gas sector Russia should be (and is) included, in spite of not 
being a Southern state. Moreover, the general term Global South refers most often to 
economically vulnerable states with few resources, whereas the focus of this study is on 
increasingly powerful states within these regions that are challenging Western 
dominance. 
54 PetroChina’s board is included – in spite of it being majority owned by CNPC (86% 
of the shares) and showing substantial overlap in terms of board membership - because 
of the size and importance of the firm, which is publicly listed. Since 2008 it has been 
the world’s number two in terms of market capitalisation, under ExxonMobil (Financial 
Times Global 500, http://media.ft.com/cms/eee5847a-9085-11dd-8abb-
0000779fd18c.pdf). 
55 The nationality of the directors was taken to define whether they come from OECD 
countries or non-OECD countries. 
56 A national corporate tie in this case means that an oil company director sits at another 
board of his own nationality, whereas a transnational corporate tie means that an oil 
company director sits at another board of a different nationality than his own. 
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57 In SNA terms this is a ‘one-mode network’ transposed from the ‘two-mode network’. 
A two mode network includes both the actors (in this case IOC and NOC board 
members in 2007) and what is in SNA parlance is called the ‘events’ (in this case the 
interlocks that they form through positions at other boards). In a transposed one mode 
network, the nodes represent only the actors (or the events), whereas the lines between 
the nodes represent the connecting events (or the actors).
58 Other companies to which these directors are connected are hence not displayed. The
size of the nodes however does reflect the total number of ties, and thus still gives an 
impression of the overall ‘degree’ of the actors and companies.
59 The latter is included - although he is a non-executive Chairman - because of the 
senior and influential role in terms of corporate management of the non-executive 
chairman in the British corporate governance system. 
60 I would like to thank Roy Barnes for highlighting this point. 
61 Useem defined as the ‘inner circle’ those directors that serve at two or more large 
corporate boards (1984:64).
62 It should, however, be noted that the affiliations were mapped on the basis of public 
reports and documents, and not on the basis of self-reporting, the number of affiliations 
hence might be larger in reality. 
63 For a full overview of the positions of the big linkers, see Table 10 in Appendix D.
64 The fact that there is such an indirect relation in terms of interlocks between the state 
and the major OECD oil company directors, was confirmed when the ‘revolving door’ 
mechanism (i.e. a persistent pattern of state positions interchanged with corporate 
positions) was taken into account, by including historical positions. This increased the 
number of the IOC directors with position(s) at state level at some time in their career to 
25, with a total of 61 statist interlocks. For the NOC directors it brought their numbers 
to 62, establishing a total of 142 statist interlocks (for an overview of the historical 
positions and examples of revolving door biographies, see Appendix D, Table 11, 12 
and 13).
65 Russia exports around 27 percent of its gas to Germany and about 40 percent of the 
latter’s oil imports come from Russia.  
66 Telephone interview David Woodward (former BP President of Azerbaijan, currently 
Senior Management Advisor at Mubadala, which is an Abu Dhabi state-owned 
investment company), 13 April 2010. 
67 There is an extensive literature on the question to what extent global governance is 
actually global in its scope and aim, or rather for instance regional, and to what extent 
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truly global governance is at all feasible (see e.g. Overbeek et al. 2010). While these are 
important questions I will here stick to the shorthand of global governance, which 
includes regional governance.
68 However, it is important to emphasise here that the state and its leading decision 
makers are also seen to have autonomous power and will be influenced by the broader 
historical, political, economic, ecological, and cultural context. 
69 Note that this is a different interpretation of structural power from how Susan Strange 
defined it in (1994 [1988]), which has become common currency in International 
Political Economy.
70 Telephone interview, 22 March 2010. 
71 Telephone interview, 21 January 2010. 
72 Telephone interview, Xiaojie Xu (CNPC), 21 January 2010. Interview Dr. Carole 
Nakhle 4 December 2009, London, UK. Interview, anonymous (Shell), The Hague, 
Netherlands, 10 March 2010. 
73 Interview Dr. Nakhle, 4 December 2009, London, UK. Interview, anonymous (Shell), 
The Hague, Netherlands, 10 March 2010. 
74 Interview, 4 December 2009, London, UK. 
75 Telephone interview, 21 January 2010. 
76 The ‘Going Global’ policy entailed a broader strategy aimed at the encouraging of 
overseas investments of Chinese enterprises. Domestically, an internal reform of the 
industry had been devised around this time, which aimed at increasing CNPCs (and 
other Chinese NOCs) autonomy and control as well as exposure to market-like 
competition (Jiang 2012:388). Because these reforms led to increasingly autonomous 
behaviour of regional production units and chaos, the government abandoned them and 
recentralized some of CNPCs authority in 1998, but at the same time undertook a 
restructuring to make the oil companies more competitive as global players: first 
through the creation of two vertically integrated majors, with CNPC and Sinopec 
swapping their upstream-and downstream assets and creating a geographically 
distributed duopoly. And, second, in a further stage of corporatisation, this led to the 
creation of listed subsidiaries, such as PetroChina (Jiang 2012).
77 One concrete point of tension between CNPC and the government in this respect is 
for instance the amount of different crude types CNPC brings back to the domestic 
market, since there is a business incentive for CNPC to sell the lighter and sweeter 
crude abroad for a much higher price and bring the heavier sour crude – that is much 
harder to refine – home (Jiang 2012:404). 
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78 Interview Joe Barnes (Rice University), 26 February 2010, Houston, US. Interview 
with Professor Jonathan Stern (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies), 3 December 2009, 
Oxford, UK. 
79 Interview Barnes, 26 February 2010, Houston, US. Moreover, as Downs argues, since 
the Chinese NOCs are relative newcomers on the international oil scene, they arguably 
need some additional support in order to be able to compete with major oil companies 
that have been operating abroad for about 100 years. Additionally, as she points out, 
while indeed financial state support for Chinese NOCs is disadvantageous to IOCs, it 
has not limited IOCs access to oil reserves to the extent that other governments have 
done: for instance US sanctions on countries such as Iran, Iraq and Libya and resource 
nationalist policies by major producers (Downs 2007a).
80 Interview Barnes, 26 February 2010, Houston, US. 
81 Interview, 26 February 2010, Houston, US. 
82 Interview Steven Lewis (China expert, Rice University), 25 February 2010, Houston, 
US. Interview Professor Weihan Wang (Univeristy of Business and Economics Beijing 
and consultant Chinese oil companies) 26 February 2010, Houston, US. Telephone 
interview, Xiaojie Xu (CNPC consultant), 21 January 2010. 
83 Interview Professor Weihan Wang, 26 February 2010, Houston, US.  
84 Interview, 26 February 2010, Houston, US. 
85 Although there are some bonuses awarded that are based on net profit, return on 
capital and so forth, the largest share of the bonuses is indexed to salaries (Jiang 
2012:397). 
86 Other levers of control by the state that Downs identifies are the investment approval 
system: domestic investments need approval of the State Council, and foreign 
investments formally need the approval of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (and ultimately the State Council for projects in excess of US $200 
million). The latter is recently replaced by the National Energy Administration (see 
Jiang 2012, Downs 2008). The formal line of decision making in the case of CNPC is 
that the central planning bureau of CNPC makes a 5 years plan, with input from the 
regional offices and subsidiaries, this is submitted to State Council and CNPC Board of 
Directors (Jiang 2012:399). Yet, in practice the process is however less centralized and 
more complex. Finally, the party-state has influence over company decisions through 
credit from China’s state-owned banks. 
87 Weiguo Shan CNPC, Director, Petroleum Market Study, email interview, 14 June 
2011. 
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88 Telephone interview, 21 January 2010. 
89 Telephone interview, 13 April 2010. 
90 Telephone interview, 13 April 2010. 
91 Interview, 7 July 2009, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
92 Interview, Postma, 7 July 2009, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
93 Telephone interview, 13 April 2010.  
94 Telephone interview, 11 May, 2010. 
95 Interview, 1 June, 2010, The Hague, Netherlands. 
96 Telephone interview, 13 April 2010.  
97 Also, as pointed out by an Iranian expert of the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), it is not only a matter of preference for statist actors or state ‘confidence’, but 
also which state actor. Telephone Interview, 30 November, 2011.
98 Interview, The Hague, Netherlands, 10 March 2010. 
99 Interview, 4 December 2009, London, UK.  
100 Telephone interview, 22 March 2010. 
101 Interview, The Hague, Netherlands, 10 March 2010, and follow-up email 
conversation 2012. 
102 Interview, The Hague, Netherlands, 10 March 2010. 
103 Interview, Postma, 7 July 2009, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
104 Interview with senior international disputes partner, Texas based international law 
firm, 3 March 2010, Texas, US. 
105 Interview, 3 March 2010, Texas, US. 
106 Interview, 3 March 2010, Texas, US. Note that the names in this quote have been 
changed. 
107 Interview with attorney in international law firm, 3 March 2010, US. 
108 Interview, 3 March 2010, Texas, US. 
109 Interview with senior international disputes partner, Texas based international law 
firm, 3 March 2010, US. 
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110 The composition of this group of investors is 24 percent index funds, 42 percent 
institutional investors, 9 percent SWFs, 25 percent retail investors holding exchange-
traded commodity index products (Stoll and Whaley 2009).
111 The Standard & Poors Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P GSCI) and the Dow 
Jones AIG Commodity Index. 
112 The more conservative assessment of the CFTC  is $ 174 billion in 2008 (Stoll and 
Whaley 2009). 
113 These data come from the annual reports of Schlumberger 2011, Halliburton 2011, 
and Baker Hughes 2011. 
114 Telephone interview, 11 December 2009. 
115 Telephone interview, 11 December 2009. 
116 Interview with international disputes counselor, 3 March 2010, Houston, Texas, US. 
117 Interview, 19 November, 2009, Paris, France. 
118 Interview, 19 November, 2009, Paris, France. 
119 Interview, 19 November, 2009, Paris, France. 
120 Telephone interview, 21 January 2010. 
121 Interview Professor Malcolm Gillis (director Halliburton and Professor of 
Economics, Rice University), 25 February, 2010, Houston, Texas, US. 
122 Interview, 25 March, 2010, London, UK. However, David Woodward (former BP 
executive) highlighted that OPEC could only be expected to have this price stabilising
role as long as they would have surplus capacity, i.e. OPEC surplus exceeding demand, 
Telephone interview Woodward, 13 April 2010. 
123 Telephone interview, John V Mitchell – energy expert at the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs in London, and former BP executive and advisor to the managing 
directors, 8 March 2010. 
124 Telephone interview, 22 March 2010. 
125 Telephone interview, 22 March 2010. 
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APPENDIX A. Full List of Interviewees for this study:1
Name Affiliation Function
Richard H. Jones International Energy 
Agency (IEA)
US Ambassador
U.S. State Department 
Deputy Executive Director
Israel (2005-2008)
Kuwait (2001-2004) Kazakhstan 
(1998-2001)  Lebanon (1996-1998)
U.S. Secretary of State’s Senior 
Advisor and Co-ordinator For Iraq 
Policy (February-August, 2005)
Noé van Hulst International Energy 
Forum (IEF)
Secretary General (2007-2011)
Ian Cronchaw International Energy 
Agency (IEA)
Head of the IEA Energy 
Diversification division (former)
Consultant office of the Chief 
Economist of the IEA (currently)
Xanthe Visram European Round Table 
(ERT)
Coordinator Energy and Climate 
Change Working Group
Tony Meggs British Petroleum (BP) Group Vice President Technology 
(retd. 2008)
Prof. Malcolm 
Gillis
Halliburton
Rice University, Houston
Director
Professor of Economics
David Woodward British Petroleum (BP)
Aabar
Mubadala Development 
Company (Abu Dhabi 
government)  
President BP Azerbaijan (1998-
2006)
Chief Executive Officer (2006-08)
Chief Operating Officer Oil & Gas 
Division (May 2008 – May 2009)
Senior Management Advisor (May 
2009 to present).
1 The affiliations listed here are the most relevant affiliation(s).
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Name Affiliation Function
Geert Greving GasTerra Head Public Affairs and 
Regulations
Paul Fair ExxonMobil Retired
anonymous Shell Global Business Environment
anonymous Shell / Dutch Government Government Relations Advisor
Dr. Carole Nakhle Surrey Energy Economics 
Centre
Energy Economist 
& see bio below*
Dr. Xiaojie Xu  China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC)
Chair Fellow, World 
Energy
Director overseas investments 
(former)
Consultant
Institute of World Economics and 
Politics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (April 2009)
Steven R. Mann ExxonMobil
BTC pipeline project
US Ambassador
Senior Counselor for International 
Affairs
Senior advisor for Caspian Basin 
Energy Diplomacy (May 2001-
2004)
Turkmenistan (1998-2001)
Sir Mark Allen British Petroleum (BP)
British Foreign Service 
Special advisor 
John V. Mitchell Chatham House, Royal 
Institute of International 
Affairs, London
BP 
Associate Fellow, Energy, 
Environment and Resources
Former executive
Anonymous National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC)
Weiguo Shan China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC)
Consultant
Director Market Study
Richard Harvey ExxonMobil Trader (former) 
224
Name Affiliation Function
Bernard Bot Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003-
2005)
Ambassador to the EU (1992-2003)
Peter van Leeuwen Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, 
Baghdad, Iraq
Ambassador (2008-2011)
Jan-Meinte Postma Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs
Energy Envoy (retd. 2010)
Anonymous  International law firm, 
Texas, US
Senior International Disputes 
Partner
Anonymous  International law firm, 
Houston, Texas
International Disputes Counsel
Anonymous  International law firm, 
Houston, Texas
Attorney
Melinda Taylor Law and Energy and 
Environment School 
University of Texas
Director 
Dr. Valérie Marcel Chatham House, Royal 
Institute of International 
Affairs, London
Associate Fellow, Energy, 
Environment and Resources
Prof. Jonathan 
Stern
Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies
Chairman and Senior Research 
Fellow of the Natural Gas 
Programme
Dr.  Kenneth 
Medlock
James Baker Institute, Rice 
University, Houston, 
Texas
James A. Baker, III, and Susan G. 
Baker Fellow in Energy and 
Resource Economics
Dr. Shamil 
Yenikeyeff
Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies
Research Fellow
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Name Affiliation Function
Joe Barnes James Baker Institute, Rice 
University, Houston, 
Texas
U.S. State Department
Bonner Means Baker Fellow
Diplomat (1979 to 1993)
Dr. Steven W. 
Lewis
James Baker Institute, Rice 
University, Houston,  TX
C.V. Starr Transnational China 
Fellow
Prof.  Weihan 
Wang
University of  International 
Business and Economics, 
Beijing
James Baker Institute, Rice 
University, Houston, 
Texas
Professor
Visiting scholar China 
Dr. Duncan Clarke Global Pacific,  Business 
and research consultanty
Director 
*Dr Carole Nakhle is an energy economist, based in London, and specialising in 
international petroleum contractual arrangements and fiscal regimes, world oil and gas 
market developments, and energy policy. She has built a portfolio of activities and 
interests, involving the two main stakeholders in the oil and gas sector – the 
Government and the industry, and academia. She acts as Economic Consultant at the 
Commonwealth Secretariat; is Associate Lecturer in Energy Economics at the 
University of Surrey and acts as Special Parliamentary Advisor in the House of Lords, 
UK. She is also External Expert for the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF. She 
makes regular contribution to the Liechtenstein based Geopolitical Information Service. 
She also acts as visiting lecturer at international institutions such as The Graduate 
School of International and Development Studies in Geneva. From 2005 to 2008, she 
served as Senior Research Fellow in Energy at the University of Surrey and acted as 
Special Parliamentary Adviser on Energy Issues and Middle Eastern Affairs in the 
House of Lords, UK. Between 2009 and 2011, she worked with Statoil then ENI.
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APPENDIX C. Additional Descriptive Data Analyses
Figure 17: Crude Oil Prices, 1950-2010
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
Figure 18: Oil production OECD and non-OECD 1965-2010
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
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Figure 19: Gas production OECD and non-OECD 1970-2010
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
Figure 20: Coal production OECD and non-OECD 1978-2010
Source: Compiled from data provided by BP (2012)
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Figures 21a to 21f: Operational Measures NOCs, Hybrids and IOCs 1987-2006
Source: Wolf (2009b)
Source: Wolf (2009b)
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Source: Wolf (2009b)
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APPENDIX D.  Oil Elites: Additional Data and Overviews
Table 9: Selection Biggest Oil Linkers 2007 (>6 Interlocking Directorates) 
Name director Oil Company Affiliation (main)
Interlocking 
directorates Nationality
Nunn Chevron 13 American
Lippens Total 11 Belgian
Desmarais Total 10 Canadian
Desmarest Total 9 French
Jeancourt-Galignani Total 9 French
Burgmans BP 8 Dutch
Fedorov Gazprom 8 Russian
Morin-Postel Shell 8 French
Denham Chevron 7 American
Henderson Shell 7 American
Lauvergeon Total 7 French
Woicke Saudi Aramco 7 German
Boskin ExxonMobil 6 American
Carroll BP 6 American
Collomb Total 6 French
Jum'ah Saudi Aramco 6 Saudi
Land Shell 6 British
Moody-Stuart Saudi Aramco 6 British
Rice Chevron 6 American
Rudder, de Total 6 Belgian
Sutherland BP 6 Irish
Tchuruk Total 6 French
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Table10: Selected Oil Elites Function Global/Transnational Organisation 2007
Name 
Oil 
Company 
Global or Transnational 
Organization 
Function 
Al-Assaf  
Saudi 
Aramco 
World Bank Group Governor for Saudi Arabia 
    IMF Governor for Saudi Arabia 
Al-Khayyal 
Saudi 
Aramco 
World Economic Forum Participant 
Bernabe PetroChina 
European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT) 
Member 
Collomb Total 
International Accounting 
Standards Foundation (IASF) 
Trustee 
    
European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT) 
Member 
    
Global Business Coalition 
Against HIV / Aids 
Vice Chairman 
Jum'ah 
Saudi 
Aramco 
World Economic Forum - 
International Business Council 
Energy Community Leader 
Moody-
Stuart 
Saudi 
Aramco 
UN Global Compact Foundation Director 
    
Global Business Coalition 
Against HIV / Aids 
Co-Chairman 
    World Economic Forum 
Steering Cmmt Member 
Responsible for Driving 
Global Governance 
    Global Reporting Initiative Director 
O'Reilly Chevron 
World Economic Forum - 
International Business Council 
Director 
Robertson Chevron US-Russia Business Council Director 
    
Global Business Coalition 
Against HIV / Aids 
Director 
    US-Arabian Business Council Director 
Sutherland BP Bilderberg Group Steering Committee 
    
UN Special Representative for 
Migration and Development 
Special Representative 
    European Commission 
Mbr Adv. Group Pres. 
Barrosso energy & climate 
change  
    World Economic Forum Member Foundation Board 
    Trilateral Commission Chairman Europe 
    ERT Vice Chairman 
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Table 11: State Affiliations Oil Elites – incl. Historical Positions
Total State Political Military N
BP 1 1 0 0 1
NIOC 3 3 0 0 3
Exxonmobil 2 2 0 1
PDVSA 6 4 2 0 5
Total 2 2 0 0 2
Royal 
Dutch Shell 2 2 0 0 2
Chevron 20 9 10 1 7
Saudi 
Aramco 22 21 0 1 6
PetroChina 8 5 3 0 7
CNPC 3 1 2 0 2
Gazprom 4 4 0 0 4
Table 12: Examples ‘Revolving Door’ Biographies
IOC Director Selection former positions state and business
Lord Levene 
Director of Total 
(2003-2008)
Lord Mayor of London (1998-1999), Advisor to the Prime 
Minister (1992-1997), Permanent Secretary Chief of Defense 
Procurement (1981-1987), Vice Chairman Deutsche Bank UK 
(1999-2001), Senior Advisor Morgan Stanley (1996-1998), 
Chairman Lloyds (2007-2002) and General Dynamics UK 
(2001-20078), and Director China Construction Bank (2006-
2007)
John Kerr
Director of Royal 
Dutch Shell (since 
2004)
UK Permanent Representative to the EU (1990-1995), British 
Ambassador to the USA (1995-1997), Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Permanent Under Secretary of State 
(1997-2002), Secretary General EU Constitutional Treaty 
Convention (2002-2003), and non-executive director at both Rio 
Tinto plc (2003-2007) and Scottish American Investment 
Company (since 2002).
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Wim Kok 
Director of Royal 
Dutch Shell (2003-
2011) 
Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1994-2002), Minister of 
Finance (1989-1993) Member of the Lower House of Parliament 
and parliamentary leader of the Labour Party (1986-1998), 
Supervisor at Royal Dutch Petroleum (2003-2005) and at KLM, 
TNT and Stork NV
Table 13: Overview State Position of Oil Elites 2007
Oil 
Company
Name State Affiliation
BP
Massey 
Member of President Bush's Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology
CNPC Jiang J. 17th CPC Central Committee - Alternate Member 
CNPC
Li X. 
Yunnan Province - Vice Governor (Since 2002 Assistant 
Governor)
Exxon 
Mobil
Boskin Commerce Department - Advisory Comm National 
Income & Product Accounts Mmbr 
Congressional Budget Office - Panel of Advisors
Gazprom Gref Minister for Economic Development and Trade
Gazprom Khristenko Minister for Industry and Energy
Gazprom Medvedev First Deputy Prime Minister 
Gazprom Yusufov Special Repr of the President for Intern Energy Coop., 
Special Envoy Ministry Foreign Affairs
NIOC
Bakhshian 
Deputy Minister of Human Resources, Ministry of 
Petroleum
NIOC Jashnsaz Deputy Oil Minister
NIOC Nozari Minister of Petroleum (or: Oil Minister)
PDVSA Carreno Minister of Popular Power for Energy and Oil
PDSVA Mendoza General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces; Council of 
Defense Secretary; Dir. Office President
PDVSA Mommer Vice Minister of Hydrocarbons 
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PDVSA Orellana Executive Assistant to the Minister of Popular Power for 
Energy and Oil
Ministry of Popular Power for Energy and Oil; Director 
General of Hydrocarbons  
PDVSA Rodriguez General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces
PetroChina
Gong 
Accountant Standard Committee under Ministry of 
Finance - Member 
PetroChina Jiang F. 17th CPC Central Committee - Alternate Member 
PetroChina
Li  H. 
Tenth Chinese People's Consultative Conference, 
standing member
PetroChina
Li Y. 
Deputy Director Liasion Office of the Central 
Government - Region of Macau
PetroChina
Liu
Subcomm for Economic Affairs of the National Comm of 
the Chinese People- Vc Chair
PetroChina Wu Supreme People's Court of China, Expert consultant
PetroChina Zheng Counselor of the State Council
Royal 
Dutch Shell Kerr 
House of the Lords (UK) Independent Member and EU 
select Committee
Royal 
Dutch Shell
Voser Swiss Federal Auditor Oversight Authority
Saudi 
Aramco 
Al-Assaf Minister of Finance
Higher Advisory Council for Petroleum and Minerals 
Member
Manpower Council – Member
Public Investments Fund – Chairman
The Saudi Fund for Development – Chairman
Civil Service Council – Member
Higher Council for Civil Defence – Member
Supreme Economic Council, Member and Vice 
Chairman of its Standing Committee
General Investment Authority
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Supreme Commision for Tourism - Board member
Council of Civil Service Member
Military Service Council – Member
Higher Commitee for Administrative Reform - Vice 
Chairman
Real Estate Development Fund – Chairman
Pension and Retirement Fund - Chairman
Saudi 
Aramco Al-Naimi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Saudi 
Aramco
Al-
Suwaiyel 
Governor of the Communications and Information 
Technology Commission KACST
President of KACST, holding rank of a Minister from 1 
July, 2007.
Saudi 
Aramco
Al-
Tuwaijiri 
Supreme Economic Council (chaired by King Abdullah) 
- Secretary-General
Saudi 
Aramco
Jum'ah Member Supreme Committee of KACST 
Director Saudi Arabian Supreme Council of Petroleum 
and Mineral Affairs
Total
Desmarais 
Economic Consultative Council Member (directed by 
minister Flaherty)
Total
Levene 
House of Lords Select Committee for Economic Affairs -
member
Sources: Annual Reports of the connected companies, SEC filings, Orbis (Bureau van 
Dijk), Lexis Nexis.
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APPENDIX E.  Partial list of products made from Petroleum (144 of 6000 
items) 
One 42-gallon barrel of oil creates 19.4 gallons of gasoline. The rest (over half) 
is used to make things like:
Solvents Diesel fuel Motor Oil Bearing Grease 
Ink Floor Wax Ballpoint Pens Football Cleats 
Upholstery Sweaters Boats Insecticides 
Bicycle Tires Sports Car Bodies Nail Polish Fishing lures 
Dresses Tires Golf Bags Perfumes 
Cassettes Dishwasher parts Tool Boxes Shoe Polish 
Motorcycle Helmet Caulking Petroleum Jelly Transparent Tape 
CD Player Faucet Washers Antiseptics Clothesline 
Curtains Food Preservatives Basketballs Soap 
Vitamin Capsules Antihistamines Purses Shoes 
Dashboards Cortisone Deodorant Footballs 
Putty Dyes Panty Hose Refrigerant 
Percolators Life Jackets Rubbing Alcohol Linings 
Skis TV Cabinets Shag Rugs Electrician's Tape 
Tool Racks Car Battery Cases Epoxy Paint 
Mops Slacks Insect Repellent Oil Filters 
Umbrellas Yarn Fertilizers Hair Coloring 
Roofing Toilet Seats Fishing Rods Lipstick 
Denture Adhesive Linoleum Ice Cube Trays Synthetic Rubber 
Speakers Plastic Wood Electric Blankets Glycerin 
Tennis Rackets Rubber Cement Fishing Boots Dice 
Nylon Rope Candles Trash Bags House Paint 
Water Pipes Hand Lotion Roller Skates Surf Boards 
Shampoo Wheels Paint Rollers Shower Curtains 
Guitar Strings Luggage Aspirin Safety Glasses 
Antifreeze Football Helmets Awnings Eyeglasses 
Clothes Toothbrushes Ice Chests Footballs 
Combs CD's & DVD's Paint Brushes Detergents 
Vaporizers Balloons Sun Glasses Tents 
Heart Valves Crayons Parachutes Telephones 
Enamel Pillows Dishes Cameras 
Anesthetics Artificial Turf Artificial limbs Bandages 
Dentures Model Cars Folding Doors Hair Curlers 
Cold cream Movie film Soft Contact 
lenses 
Drinking Cups 
Fan Belts Car Enamel Shaving Cream Ammonia 
Refrigerators Golf Balls Toothpaste Gasoline 
Source: Ranken Energy (2012): 
http://www.ranken-energy.com/Products%20from%20Petroleum.htm (20 Dec 2012).
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Naar een Hybride Mondiale Energie Orde - Staatsoliemaatschappijen, 
bedrijfselite-netwerken en bestuur
Inleiding
Energie ligt aan de basis van onze levensstijl. Met name olie vormt nog steeds 
het weefsel van moderne geïndustrialiseerde samenlevingen. Een overgroot deel 
van de producten die wij gebruiken in het dagelijkse leven, van elektronische 
apparaten zoals mobiele telefoons en laptops tot geneesmiddelen, cosmetica en 
zelfs levensmiddelen, bevatten petrochemische producten afgeleid van olie of 
gas. Daarbij zijn fossiele brandstoffen nog steeds onmisbaar in het wereldwijde 
vervoer van deze producten en van mensen. Olie is daarbij ook een ‘strategisch 
goed’: het is van cruciaal belang voor staten zowel vanwege de macro-
economische impact als de nauwe verbondenheid met nationale veiligheid en 
defensie. Daarnaast hebben vraagstukken over de huidige fossiele energie orde 
uiteraard een belangrijke ecologische dimensie. Tot slot gaat er in de olie-
industrie veel kapitaal om dat zich grotendeels concentreert binnen een toplaag 
van bedrijven en bestuurders. Inzichten in wie de leiders in deze industrie zijn, 
hoe er bestuurd wordt en waarom zijn dus van groot belang.
Sinds de eeuwwisseling is de mondiale energie orde, de politieke en 
economische organisatie van de energiesector, aan een ingrijpende 
transformatie onderhevig. Deze transformatie wordt gekenmerkt door onder 
andere de wereldwijde expansie van niet-Westerse staatsoliemaatschappijen, 
een heropleving van zogenaamd ‘resource nationalism’ (grondstoffen-
nationalisme) in belangrijke producerende regio's, een uitzonderlijk hoge 
olieprijs en een groeiend bewustzijn over de dramatische gevolgen van de 
klimaatverandering. Recent heeft ook de mogelijkheid van winning van 
schaliegas op grote commerciële schaal de energiewereld op zijn kop gezet. Het 
meest ingrijpende aspect van deze transformatie is echter de snelle economische 
ontwikkeling van een aantal landen buiten de OESO wereld. OESO staat voor 
Organisatie van Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling, een overwegend 
Westerse organisatie die zich inzet voor de bevordering van de markteconomie 
en liberale democratieën. De opkomst van deze nieuwe groeipolen leidt tot 
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bredere transformatie binnen de mondiale politieke economie en betekent een 
drastische herschikking van de geografische patronen van energieproductie en -
consumptie. 
Deze studie draagt bij aan de groeiende hoeveelheid onderzoek over de 
opkomst van deze nieuwe niet-Westerse spelers door zich te richten op een 
analyse van de expansie van niet-Westerse staatsoliemaatschappijen en hun 
impact op de bestaande zakelijke en institutionele machtsverhoudingen binnen 
de mondiale energie orde. Daarbij richt ik mij met name op de impact die dit 
heeft gehad op bedrijfsnetwerken en elitenetwerken in de top van de olie en gas 
industrie. Daarnaast is onderzocht in welke mate en op welke manier de 
opkomst van deze staatsoliemaatschappijen, de zogenaamde National Oil 
Companies (hierna NOC's), het bestuur van de energiesector hebben beïnvloed, 
oftewel: de regels van het spel.  De opkomst en wereldwijde expansie van de 
NOC's heeft recentelijk geleid tot een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid literatuur en 
‘case studies’ die zich met name richten op (vergelijkende) vragen naar de 
efficiëntie en strategieën van deze bedrijven ten opzichte van elkaar en van 
private oliemaatschappijen (de zogenaamde International Oil Companies, hierna 
IOCs). Verrassend weinig aandacht is gericht op de vraag hoe de expansie van 
NOC’s de bestaande (machts)verhoudingen en gevestigde belangen binnen de 
energie-industrie heeft beïnvloedt. Deze studie – die geplaatst kan worden in de 
traditie van power structure research - draagt bij aan de bestaande literatuur 
door meer inzicht te geven in de veranderingen van de machtsstructuren aan de 
top van de olie- en gasindustrie, als gevolg van de opkomst van deze nieuwe 
niet-Westerse spelers.
Theorie, Methode en Structuur
Dit onderzoek bevat ook een theoretische puzzel binnen het gebied van de 
Internationale Politieke Economie. De mondiale expansie van staatsbedrijven en 
staatskapitaal wijzen op een toename van macht en invloed van de staat. Dit 
druist in tegen een aanname in de literatuur die lange tijd dominant was; 
namelijk dat transnationalisering (een trend die vaak wordt toegeschreven aan 
globalisering en verwijst naar relaties en processen die de nationale grenzen 
overstijgen en ook niet-statelijke actoren omvat) een onomkeerbare afname van 
de macht van de staat teweeg zou brengen. Dat blijkt niet het geval, zoals ook in 
deze studie wordt aangetoond. In tegendeel: sinds het begin van dit millennium 
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is er in de mondiale energie orde sprake van een opleving van staatsmacht en 
een versterking van de staatsgrenzen. Tegelijkertijd heeft het hernieuwde belang 
van de rol van de staat en van staatskapitaal niet geleid tot een beperking van de 
transnationalisering en financialisering van de mondiale politieke economie. De 
paradox die uit mijn onderzoek naar voren komt is dat deze 'opleving van de 
staat' zich voltrekt naast een voortgaande verdieping en uitbreiding van 
transnationale processen en betrekkingen. In dit proefschrift heb ik deze 
tegenstrijdigheid verklaard door een kritische politiek-economische benadering 
te hanteren. Met behulp van deze benadering heb ik verklaard hoe globalisering 
- en dus transnationalisering - voor een groot deel gedreven wordt door de 
expansie van het kapitaal en hoe zowel de geografische als de staatsrechterlijke 
grenzen van de staat cruciaal zijn voor kapitaalexpansie. In dit verband heb ik 
het concept sovereign social space geïntroduceerd om te illustreren dat de 
soevereiniteit van staten zowel een geografische dimensie als een gerechtelijke 
(en dus sociaal geconstitueerde) dimensie omvat. De dialectiek tussen kapitaal 
expansie en haar behoefte aan de grenzen die geboden worden door deze 
sovereign social spaces, verklaart de parallelle - ogenschijnlijk tegenstrijdige -
tendensen van transnationalisatie enerzijds en een voortdurende herformulering 
van staatsmacht aan de andere kant.
In de hoofdstukken die volgen op het theoretische raamwerk wordt 
aangetoond hoe deze tegenstrijdige tendensen zich manifesteren in de mondiale 
energie orde. Als achtergrond wordt in een historisch hoofdstuk de 
ontwikkeling van de olie- en gassector sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
geschetst. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook een globaal overzicht gegeven van de 
geografische verschuiving van de mondiale energieproductie- en consumptie in 
de afgelopen decennia, alsmede van de verschuivingen in de zakelijke top van 
de mondiale energiesector. Het empirische hart van dit proefschrift is een 
analyse van de expansie van een selectie van ’s werelds grootste 
staatsoliemaatschappijen (NOCs) in de periode 1997-2007, en de wijze waarop 
dit de machtsstructuur, geoperationaliseerd als bedrijfs- en elitenetwerken, aan 
de top van de olie-en gasindustrie heeft beïnvloed. Ten eerste, door middel van 
een analyse van de veranderingen die hebben plaatsgevonden in de mondiale 
bedrijfsnetwerken van deze niet-Westerse NOCs. Ten tweede, door een analyse 
van de elitenetwerken van de bestuurders van deze bedrijven. Hierbij worden 
ook de elitenetwerken van de bestuursleden van ’s werelds grootste Westerse 
private oliemaatschappijen (IOCs) betrokken om te beoordelen in hoeverre de 
uitbreiding van de NOC's heeft geleid tot de integratie van hun bestuurders in de 
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gevestigde bedrijfs-elitenetwerken van het Westen. Het derde deel van het 
proefschrift behandelt de wijze waarop de ‘regels van het spel’ zijn veranderd in 
het licht van de expansie van niet-Westerse NOC’s. Drie aspecten worden hier 
geanalyseerd: een ‘verstatelijking’ van het bestuur van de energie relaties, de 
‘vermarkting’ en de financialisering van de energie sector en een analyse van 
veranderingen in het institutionele landschap van mondiaal energie-bestuur.
In de netwerkanalyses van dit proefschrift combineer ik een methode 
die ik 'organisatorische en biografische mapping' heb genoemd, met de methode 
van Social Network Analysis (SNA). SNA maakt visualisatie en analyse van de 
relaties tussen actoren mogelijk en helpt de patronen in deze sociale structuren 
in kaart te brengen. Ter aanvulling van de patronen die door de netwerkanalyses 
naar voren kwamen werden voor deze studie drieëndertig elite-interviews 
afgenomen met bestuurders en medewerkers van oliemaatschappijen, 
bestuurders van beleidsplanning-organisaties, diplomaten en deskundigen. Deze 
interviews werden getranscribeerd, geanalyseerd door middel van een 
thematische structurering en aangevuld met secundaire bronnen. Hoewel deze 
interview gegevens in de hele thesis gebruikt worden, spelen ze de meest 
prominente rol in het laatste empirische deel van deze studie.
Centrale Bevindingen
De belangrijkste bevindingen van de netwerkanalyses zijn dat  er sinds  1997 
een significante mondiale expansie heeft plaatsgevonden van ‘s werelds 
grootste niet-Westerse NOCs. Deze uitbreiding wordt echter niet gekenmerkt 
door een eenvoudige overname van NOC's ten koste van IOC’s, maar vond 
plaats door middel van toenemende samenwerking van niet-Westerse NOCs met 
zowel private oliemaatschappijen als andere staatsoliemaatschappijen. De 
mondiale expansie van de niet-Westerse NOC’s heeft dus geleid tot een meer 
transnationaal mondiaal energienetwerk, gekenmerkt door een toename van 
meer hybride allianties waarin private ondernemingen en staatsbedrijven 
samenwerken. Een heel ander beeld kwam echter naar voren uit de analyse van 
wat ik de ‘olie-elite netwerken’ noem. Niet-westerse bestuurders van NOCs 
bleken nauwelijks geïntegreerd  in de sociale netwerken van de bestuurders van 
's werelds grootste private oliemaatschappijen. Overeenkomstig bestaand 
onderzoek waren de Westerse bestuurders verbonden door zowel nationale als 
transnationale bedrijfsnetwerken door middel van ‘interlocking directorates’ 
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(het bekleden van meerdere gelijktijdige bestuursfuncties) en door hun relaties 
met belangrijke beleidsplanning organisaties. Het verrassende resultaat van deze 
studie is dat de niet-Westerse olie-elite zich niet volgens deze gekende patronen 
organiseert, ondanks het feit dat de bedrijven die ze besturen zich steeds meer 
mengen in de Westerse netwerken.  Wat ook naar voren kwam uit deze 
systematische ‘mappings’ is de directe en hechte relatie van veel niet-Westerse 
olie-elites met de overheid van hun land, waar ze vaak uitvoerende functies op 
hoog niveau bekleden. Deze bevinding - hoewel wellicht weinig verrassend -
benadrukt de verschillen tussen niet-Westerse en Westerse olie-elites; de 
laatstgenoemden hebben een meer indirecte en adviserende relatie tot de 
overheid, vaak gekenmerkt door de zogeheten ‘revolving door’ (het afwisselen 
van functies in het bedrijfsleven met posities binnen de overheid).
Ook in het derde empirische deel van de studie worden twee 
verschillende en schijnbaar tegenstrijdige tendensen blootgelegd. Enerzijds gaan 
niet-westerse NOCs - als gevolg van hun expansie en transnationalisering –
steeds meer lijken op IOCs: ze worden concurrenten van de IOCs, maar worden 
tegelijkertijd ook geconfronteerd met vergelijkbare uitdagingen en moeten in 
toenemende mate voldoen aan de regels van het spel zoals gedicteerd door het 
Westerse kapitalisme en haar protagonisten. Anderszijds is er een ontwikkeling 
gaande die misschien het best kan worden aangeduid als een toenemende 
‘verstatelijking’ van het bestuur van energie-relaties.  Dit uit zich bijvoorbeeld 
in de voorkeur van niet-Westerse NOC's (met name wanneer zij omvangrijke 
energiebronnen bezitten) voor ‘state-to-state’ onderhandelingen en dwingt 
zowel IOCs als overheden om hun strategieën aan te passen. Voor de IOCs 
betekent dit dat ze nauwere samenwerking moeten aangaan met staatsbedrijven 
en voor overheden betekent het dat ze strategische en bilaterale betrekkingen op 
energiegebied moeten gaan ontwikkelen. Wat ook naar voren kwam uit het 
onderzoek was dat de samenwerking met IOCs voor veel niet-Westerse NOCs 
een middel is om vaardigheden te verwerven die hen in staat stellen om 
uiteindelijk minder afhankelijk van de IOCs  te worden, in het bijzonder met 
betrekking tot kennis van technologie en project management. Tot slot bevestigt 
deze studie dat mondiaal energie-bestuur nog steeds sterk gericht is op de 
belangen van de Westerse mogendheden en bedrijven en dat dus de veranderde 
verhoudingen, waarbij niet-Westerse landen zijn uitgegroeid tot 's werelds 
grootste producenten en consumenten van energie, hier nog niet voldoende 
weerspiegeld worden.
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Implicaties van het onderzoek
Samengevat tonen de bevindingen van deze studie aan dat de expansie van de 
niet-Westerse staatsoliemaatschappijen, sinds 1997, tot een meer hybride 
mondiale energie orde heeft geleid. Bedrijfsnetwerken aan de top van de 
industrie zijn in toenemende mate getransnationaliseeerd en gehybridiseerd.
Echter, de olie-elite is nog steeds georganiseerd in gescheiden netwerken 
waarbij de niet-Westerse nieuwkomers (nog) weinig toegang hebben tot de 
bedrijfselite-netwerken die kenmerkend zijn voor het Westerse bedrijfsleven. 
Dit vraagt om vervolgonderzoek naar de alternatieve organisatie van niet-
Westerse bedrijfs-elite netwerken. Met betrekking tot ‘de regels van het spel’ 
heeft de opkomst en expansie van de niet-Westerse NOCs niet automatisch 
geleid tot hun ‘empowerment’, zoals vaak wordt beweerd. Het lijkt erop dat de 
expansie voor een groot deel afhankelijk is geweest van hun vermogen om het 
spel te spelen volgens de regels zoals deze gedefinieerd zijn door Westerse 
(zakelijke en politieke) belangen en normen. Tijdens dit aanpassingsproces 
vindt een socialisatie proces plaats waarin de huidige regels – en de ideeën en 
waarden die hieraan ten grondslag liggen - gedeeltelijk geïnternaliseerd raken. 
Dit zal weerspiegeld worden op het moment dat de nieuwe spelers regelmakers 
worden.
Het blijft een open vraag wanneer het omslagpunt bereikt zal worden 
waarop niet-Westerse spelers daadwerkelijk de regels (mede) gaan bepalen. Dat 
er zo'n moment komt, lijkt duidelijk, gezien de gestage groei en uitbreiding van 
een aantal van de grotere spelers, met name China.  Wat deze studie aantoont is 
dat dit echter niet zal leiden tot een radicale breuk met de bestaande 
bestuursvormen, maar tot een meer hybride vorm van bestuur zal leiden waarin 
elementen van de huidige regels worden gecombineerd met de waarden en 
belangen van niet-Westerse mogendheden.
